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Abstract
RFID is a leading technology that has been rapidly deployed in several
daily life applications such as payment, access control, ticketing, e-passport,
supply-chain, etc. An RFID tag is an electronic label that can be attached
to an object/individual in order to identify or track the object/individual
through radio waves. Security and privacy are two major concerns in several
applications as the tags are required to provide a proof of identity. The RFID
tags are generally not tamper-resistant against strong adversarial attacks.
They also have limited computational resources. Therefore, the design of
a privacy preserving and cost-effective RFID authentication protocol is a
very challenging task for industrial applications. Moreover, RFID systems
are also vulnerable to relay attacks (i.e., mafia, terrorist and distance frauds)
when they are used for authentication purposes. Distance bounding protocols
are particularly designed as a countermeasure against these attacks. These
protocols aim to ensure that the tags are in a bounded area by measuring
the round-trip delays during a rapid challenge-response exchange of short
authentication messages. Several RFID distance bounding protocols have
been proposed recently in the literature. However, none of them provides
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the ideal security against the terrorist fraud. Besides, the requirements of
low resources and inefficient data management trigger to make use of cloud
computing technology in RFID authentication systems. However, as more
and more information on individuals and companies is placed in the cloud,
concerns about data safety and privacy raise. Therefore, while integrating
cloud services into RFID authentication systems, the privacy of tag owner
against the cloud must also be taken into account.
Motivated by this need, this dissertation contributes to the design of al-
gorithms and protocols aimed at dealing with the issues explained above.
First of all, we introduce two privacy models for RFID authentication pro-
tocols based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF). We propose several
authentication protocols in order to demonstrate these models. Moreover,
we study distance bounding protocols having bit-wise fast phases and no
final signature. We give analysis for the optimal security limits of the dis-
tance bounding protocols. Furthermore, we propose a novel RFID distance
bounding protocol based on PUFs and it satisfies the highest security levels.
Finally, we provide a new security and privacy model for integrating cloud
computing into RFID systems. For the sake of demonstration of this model,
we also propose two RFID authentication protocols that require various com-
putational resources and provide different privacy levels.
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RFID SI˙STEMLERI˙NDE GU¨VENLI˙K VE MAHREMI˙YET
Su¨leyman Kardas¸
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mu¨hendislig˘i
Doktora Tezi, 2014
Tez Danıs¸manı: Doc¸ent Dr. Albert Levi
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: RFID, Gu¨venlik, Mahremiyet, Mesafe Sınırlama
Problemi, Fiziksel Klonlanamayan Fonksiyonlar
O¨zet
Radyo Frekanslı Kimlik Tanımlama (RFID) teknolojisi, son zamanlarda
gu¨nlu¨k hayatımızdaki bir c¸ok uygulamalarda kullanılmaktadır. O¨zellikle
pasaportlarda, o¨deme sistemlerinde, giris¸/c¸ıkıs¸ kontrollerinde, tedarik zin-
cirinde vb. uygulamalarda kullanılmaktadır. RFID etiketleri nesne veya
canlılar u¨zerinde yerles¸tirilen bir c¸ip olup radyo frekansı aracılıg˘ı ile kim-
lik tanımlamaya ve takip edilmeye olanak sag˘lar. Kimlik dog˘rulama gerek-
tiren uygulamalarda gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet iki o¨nemli sorundur. O¨te yan-
dan, RFID etiketleri gu¨c¸lu¨ fiziksel saldırılara kars¸ı dayanıklı deg˘ildirler ve
sınırlı hesaplama kaynaklarına sahiptirler. Bu nedenle, endu¨striyel uygu-
lamalar ic¸in mahremiyet odaklı, gu¨venli ve maliyet etkin bir dog˘rulama
mekanizması tasarlarmak c¸ok zor bir is¸tir. Ayrıca, RFID sistemleri kimlik
dog˘rulama amac¸lı kullanıldıg˘ında aktarma saldırılarına ( yani mafya, tero¨rist
ve dolandırıcılık saldırıları) ac¸ıktır. Mesafe sınırlama protokollerı o¨zellikle bu
saldırılara kars¸ı bir o¨nlem olarak tasarlanmıs¸tır. Bu protokollerde, etiketler
ile okuyucu arasında hızlı bir sorgu/cevap is¸leminde mesajların gidis¸-do¨nu¨s¸
gecikme su¨releri o¨lc¸u¨lerek etiketlerin dar ve sınırlı bir alan ic¸erisinde kimlik
dog˘rulama yapmaları hedeflenmektedir. Son zamanlarda, literatu¨rde bir c¸ok
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RFID mesafe sınırlayıcı protokolleri sunuldu, ancak bunların hic¸biri tero¨rist
dolandırıcılıg˘a kars¸ı ideal bir gu¨venlik c¸o¨zu¨mu¨ sunmamaktadır.
O¨te yandan, okuyucu ve sunucu tarafında kaynakların yetersiz olması du-
rumunda gu¨venli ve verimli bir kimlik dog˘rulama protokolu¨nu¨ tasarımı ins¸a
etmek zorlas¸maktadır. Bulut bilis¸im bu soruna etkili bir c¸o¨zu¨m sag˘lamak
ic¸in umut verici bir teknoloji olarak kars¸ımıza c¸ıkmaktadır. Bulut bilis¸imde
birey ve s¸irketler hakkında belge ve doku¨manların sayısı arttıkc¸a ve bu bilgi-
lerin bulut bilis¸imde korunması gereklilig˘i endis¸elerini arttırmaktadır. RFID
kimlik dog˘rulama sistemleri ic¸ine bulut hizmetlerini entegre ederken, bulut
bilis¸ime kars¸ı RFID etiket sahibinin mahremiyetinin korunması da dikkate
alınmalıdır .
Bu motivasyonla, bu doktora tezi, yukarıda belirtilen problemlere c¸o¨zu¨m
olmak amacı ile gu¨venli ve mahremiyet odaklı RFID protokollerin tasarımlarına
katkıda bulunmaktadır. O¨ncelikle, Klonlanamayan fonksiyonlara (PUF) dayalı
iki farklı RFID mahremiyet modeli o¨nerildi. Modellerin uygulanabilirlig˘i
ic¸in c¸es¸itli kimlik dog˘rulama protokolleri o¨nerildi. Ayrıca, mesafe sınırlama
protokolleri u¨zerinde katkılar yapıldı. PUF fonksiyonlar kullanılarak yeni
bir RFID mesafe sınırlayıcı protokolu¨ o¨nerildi ve bu protokol ile en yu¨ksek
gu¨venlik seviyelerinin nasıl sag˘landıg˘ı go¨sterildi. Son olarak, RFID sistemleri
ic¸ine bulut bilis¸im teknolojilerinin entegre edilmesi ic¸in yeni bir gu¨venlik ve
mahremiyet modeli tanımlandı ve bu modelin pratikte uygulanabilir oldug˘unu
go¨stermek ic¸in iki farklı protokol o¨nerildi.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter firstly presents the motivations for the challenges that are faced
in RFID systems. Then, the structure and organization of the dissertation
are outlined. Finally, it briefly discusses our contributions for handling these
challenges.
1.1 Motivations
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology has received increasing
attention as an emerging solution for remotely identifying and/or authenti-
cating objects or individuals with the help of RFID tags. A typical RFID
system generally consists of tags, i.e., a microcircuit with an antenna, readers,
which allow to remotely query the tags, and a back-end server that manages
all the information related to each tag. In simplest terms, the working princi-
ple of an RFID system is that a tag transfers its coded data when queried by
a reader. The reader conveys the packets collected from the tag to back-end
server in order to perform the identification and/or authentication process.
Recently, RFID technology has been rapidly deployed in several daily-
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life applications such as payment, access control, ticketing, e-passport, etc.
The communication between tags and readers runs on an insecure wireless
channel. The security and privacy are definitely two critical concerns in
those applications since the tags are generally required to provide a proof of
identity in most applications. The most conspicuous privacy risk is tracking
of the tag owner. In this case, the tracker can obtain and abuse tag owners’
profile. Therefore, an RFID system should provide confidentiality of the tag
identity along with privacy of the tag owner.
Mitigating these problems requires researchers to design identification
and authentication protocols that include cryptographic mechanisms. On
the other hand, most of RFID tags have limited memory and computational
capability; therefore, the existing privacy-preserving mechanisms, which re-
quire high computational costs, are not applicable to many restricted RFID
systems. Furthermore, most of RFID tags are not tamper resistant against
strong adversarial attacks. Namely, physical attacks on tag’s chip allow the
adversary to learn the secrets stored in the tag. Thus, the design of a privacy
preserving and cost-effective RFID authentication protocol is a challenging
task. To fulfill these needs, several authentication mechanisms have been
proposed in the literature [1–17].
Moreover, having a security and privacy model for RFID systems is es-
sential for making formal security analysis of RFID authentication protocols.
A large number of frameworks have been proposed to formalize security and
privacy in the context of RFID system [18–27]. The shortcomings of these
frameworks are addressed in [28].
Furthermore, typical RFID systems are also vulnerable to relay attacks
when they are used for authentication purposes. Distance bounding pro-
tocols are particularly designed as a countermeasure against relay attacks.
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These protocols aim to ensure that the tags are in a bounded area by mea-
suring the round-trip delays during a rapid challenge-response exchange of
short authentication messages. Several RFID distance bounding protocols
have been proposed in the literature. However, none of them provides ideal
security against the terrorist fraud, who collaborates with the tag’s owner.
On the one hand, in some applications multiple tag reading points may
be required to track the products throughout the workplace. For scalability
reasons, in some systems, multiple databases can be established which is
costly and it is difficult to merge them in-house. Moreover, such systems
may have synchronization and data consistency problems if managed poorly.
Furthermore, in order to make use of the benefits of RFID, retailers will need
to upgrade their IT infrastructure in a number of areas, and their interfaces
with other businesses should be closer. Outsourcing background systems and
database management to the cloud is a promising alternative to the these
issues. However, the verification of tagged items by RFID systems provides
full traceability from sender (e.g. manufacturer) to receiver by maintaining
a single database placed in a cloud computing. This provides assurance that
a product has been shipped and delivered. However, as more and more
information on individuals and companies are placed in the cloud, safety and
privacy of the cloud environment become an important issue. Therefore, the
integration of cloud computing into RFID systems requires the privacy of the
tag owner against the cloud to be taken into account.
1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of the dissertation are given as follows:
1. In Chapter 3, we give our first contributions to the RFID privacy-
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preserved authentication protocols based on Physically Unclonable Func-
tions. In this chapter, we study the common assumption of PUFs that
their physical structure is destroyed once tampered. This assumption
works only in the ideal case because the tamper-resistance depends on
the ability of the attacker and the quality of the PUF circuits. We have
weaken this assumption by introducing a new definition k-resistant
PUFs. k-PUFs are tamper-resistant against at most k attacks, i.e.,
their physical structure remains still functional and correct until at
most kth physical attack. Furthermore, we prove that strong privacy
can be achieved without public-key cryptography using k-PUF based
authentication. We finally prove that our extended proposal achieves
both reader authentication and k-strong privacy. The results presented
in Chapter 3 have been accepted in [29].
2. In Chapter 4, we first revisit Vaudenay’s model [18], extend it by con-
sidering oﬄine RFID system and introduce the notion of compromised
reader attacks. Then, we propose an efficient RFID mutual authenti-
cation protocol for oﬄine RFID system. Our protocol is based on the
use of PUFs. We prove that our protocol provides destructive privacy
for tag owner even against reader attacks. The results presented in
Chapter 4 have been published in [30].
3. In Chapter 5, we formally analyze a recent RFID authentication pro-
tocol [31] and proved that it provides destructive privacy according to
Vaudenay privacy model [18]. Then, we propose a unilateral authen-
tication protocol and prove that our protocol satisfies higher privacy
level such as narrow strong privacy. Moreover, we provide an enhanced
version of the protocol, which has the same privacy level as the protocol
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of [31], but has also reader authentication against stronger adversaries.
Furthermore, the enhanced version of our protocol uses smaller number
of cryptographic operations when compared to [31]’s protocol. It is also
cost efficient at the server and tag side and requires O(1) complexity
to identify an RFID tag. The results presented in Chapter 5 have been
published in [32,33].
4. In Chapter 6, we introduce the notion of k -previous challenge depen-
dent (k -PCD) distance bounding protocols, in which each response bit
depends on the current and the k previous challenges. We then ana-
lyze k -PCD distance bounding protocols and show the success proba-
bilities against mafia and distance fraud attacks. We present a simple
approach to construct k-PCD protocols with only two registers. The
results presented in Chapter 6 have been published in [34] and have
been submitted to a Journal [35].
5. In Chapter 7, we first introduce a strong adversary model for PUF
based authentication protocol in which the adversary has access to
volatile memory of the tag. We show that the security of Sadeghi et
al.’s PUF based authentication protocol is not secure according to this
model. We provide a new technique to improve the security of their pro-
tocol. More specifically, in our scheme, even if an adversary has access
to volatile memory, she cannot obtain all long term keys to clone the
tag. Next, we propose a novel RFID distance bounding protocol based
on PUFs, which satisfies the expected security requirements. Compar-
ing to the previous protocols, the use of PUFs in our protocol enhances
the system in terms of security, privacy and tag computational over-
head. We also prove that our extended protocol with a final signature
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provides ideal security against all those frauds, remarkably the terrorist
fraud. Besides, our protocols enjoy the attractive properties of PUFs.
The results presented in Chapter 7 was published in [1].
6. In Chapter 8, we first provide a new security and privacy model for
RFID systems that utilize the cloud computing. In this context, we
first define the capabilities of the adversary and give the privacy defini-
tions. Then, we present two cloud-based RFID authentication protocols
in order to illustrate our model. The first one is based on symmetric
cryptography and the other one is based on elliptic-curve cryptography.
According to our model, we prove that the former protocol achieves
destructive privacy and the latter one provides narrow-strong privacy.
The cloud is assumed to be honest-but-curious; therefore, tag related
data are stored in an encrypted form in the cloud. In order for re-
trieving tag data without violating privacy of the tag owner, we also
propose a private and efficient single keyword search scheme. We prove
that our search scheme satisfies data, query and result pattern privacy.
The results presented in Chapter 8 have been published in [36] and
submitted to a Journal [37].
1.3 Thesis Outline
The organization of the dissertation is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 pro-
vides an overview of RFID systems and describes the security and privacy
challenges that the RFID technology should address. It also gives the cryp-
tographic background. Chapter 3 introduces privacy models for RFID au-
thentication protocols based on the use of Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUFs). Chapter 4 gives our contributions to the oﬄine RFID system. Chap-
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ter 5 introduces our proposed RFID authentication protocol and gives its for-
mal security and privacy analysis. Chapter 6 explores k-previous challenge
dependent (k-PCD) distance bounding protocols, in which each response bit
depends on the current and the k previous challenges. Chapter 7 proposes
a new PUF based RFID distance bounding protocol and shows the use of
PUF enhancements. Chapter 8 presents our contributions to the RFID sys-
tems where cloud services are integrated. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes our
contributions.
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Chapter 2
OVERVIEW OF RFID
SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we first give a brief explanation of a typical RFID system.
Then, we classify RFID systems into two models that differ in terms of
connectivity of RFID readers to the back-end server. After that, we explain
the security and privacy needs in RFID systems. Finally, the related work
on RFID systems is given.
2.1 RFID Systems
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology is getting pervasively de-
ployed in many daily life applications ranging from inventory management to
anti-counterfeiting protection. A typical RFID system consists of three com-
ponents that actively or passively interact with each other (see Figure 2.1).
The first component of the system is a group known as tags or labels. Most
of the tags contain a tiny integrated microcircuit, of a few millimeters on the
side, for storing and calculating information, modulating and demodulating
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Figure 2.1: A typical RFID system
a radio-frequency (RF) signal and an antenna for receiving and transmitting
the signal. There are three types of tags; (i) passive, (ii) active and (iii)
battery assisted passive tags. The passive tags have no internal power source
and need an external signal to be invoked. They are being energized and
activated by radio waves from an outside source. They represent the most
commonly used tag class in RFID applications. Active tags contain a power
source (i.e. a battery) and can actively generate and send signal to a reader
for communication. The last tag family (battery assisted passive tags) contain
a low power source but these kinds of tags still need a wake up signal as
passive tags do. They use the battery for only computation inside the chip.
The wireless channel between a tag and a reader can use spectrum in the
Low Frequency (LF) range (124 to 135 KHz), High Frequency (HF) range
(13.56 MHz) or Ultra High Frequency (UHF) range (868, 915, 950 MHz).
Thus, direct contact between a reader and a tag is not required. According
to the frequency specification, some of them can be queried from several
meters. The tagged object does not need to be in the line of sight, but earlier
technologies such as the bar-code and smart cards do. This is a significant
difference between RFID and the earlier technologies.
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Some of the most popular daily life RFID applications are given as follows.
• Tracking persons and animals.
• Access control and management.
• Toll collection.
• Contact-less payment.
• Tracking of books in library.
• Machine readable travel documents.
• Tracking of goods in supply-chain management.
The second component is a group known as readers or interrogators.
RFID readers are commonly composed of an RF module, a control unit,
and a coupling element to interact with the tags by means of RF communi-
cation [38]. The readers consign the packets collected from the tags to the
back-end server in order to perform the identification and/or authentication
process. Readers have no physical and computational restriction and they
can be mobile or fixed.
The last component is the back-end system, which can be centralized or
distributed. It stores all tags’ information and readers’ information in its own
database. It is also the synchronization point for all the other components
and all initialization routines take place. Moreover, in RFID areas, the back-
end system is generally assumed to be secure against all kind of attacks.
2.2 RFID Models
An RFID system can be classified into two models in terms of the commu-
nication between a back-end server and readers. First one is referred to as
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central database model but throughout the dissertation it is called as online
model. The latter is referred to oﬄine model.
2.2.1 Online Model
In the online model, the back-end system contains all the tag-related infor-
mation. The readers are assumed to be always connected to the back-end
system. Although it is between the tags and the back-end system, the main
duty of the reader is to query the tag and to return the response of the tags
to the back-end system without knowing the content of the tag reply. It
does not contain any tag specific information such as keys, IDs, counters,
etc. A good example is a building access system where the users have their
own cards to be used as keys in order to enter rooms or to access different
facilities. The major shortcoming with the online model is that the readers
must have a live secure connection to the database of the central server.
2.2.2 Oﬄine Model
RFID technology is getting more popular in large-scale applications espe-
cially in mobile environments, such as ticketing system for mass transporta-
tion and sport events. These applications work with oﬄine RFID system
which requires three components: RFID tags, readers and server. Tags are
inherently mobile but they are not tamper resistant against any physical
attack. Considering mobile hand-held devices, the readers are regarded as
mobile and they are synchronizations of the database of the readers, and
firmware updates. Although the reader in this model is oﬄine during most
of its life cycle, it still should be able to identify and authenticate the tags all
the time. Such need requires the readers to have a higher resources and com-
putational capacity compared to the online model. For instance, the ticket
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intermittently connected to the central server only during verifier of a flying
agent in the site of a sport event is connected to the server only when the
agent is back to the headquarter. Therefore, the readers should be able to
authenticate the customers [39] when the server is oﬄine.
Besides, since the hand-held reader is mobile, the loss or the theft of
a hand-held reader is a typical case of a threat for oﬄine system. Since
the privacy-preserving authentication protocols for identifying the tags are
run by oﬄine reader, there is no practical solution to renovate the privacy
as soon as the readers are compromised by a malicious adversary. However,
renewing all the tag information, which is impractical, can defeat this threat.
The server hosts a centralized back-end system and manages data about the
tickets and customers. Since the oﬄine reader is not always connected to
server, the detection of fraud (for example, the multiple use of tickets) is
very difficult. Moreover, the firmware software or the configuration data
of the reader are uploaded to the reader only at an inspection done by a
maintenance personnel.
To exemplify the fear of compromise reader attacks in oﬄine infrastruc-
tures, we consider a real-life RFID ticketing system deployed by RFIDea dur-
ing a 3-day automobile race in 2009 [40]. This case study has been analyzed
in [41]. In this deployment, several mobile readers and more than 100000
tags for tickets are used in order to reduce queues in the event and curtailing
fraud. The system setup procedure works as follows. The mobile readers
are first setup by the administrator and then given to the agents in the field
until the end of the event. The mobile readers store the tags’ secret keys
in their database which are used for authentication and identification of all
spectators’ and employees’ badges. The agents are not mobile, whereas spec-
tators and employees are. Thus the oﬄine RFID system can easily manage
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the mobility of all the participants during the event. In this event, contrary
to the expectations of the event organizer, some of the readers were stolen.
With these readers, the participants are traced which violates the privacy.
This showed that compromise of a reader attack can really happen.
2.3 Security and Privacy Threats and Cryp-
tographic Background
As deployment of RFID in the world increases, potential security and privacy
risks that they bring forward also increase. There are a variety of security
threats in RFID systems. Since some of these security and privacy threats are
mentioned by popular media, mass civic movements are formed against the
use of RFID at different parts of the world. Several companies are taken to
court as a result of using RFID tags in their products [42]. If precautions are
not taken, mass utilization of RFID tagged items creates an approaching and
potentially widespread threat to consumer privacy. To eliminate concerns of
the public and to prevent possible future security and privacy problems, it
is necessary to increase security and privacy level of RFID systems. Some of
the possible security and privacy threats are discussed in this section.
2.3.1 Security Threats
An RFID system is perpetually under the threat ofman-in-the-middle attacks
ensuing from eavesdropping the communication between reader and tag. An
adversary may monitor the messages during transmission and use or modify
some parts of the messages. Then it can retransmit the messages maliciously
to query the tag or the back-end server so as to impersonate the valid tag or
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the valid reader. Another important attack is replay attack in which a valid
message in the previous transmission is fraudulently used in another session.
In an RFID scheme, if server has to authenticate a tag as well as to identify
it, the scheme must prevent the replay attacks. One way of preventing this
is the use of fresh random challenges in the hash calculations [43] or ran-
domizing the responses. Moreover, an adversary can use a faulty/noisy tag
or a jammer to cause tag/reader confusion during an authentication session
and losing synchronization. Such an attack is called desynchronization at-
tack. For instance, suppose a tag updates its shared secret values while the
server does not; in such a case, the server is no longer able to authenticate
the tags [6].
On the other hand, the tags, which are used in daily life applications, are
expected to be low-cost and this restriction yields tag to have limited memory
capacity and computational ability. Their memory is also considered as not
tamper-resistant.
Furthermore, RFID authentication protocols are vulnerable to relay at-
tacks, in which an attacker defeats the authentication system by only relaying
messages from one legitimate party to another legal party (generally a prover
and a verifier).
The seminal works of Desmedt et al. [44] and Beth et al. [45] on mafia
and terrorist frauds demonstrated how an adversary can defeat such pro-
tocols by simply relaying the messages without dealing with cryptography.
The concept of relay attack was originally proposed by Conway using a sce-
nario called ”‘Chess Grandmaster Problem”’ in 1976 [46]. In this scenario,
a little girl plays remotely in parallel two correspondence games against two
chess grandmasters. By only relaying the moves of the grandmasters she
finally either defeats one of the grandmasters or draws against both. Also,
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those kinds of attacks have been practically demonstrated in many different
contexts and especially in RFID systems [47–51].
According to the capabilities of the adversary, relay attacks are simply
classified as mafia, distance and terrorist fraud attacks [52]. Based on the au-
thentication protocols that include challenge-response messages, mafia fraud
scenario (see Figure 2.2) can be defined as follows. An adversary pretending
to be a legitimate prover (or tag) first gets the challenge from the verifier (or
reader) and relays it to the legitimate prover which is out of neighborhood
(authentication region) at the beginning of the attack. After that she gets
the valid response for this challenge and forwards it to the reader as her
answer. Mafia fraud attack demonstrations and constructive considerations
are addressed in [47,49,53]. The formal definition of the mafia fraud is given
as follows.
Definition 1. Mafia fraud [52]. A mafia fraud is an attack where an adver-
sary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
between the reader and an honest tag located outside the neighborhood.
R
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Figure 2.2: Mafia fraud scenario
Another type of attack is terrorist fraud in which the legitimate prover
collaborates with an adversary in order to authenticate her when the former
is out of the authentication region. In this attack, it is assumed that prover
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helps the adversary without revealing any information of the long-term secret
key. The formal definition of the fraud is given as follows.
Definition 2. Terrorist fraud [52]. A terrorist fraud is an attack where
an adversary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle
(MITM) between the reader and a dishonest tag located outside of the neigh-
borhood, such that the latter actively helps the adversary to maximize her
attack success probability, without giving to her any advantage for future at-
tacks.
The example of home confinement can be given as an instance of the
terrorist attack [52]. In this example, the arrested offender could get a help
from his/her friends who stay close to electronically monitoring system. In
such a condition, a terrorist fraud is needed because the ankle bracelet cannot
be physically removed except by the authorities.
Legal 
Authentication
Region
Reader TagR
C
Figure 2.3: Distance fraud scenario
Similar to mafia fraud, there is also another attack called distance fraud
(Figure 2.3). The distance fraud is an adversary that has an ability to reach
secret key (e.g., a dishonest legitimate tag owner) to convince the verifier that
she is within the neighborhood whereas she is not. Home confinement based
on electronic monitoring with ankle bracelets is a typical example where
distance fraud is definitely relevant. This fraud would allow the person under
monitoring to temporary leave his residence without being detected.
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2.3.2 Privacy Threats
An RFID tag may contain information about a person, item or product.
Whenever a legitimate reader interrogates a tag, the tag sends its computed
response to the reader. The communication between a tag and a reader
could be eavesdropped by an adversary. Since RFID systems use shared un-
protected radio medium, this makes such an attack more practical. The data
obtained by the adversary can be misused in order to violate the anonymity
of tag owners. These collected data might be valuable to some companies
for marketing research or even thieves in search of wealthy victims [54]. This
threat is classified as tag information privacy violation. This threat could be
eliminated by controlling RFID systems so that only the authorized readers
are able to access the information associated with a tag [6]. A further privacy
concern is the possibility of tracking the tag. If the responses of a tag are
correlated, then an adversary can record the responses obtained from readers
at different locations. With this information, she can track the movement of
the tag. In order to avoid this threat, the responses from the tags have to be
anonymous.
Apart from these vulnerabilities, a strong adversary could tamper a tag
and reach its long term secrets. After the tampering, the privacy for the
previous responses of the tag could be questioned. Therefore, the schemes
that are used for authentication/identification should satisfy security and
privacy not only against passive attacks, replay attacks and cloning attacks,
but also against strong adversaries.
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2.3.3 Cryptographic Background
For a set S of any cardinality, s ∈R S means s is chosen uniformly random
among all elements of S. y ∈ {0, 1}α means y is any natural number such
that y’s bit length is at most α. For the case, α = ∗, there is no restriction on
bit length of y, i.e. y can be any natural number. A mapping X : {0, 1}α →
{0, 1}β means that X maps elements from {0, 1}α to {0, 1}β. Namely, the
domain of X is {0, 1}α and the range of X is {0, 1}β. Let C be any algorithm,
then C(a) = b means, on input a, the algorithm C has b as output value.
Let E be some event , then Prob(E) denotes the probability that the event
E happens. Moreover, MSBa{k} denotes most significant a bits of binary
representation of k.
2.3.3.1 Hash Function
The definition of the hash functions used throughout the dissertation is given
as follows.
Definition 3. Hash Function. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter such that
γ ∈ N is polynomially bounded by k. Define hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}2γ. Then H has the following properties:
• For any given input m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the time required to calculate H(m)
is polynomially bounded.
• Hash functions are pre-image resistant. That means, for any c ∈
{0, 1}2γ, it is infeasible to find m ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that H(m) = c.
• It is infeasible to find two different inputs giving the same output.
• Any probabilistic polynomial time adversary can distinguish between
output of a H and random value with at most negligible probability.
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We treat hash functions as random oracles. Namely, the function H
responds to every query with a truly random response chosen uniformly from
{0, 1}α. The function always gives the same response for a given input word.
2.3.3.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Points on an elliptic curve are represented by capital letters while scalars
are represented by lower-case letters. Let E be an elliptic curve with prime
order p over Fp, then for a point Q = qx, qy with qx, qy ∈ [0, . . . , p − 1],
xcoord(Q) maps Q to qx mod ℓ. We define xcoord(O) = 0, where O is the
point at infinity. Note that the xcoord(.) function is the ECDSA conversion
function that comes almost for free when using elliptic curves [22,55]. In this
dissertation, we also use the similar hash functions defined in Section 8.3.
The security of our some proposals in the thesis depends on the hardness of
solving discrete logarithm in elliptic cryptography and the formal definition
of this problem is given as follows.
Definition 4. ECC Discrete Logarithm Problem. Let P be a generator
of a group Gℓ of order ℓ and let A be a given arbitrary element of Gℓ The
discrete logarithm (DL) problem is to find the unique integer a ∈ Zℓ such
that A = aP .
The difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problem in ECC is stated in
the following remark.
Remark 1. It is computationally hard to solve the Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem for Elliptic Curves Cryptography. In fact the expected complexity to solve
this problem is eO(max(log(q),n
√
log(q))), where the field that we work is Fqn with
25n ≤ q or q = 2 and n4 ≤ q.
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2.4 Literature on Security and Privacy in RFID
Systems
Throughout the dissertation, in some of the authentication proposals, Physi-
cally Unclonable Function (PUF) is used to enhance security. In this context,
we first provide definition of PUF and the related work on it. Then, we give
related work on the solution of relay attacks. After that, we present the liter-
ature on the solution of privacy-preserving authentication solutions. Finally,
we provide Vaudenay’s privacy model, which is used as a basis in some of
the chapters.
2.4.1 Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a disordered physical structure
implementing a unique function that maps challenges to responses. These
responses depend on the nano-scale structural disorder of the PUF that is
assumed to be unclonable or not even reproducible by the PUF’s manufac-
turer. Namely, the PUF functions are embodied in a physical structure in
a complex way upon several physical properties that the manufacturers can-
not control, and they are easy to be computed, but difficult to be predicted,
characterize and model the mappings.
The first attempt to exploit the physical properties of the devices for au-
thentication purposes were done in [56–58]. Naccache and Fremanteau [59]
later proposed an authentication mechanism for memory cards which uses
these physical properties. The concept of PUFs is first introduced by Pappu [60,
61]. Their PUF functions were based on an optical principle of operation.
In these PUFs, transparent tokens include randomly distributed scattering
particles and are illuminated by a laser light with a specific angle, distance
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and wavelength. The resulted speckle patterns from multiple scattering of
laser in an incoherent optical medium are used for unique and unpredictable
identifier. The challenge of the PUF can be the angle of incidence, the local
distance or the wavelength of the laser. The responses can be hash value of
digitized image of the speckle pattern. Afterward, several papers considered
various hardware structures of PUF [62–65].
Besides, for a given challenge c, a typical PUF P may produce a slightly
different response r (r ← P (c)) because the response depends on the phys-
ical characteristics that could be affected by environmental noises such as
temperature, light and supply voltage variations. This obstacle can be elim-
inated by a small circuit, called Fuzzy Extractor and with additional helper
input w [66, 67]. Moreover, even though two PUFs are implemented on the
same device with the same structure, they both give independent responses
with overwhelming probability for the same given challenges. Armknecht et
al. proposed a formal foundation for such security primitives based on PUFs
in [68].
The usage of PUFs in the authentication mechanisms has led to an in-
crease in the security of existing RFID systems. They provide a new way
for cost-efficient privacy preserving authentications based on the unclonable
physical properties. In [62], it is shown that how PUFs can be used to es-
tablish a shared secret with a specific physical device. Namely, PUFs are
embedded into a microchip. The first attempts to embody PUF functions
into RFID authentication protocols are done in [69, 70]. In these studies, a
set of challenge/response is derived from the PUF for each tag. The chal-
lenge/response pairs are stored in a secure database. The RFID reader selects
a random challenge from the database and broadcasts it to the environment.
Then, the received responses of the tags are interpreted by simply looking up
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the database. The main obstacle of the scheme is that the challenge cannot
be used anymore since it results in replay attacks. Another obstacle is storing
huge amount of challenge/response in the database.
Tuyls et al. [71] used PUF functions as secure key derivation mechanism
since PUF behaves like a hidden pseudo-random functions. Whenever a key
hidden by PUF is needed during an authentication, it is simply derived by
evaluating the PUF on the chip. Tuyls et al. assumed that as the adversary
tries to evaluate a PUF or an IC, for instance, by using the probes to measure
the wire delays, the characteristics of that particular PUF are changed. Thus,
the intrinsic structure of the PUFs yields resistance against tampering and
this reduces the capability of an adversary to clone an RFID tag. Moreover,
they also demonstrated that PUF circuit can be easily implemented on RFID
chips with less than 1000 gates [71].
In [72], another way of using PUF within a privacy-preserving RFID
authentication scheme was proposed. In this scheme, for each ID of tag, the
database of the reader stores the vector {ID, P (ID), P 2(ID), . . . , P t(ID)}
where t is the limit for authenticating a tag. Whenever the reader interrogates
a tag, the tag evaluates its PUF with its identifier ID. The response is sent to
the reader and the tag updates its ID with this response. The reader simply
looks up the database, identifies the tag and removes the used response from
the database. The main bottleneck of this protocol is that the system should
store a huge amount of data for a large t. It also suffers from Denial of
Service(DOS) attacks as the tag must be re-initialized after at most t sessions.
Sadeghi et al. [3] proposed a destructive private RFID authentication
protocol based on PUF, which is similar to PUF functions of [71]. Whenever
a strong adversary performs a physical attack, such as side channel on PUFs
of RFID tags, these PUF functions are destroyed and cannot be evaluated
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anymore. Moreover, several new authentication mechanisms based on PUF
functions have been recently proposed in order to enhance their security and
privacy levels [73–77].
2.4.2 Distance Bounding Protocols
In order to mitigate the frauds defined in Section 2.3, two main countermea-
sures have been adopted in RFID authentication protocols. The first one is
based on measuring the radio signal strength (RSS) so that the verifier can
learn whether the prover is close to it. This method has a drawback that a
capable adversary can regulate its signal strength to convince the verifier that
it is close to the verifier [78]. The second one is distance bounding approach
suggested by Desmedt et al. [44,45]. This approach is a breakthrough to mit-
igate relay attacks by measuring the round trip time of short authenticated
messages.
Brands and Chaum introduced the first distance bounding protocol [79].
This protocol aims to bring a solution to mafia and distance frauds. It
consists of three phases, a slow phase, followed by a fast phase and a final
signature phase. The first slow phase is used to exchange the committed
random bits. The proximity verification is achieved by a bit-wise challenge-
response during the second phase (i.e., fast phase), namely after series of n
rounds where n is a security parameter. For each round of the fast phase,
the verifier measures the round-trip time in order to extract the propagation
time. Finally, the prover sends a final signature to the verifier and opens
the commitments to complete the protocol. The success probability of mafia
and distance frauds for this protocol are (1/2)n, but it is not secure against
terrorist fraud.
Cˇapkun et al. modified the Brands and Chaum’s protocol to achieve mu-
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tual authentication with distance-bounding [80]. However, their protocol is
also vulnerable to terrorist fraud and is not resilient to bit errors during the
rapid bit exchange.
Hancke and Kuhn proposed the first lightweight distance bounding proto-
col for RFID systems [78]. The major difference from Brands and Chaum’s
protocol is that it does not involve a final signature phase. This protocol
involves a common secret symmetric-key k between a prover and a verifier.
This protocol can be briefly described as follows. The verifier first generates
a nonce Nv and sends it to the prover. Similarly, the prover also generates
a nonce Np and sends it to the verifier. Two n-bit registers R
1, R2 are com-
puted such that R1‖R2 = f(k,Nv, Np) where f is a public pseudo-random
function. After that, n-round fast phase starts. For each i-th round, the ver-
ifier picks a random challenge-bit ci and sends it to the prover. The prover
replies with a response-bit ri such that
ri =

 R
0
i ifci = 0
R1i ifci = 1

 .
The success probabilities of the mafia fraud and distance fraud are both
equal to (3/4)n [34,78]. These studies triggered other researchers and several
distance bounding protocols that use round trip time method have been
proposed to increase security conditions against relay attacks [1, 53, 80–97].
One of the main obstacles of the existing distance bounding protocols is
achieving the ideal security level (i.e., (1/2)n where n is a security parameter)
against all frauds. However, achieving the ideal security against terrorist
fraud is a very challenging task. Some attempts to thwart terrorist fraud [82]
yield a more serious security problem; namely, the key recovery attack. This
attack occurs due to the misuse of long-term key in the protocols [92].
24
On the other hand, Avoine et al. [52] introduced a unified framework for
improving the analysis and the design of distance bounding protocols. The
black-box and the white-box security models are introduced in the distance
bounding domain, and the relation between the frauds are described with
respect to these models. In the white-box model, the prover can provide
more information to the adversary since the prover can access the internal
key. We note that the security level of an RFID authentication in white-box
model is generally lower than the security level in the black-box model.
2.4.3 Privacy-Preserving RFID Authentication Proto-
cols
Mitigating the problems discussed in Section 2.3 requires the researchers
to design identification/authentication protocols that include cryptographic
mechanisms. On the other hand, most of RFID tags have limited mem-
ory and computational capability; therefore, the existing privacy-preserving
mechanisms, which require high computational costs, are not applicable to
many restricted RFID systems. Furthermore, most of RFID tags are not
tamper resistant against strong adversarial attacks. Namely, physical at-
tacks on tag’s chip allow the adversary to learn the secrets stored in the
tag. Thus, the design of a privacy preserving and cost-efficient RFID au-
thentication protocol is very challenging task. To fulfill these needs, several
authentication mechanisms have been proposed in the literature [1–7,17].
The design of a privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocol is very
difficult without a suitable security and privacy model. A large number of
privacy models have been proposed to formalize security and privacy in the
context of RFID system [18–27]. Vaudenay’s model [18] is one of the most
evolved and well defined privacy model. Moreover, Paise et al. [98] extended
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Vaudenay’s privacy model (PV-model). The model additionally offers reader
authentication. Later, Armknecht et al. [99] showed that it is impossible
to achieve both reader authentication and any reasonable notion of RFID
privacy in the PV-Model, in which the target tags are vulnerable to corrup-
tion. On the other hand, Habibi and Araf [100] claimed that the privacy
definition and adversary goal presented by Armknecht et al. is completely
different from the PV-Model and the highest achievable privacy level in the
Armknecht et al.’s privacy model is narrow weak privacy. The shortcomings
of all recent privacy models are addressed in [28].
2.4.4 Vaudenay’s Privacy Model
Throughout the dissertation, we use Vaudenay’s privacy model [18] as a
baseline during the security analysis of the proposals. Next, we first define the
system procedures, adversary oracles and privacy experiments following the
standard definitions of [18] for an RFID system. For the sake of simplicity, the
reader and the server are assumed to be a single entity which are connected
through a secure channel.
2.4.4.1 System Procedure
An RFID scheme is defined by the following procedures.
• SetupReader(1ℓ) : This algorithm first produces a public-private
key pair (KP , KS) where ℓ is the security parameter, then initializes its
database DB.
• SetupTagKP (ID): This algorithm generates a tag secret K and the
initial state S of a tag with identifier ID. If this tag is legitimate, the
pair (ID,K) is inserted into the database.
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• Ident: An interaction protocol between a tag and the reader to com-
plete the authentication transcript.
2.4.4.2 Adversary Oracles
An adversary A can interact with the RFID system by the help of following
generic oracles. First of all, A setups a new tag of identifier IDT .
• CreateTag(IDT ) : It creates a free tag T with a unique identifier
IDT by using SetupTagKp . It also inserts T into DB.
• Launch()→ π : It makes the reader R start a new Ident protocol
transcript π.
• SendReader(m,π)→ m′ : This sends the message m to the reader R
in the protocol transcript π and outputs the response m′.
• SendTag(m,π)→ m′ : This sends the message m to T and outputs
the response m′. Also, A asks for the reader’s result of the protocol
transcript π.
• DrawTag(distr)→(T1, b1, . . . , Ts, bs) : It randomly selects s free tags
among all existing ones with distribution probability of distr. The
oracle assigns a new pseudonym, Ti for each tag and changes their
status to drawn. This oracle also returns bit bi of tag i whether it is
legitimate or not. The relations (Ti,IDTi) are stored in a hidden table
Tab. This hidden table is not seen by the adversary until the last step
of the privacy game. Finally, the oracle returns all the generated tags
in any order.
• Free(T ) : This oracle changes status of tag T from drawn to free.
After that, A does no longer interact with T .
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• Corrupt(vtag)→ S : It returns volatile and non-volatile memory of
the tag.
• Result(π)→ x : When π completes, returns x = 1 if the tag is iden-
tified, x = 0 otherwise.
2.4.4.3 Privacy Classes
Vaudenay’s privacy model introduces five privacy classes of polynomial-time
bounded adversary, determined by A’s access to Result or Corrupt ora-
cles. These classes are defined as follows.
Definition 5. (Adversary Classes [18]) An adversary A is a p.p.t. algo-
rithm which has arbitrary number of accesses to the oracles described-above.
Weak A uses all oracles except Corrupt oracle. Forward A can only use
Corrupt oracle after her first call to this oracle. Destructive A cannot
use any oracle against a tag after using Corrupt oracle. Strong A uses
all oracles described-above without any restrictions. Finally, Narrow A has
no access to Result oracle.
It is clearly seen that the following relation holds for these classes: Weak⊆
Forward⊆ Destructive ⊆Strong.
Figure 2.4: The adversary classes (⇒: means that it implies.)
Strong ⇒ Destructive ⇒ Weak
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Narrow Strong ⇒ Narrow Destructive ⇒ Narrow Weak
2.4.4.4 Notion of Security and Privacy
The security definition given by Vaudenay’s privacy model considers attacks
in which the adversary aims to impersonate or forge a legitimate tag but not
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security against cloning and availability.
Definition 6. (Tag Authentication [18].) An RFID system achieves tag
authentication if for every adversary, AP , where P is a class of adversary
defined in Definition 5, is at most negligible.
The privacy definition of Vaudenay is flexible and depends on the ad-
versary classes in Definition 5, so it covers different notion of privacy. The
privacy is simply based on the existence of a blinder B, which is able to
simulate each tag T , and the reader R without knowing their secrets such
that the adversary cannot distinguish whether it interacts with the real or
simulated oracles. In the privacy game of Vaudenay’s model, the participat-
ing entities are a set of tags, a protocol transcript π, and the reader. The
adversary can interact with tags and with the reader by calling any oracle
polynomial-bounded number of times according to her privacy class. The
definition of the blinder is described as follows.
Definition 7. (Blinder, trivial adversary [18]). A blinder B is a simula-
tor which simulates Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result ora-
cles without having access to the real secret keys and the database. When a
blinded adversary AB uses these oracles, she is answered through the blinder
B. An adversary A is trivial if there exists a blinded adversary AB such that
Prob[A wins]− Prob[AB wins] is at most negligible.
Remark 2. The blinder B can simulate any tag or reader without knowing
the secrets of corresponding tag or reader. Moreover, although there is no
interaction between B and A, the blinder B can see inputs and corresponding
outputs of oracles applied by A. Furthermore, the blinder B is consistent and
acts like a real reader in a way that if a protocol transcript’s inputs are derived
as a result of usage of oracles to B, the answer given by B to the Result
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oracle on this protocol transcript is 1. If all inputs of a protocol transcript are
not derived as a result of usage of oracles to B, then the answer given by B
to the Result oracle on this protocol transcript depends on the appearance
probability of missing inputs on protocol transcript. Besides, B holds all its
answers to the oracles used by A in its database and answers the new oracles
depending on its database.
We now explicitly describe Vaudenay’s privacy game by the following
experiment Expprv−bAprv :
Let ℓ be a given security parameter, b ∈R {0, 1} and Aprv be an adver-
sary given in Definition 5. There are two phases in the experiment: learn-
ing phase and challenge phase. In the learning phase, R is first set with
(skR, pkR,DB) ←SetupReader(1ℓ). Both Aprv and B also get the public
key pkR. Then, Aprv arbitrarily inquires all oracles defined in Section 2.4.4.2
but is limited to use the oracles according to her privacy class (See Defini-
tion 5). Whenever b = 0, Aprv simply calls real oracles. However, when b = 1,
B receives and answers all queries to Launch, SendReader, SendTag,
and Result oracles. At this moment, B sees all oracles that are simulated
by B, but are made by Aprv (B sees what Aprv sees). These steps are done
polynomial number of times. In the challenge phase, Aprv can no longer
interact with the oracles but the hidden table Tab of DrawTag oracle is
revealed to her. Finally, Aprv is expected to return an answer bit b′, which
is denoted by Expprv−bAprv = b
′. The formal definition of privacy is given as
follows.
Definition 8. (Privacy [18]). Let C be an adversary class defined as in
Definition 5. An RFID system is C-private if ∀Aprv ∈ C, there exists a
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p.p.t. algorithm B such that the advantage
AdvprvAprv = |Pr[Expprv−0Aprv = 1]− Pr[Expprv−1Aprv = 1]|
of Aprv is at most negligible. B is the blinder, which simulates the Launch,
SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles without having access to skR
and DB. Also, all oracles done by Aprv are sent to B
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Chapter 3
K-STRONG PRIVACY FOR
RFID AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOLS BASED ON
PUFS
In the scope of this chapter, we first address the following privacy issue,
which is not covered in Vaudenay’s privacy model. Assume that a number of
physical attacks (say k) are done on a target tag, after kth corruption the tag
is no longer usable. During the period of k corruptions, the adversary can
interact with the tags and still get its internal state correctly. In Vaudenay’s
model, privacy in such scenario is not taken into account. This is the starting
point of our work, in which we define the security and privacy levels between
weak privacy and strong privacy.
The strongest achievable notion of privacy in Vaudenay’s model, which
is strong privacy, entails expensive public-key cryptography. This require-
ment generally exceeds the computational capabilities of current cost-efficient
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RFID tags. In order to achieve the highest privacy level using only low cost
cryptography, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been studied.
In the literature, several PUF-based authentication protocols have been pro-
posed [3, 71, 101]. The security of these protocols relies on tamper-resistant
structure of PUF devices which assumes that an attempt to measure physical
parameters of PUF will definitely make it unusable. This assumption works
only in ideal world whereas in the real case the PUF devices may be usable
up to a number of physical attacks. If a PUF device is usable after the first
successful physical attack, the security of such devices would be question-
able. Therefore, it is not simple to decide whether the security of the system
should rely on the protocol or on the tamper resistance of the device. Indeed,
ultimate care is required for designing privacy-preserving protocols that the
security relies on the tamper resistance of a device. We study these types of
PUFs and introduce a new PUF definition, k-resistant PUF, which provides
resistance against physical attacks at most k times where the integer value
of k depends on the capability of adversary and manufacturing quality of
PUFs. We show that the use of k-PUF helps to resolve the above-mentioned
privacy issues in Vaudenay’s model, the use of k-PUF helps to resolve the
privacy issues mentioned above.
Our contributions are multiple. We first revisit Vaudenay’s model and
introduce two new privacy notions, k-strong privacy and k-forward privacy.
Namely, we group all privacy classes of Vaudenay’s model into two generic
privacy classes. With this methodology, we construct a new privacy class
between strong and destructive privacy.
In order to achieve highest security levels with only low-cost primitives,
we study Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We note that the security
of the system relies on the assumption that physically tampering a PUF will
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immediately destroy its physical structure and making it unusable. This is,
actually, an assumption commonly used in the literature. However, in the
real world, this assumption is not always correct because tamper resistance
depends on the ability of the attacker and the quality of the manufacture
and the design of the PUF circuit. The circuit may not be destroyed until
some number of physical attacks (say k). Moreover, the structure of the
PUF might be destroyed when unexpected environmental changes such as
voltage, temperature changes occur and this destruction makes the PUF
unreliable [102]. Therefore, we introduce a new extended PUF definition
what we called k-resistant PUF (k-PUF). These PUFs are resistant against
at most k number of physical attacks. After the k-th attack, the structure
of the k-PUF is destroyed and can no longer be evaluated correctly. Also, k-
PUF functions are more reliable against the k number of unexpected changes.
To illustrate our new privacy model, we analyzed two recent PUF based
authentication protocols and show their security and privacy levels in our
model [1, 3]. We show that these protocols do not achieve k-strong privacy
for k > 1.
Next, we propose an efficient unilateral RFID authentication protocol
based on k-PUFs. We prove that our protocol achieves k-strong privacy with
low-cost cryptographic primitives such as hash functions and PUFs. When
we choose k to be zero, 0-strong privacy implies weak privacy in Vaudenay’s
model, and when k is infinite, ∞-strong privacy implies strong privacy in
Vaudenay’s model. Therefore, to the best our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to achieve strong privacy of Vaudenay’s model only using symmetric
cryptographic primitives.
Finally, we adapt and extend our generic authentication protocol to a
mutual authentication. We prove that this extended protocol achieves both
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k-strong privacy and reader authentication.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 gives the motiva-
tion behind this study and formulate the problem statement. In Section 3.2,
we first briefly describe PUF functions and its characteristics. Then we dis-
cuss the problem on the common PUF assumption and give our new PUF
definition. Section 3.3 introduces our extended privacy model. Section 3.4
introduces two recent PUF based RFID protocols and analyze their security
and privacy levels. In Section 3.4, we propose a simple generic PUF based
RFID authentication protocol and analyze it with the help of our model. In
Section 3.6, we prove that it is possible to provide both k-strong privacy and
reader authentication in an RFID scheme. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
The results presented in Chapter 3 have been accepted in [29].
3.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Vaudenay defines several adversary classes which cover almost all of the pri-
vacy levels in his seminal work [18]. Nevertheless, the following privacy issues
are not considered in the model. Suppose that an adversary corrupts a target
tag k times where k is an integer. During (and after) these attacks, the tag is
still functional and the adversary can still interact with it and the privacy of
the tag is satisfied. However, after the k+1-th corruption, the privacy of the
tag is not satisfied. The security and privacy of this scenario is not addressed
in Vaudenay’s model. Note that when k goes to infinity, if the privacy of the
tag is ensured against such an attack, then the strong privacy of Vaudenay’s
model is achieved. If k is equal to 1 and the privacy is still ensured, then
the destructive privacy of Vaudenay’s model is achieved. Similarly, if k is
equal to 0, the weak privacy of Vaudenay’s model is achieved. However, the
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privacy levels are not defined in Vaudenays model in case of k ≥ 2. This is
the starting point of our work, in which we define the security and privacy
levels between weak privacy and strong privacy notions for the first time in
the literature.
We would like to highlight that the strong privacy of Vaudenay’s model
requires expensive public key cryptography. The driving motive behind this
chapter is achieving security levels of k ≥ 1 using only low cost primitives.
In this context, we have studied PUF functions and the common assumption
on the PUFs. Then, we defined a new generic PUF function, which we call
k-PUF. With this new k-PUF function, we show that the security levels
described above can be achieved.
Now, let us look at the assumption. A large body of literature dedicated
to PUFs assumes that any attempt to tampering the PUF circuit in order to
observe its internal states will most likely alter these variables or even destroy
the structure of the circuit [64, 71, 101, 103–105]. Here, most likely means
that in practice some circuits may stay working as usual after a number of
physical attacks. In fact, it depends on the manufacturing structure of the
circuit and the ability of the attacker. Therefore, it is a strong assumption
to postulate that any PUF circuit will destroy after a single attack. In what
follows, we examine this problem and give a more general statement for
realistic circumstances by weakening this assumption.
Let p be the destruction probability of a given PUF after a single physical
attack. The value of p depends on the attacker’s capability and chip’s level
of strength against the physical attacks. The PUF circuit is assumed to be
destructed if p ≥ Pdest where Pdest denotes a threshold value. If p ≥ Pdest
after the first corruption then the circuit fulfills the best tamper-resistance
property which corresponds to the ideal PUF case. More generally, let P (X =
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i) denote the event of tag’s evaluating not correctly after i-th corruption, then
the probability of tag’s not evaluating correctly at most k physical attack is
k∑
i=1
P (X = i) = p
k−1∑
i=0
(1− p)i = 1− (1− p)k
where k ≥ 1, k ∈ Z. Thus, the tag cannot evaluate correctly if the condition
below is satisfied
1− (1− p)k ≥ Pdest ⇒ k ≥ ln (1− Pdest)
ln (1− p) .
Note that the basic case of k = 1 corresponds to the ideal PUF. In the
next section, we generalize the definition of ideal PUF by extending it to
a more realistic sense by allowing limited number of attempts to tamper
without destruction (up to a level of k).
3.2 Our New PUF Definition: k-PUF
In this chapter, we introduce a new PUF function definition (k-PUFs) that
are resistant to at most k number of physical attacks. Contrary to the PUF
of [1,3,71], after the kth physical attack on the chip, the PUF inside the tag
cannot be evaluated anymore because the structure of the PUF is destroyed
with overwhelming probability. Similar to [1], we also assume that an adver-
sary can reach to volatile and non-volatile memory of the tag in the case of
physical attacks. The formal definition of our PUF is given as follows.
Let us denote s ∈R S for choosing a value s uniformly at random from
the set S. y ∈ {0, 1}α means y is any natural number such that y’s bit length
is at most α. For the case α = ∗, there is no restriction on bit length of y,
37
i.e., y can be any natural number.
A mapping f : {0, 1}α → {0, 1}β means that f maps elements from
{0, 1}α to {0, 1}β. Pr(E) denotes the probability of event E occurring.
MSBa{k} denotes the most significant a bits of binary representation of
k.
We are now ready to present our new definition of PUF as follows:
Definition 9. (k-resistant PUF (k-PUF)) Let κ ∈ N be a security parameter
such that β, θ ∈ N are polynomially bounded in κ. Define an evaluation
function of k-resistant PUF (k-PUF) Pk : {0, 1}β → {0, 1}θ. Then, Pk has
the following properties:
• Same inputs always give same output result, i.e, let Pk(a1) = b1 and
Pk(a2) = b2, if a1 = a2 then Pr(b1 = b2) = 1.
• Any probabilistic polynomial time adversary has at most negligible suc-
cess probability to distinguish between output of Pk and a random value.
• k-PUF is resistant against any physical attack at most k times (e.g.,
invasive attack). Namely, Pk cannot be evaluated correctly anymore
after k physical attacks.
3.2.1 Practicality of k-PUF
In this section, we are going to provide some intuition about how to create
a k-PUF structure. The coating PUF modeled by Tuyls et al. in [104] has a
self destructing capability control where an invasive attack would probably
cause to destroy PUF structure. This control detects the attack whenever
the level of noise caused by the attack in the output of the PUF exceeds
some threshold; so, if not detected, the PUF will not be destructed. This
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makes coating PUF non-ideal in real life. If the PUF is destroyed after the
first attack, this PUF could be considered as a natural example of k-PUF
where k = 1. Our construction of k-PUF is inspired by the above-mentioned
observation on [104] is described as follows.
The coating PUF can be built as top layer of an Integrated Circuit (IC)
by applying circuit paths and laid out in a comb shape. These paths will
be encased by a material that is randomly doped with dielectric particles
of different size and dielectric strength. Each pair of circuit paths forms a
capacitor with random capacitance, which again is unlikely to be controllable
by the manufacturer. Random capacitor allows PUF to give a response with
noise for a given challenge. In order to clean the noise from the response
(i.e., error correction), helper data algorithm/fuzzy extractor is used for the
reconstruction of secret keys [66,67]. Tuyls et al. [102,104] show that coating
PUFs are resistant to an adversary who has the following optical and invasive
methods.
• Optical inspection equipment to look into memory cells.
• Etching methods (e.g. chemical) to remove protective layers.
• Focused Ion Beam (FIB) to make holes in protective layers and allow
for probing (of e.g. memory).
Since the coating is opaque, it is not so possible to look into the digital
memory optically without damaging the coating [104]. Tuyls et al. [104]
presented an advanced attack on the coating PUF where an adversary uses
FIB to make an hole in the coating. The adversary uses her micro-probe(s)
to retrieve the key bits during the reconstruction phase of the key. The use of
FIB and micro-probes might give damage on the PUF. This damage causes
the extracted key bits with more noise. It is stated that during reconstruction
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phase, the extracted keys are checked with a signature. If the level of the
noise is very high, then the computed signature would not be valid and the
PUF would be destroyed by the controller. However, the adversary gets key
bits with some noise during the attack. For example, if the PUF produces
key length of 128-bits then the attacker can recover the complete bits with
251 trials (we refer to [104] for further details.). We highlight that the level
of noise in the PUF response is not only affected by the physical attacks
but also affected by the unexpected significant environmental changes such
as temperature, voltage changes. Thus, this environmental situation makes
PUF unreliable.
The proposed k-PUF design is described as follows. We employ an addi-
tional counter, which is initialized to zero in the PUF control. The counter
enables the PUF to limit the number of invasive attacks applied to the cir-
cuit. For example, a similar attack described above is performed, the PUF’s
control would detect the attack and it increments the counter by one because
the attack causes the circuit to produce key bits with higher noise and Fuzzy
Extractor is not able to produce a valid key and the signature would not be
correct. When the counter is greater than or equal to k − 2, the control in
the PUF immediately destroys the circuit. In the worst case, in each attack,
the adversary is assumed to recover a different key. In total she can gain at
most k − 1 different keys but in the kth attack the structure of the PUF is
destroyed. Hence the security of the our PUF is still protected. Moreover,
our PUF functions are also vulnerable to environmental changes but they
are reliable against k − 1 number of unexpected changes.
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3.3 Our Extended Security and Privacy Model
In this section, we borrow many of the privacy concepts of Vaudenay’s privacy
model, which is explained in Section 2.4.4 in detail. We extend this model
by introducing two new classes of adversary, namely, k-strong and k-forward
adversaries. After that, we introduce our privacy definitions.
3.3.1 Our Extended Privacy Experiment
Contrary to Vaudenay’s model, we first introduce two new notion of adver-
sary classes: k-strong adversary and k-forward adversary. The k is defined as
an integer for privacy level. k-strong adversary covers three privacy classes
of Vaudenay’s model. These are Weak, Destructive and Strong ad-
versaries. We finally give the formal definitions of k-strong and k-forward
privacy according to these two new adversary classes.
Definition 10. (k-Strong adversary). Let an RFID system S and a target
tag T be given. Let also k be defined as a privacy level, which is an integer
in Z+ ∪ {0}. k-strong adversary A has the following capabilities:
• A can use Corrupt oracle on T at most k times.
• A cannot use any other oracles after A made its kth corruption on the
target tag.
• A can use all oracles if less than k Corrupt oracles are used.
Definition 11. (k-Forward Adversary). Let an RFID system S and a target
tag T be given. Let also k be defined as a privacy level which is an integer
in Z+ ∪ {0}. k-forward adversary A has the following capabilities:
• A can use any other oracles until kth Corrupt oracle on T .
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• A can use only Corrupt oracle after kth Corrupt oracle on T .
Remark 3. For the case k = 0, A can not use Corrupt oracle on any tag,
but A can use all oracles except Corrupt oracle without any limitation.
Next, we are now ready to define our privacy definition according to
our new adversary classes. Note that this definition is almost similar to
Vaudenay’s privacy game except its adversary classes.
Definition 12. (k-Strong Privacy). Let Aprv be a k-strong adversary defined
as in Definition 10. An RFID system is k-Strong private if ∀Aprv, ∃ a p.p.t.
algorithm B such that the advantage
AdvprvAprv = |Pr[Expprv−0Aprv = 1]− Pr[Expprv−1Aprv = 1]|
of Aprv is at most negligible. B is the blinder, which simulates the Launch,
SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles without having access to skR
and DB. Also, all oracles done by Aprv are sent to B.
Theorem 1. When k = 0, 0-strong privacy implies Weak privacy. When
k = 1, 1-strong privacy implies Destructive privacy. When limk→∞, k-
strong privacy implies Strong privacy.
Proof. Let us start with the trivial cases. By remark 3, when k = 0, by
definition, 0-strong privacy is equivalent to Weak privacy. Moreover, when
k = 1, by definition 3, 1-strong adversary cannot use any other oracles after
the first Corrupt oracle usage and the adversary can apply any oracle
before the first Corrupt oracle usage. Hence, this definition is equivalent
to destructive adversary in Vaudenay’s model.
For the limk→∞, k-strong privacy case, we are going to prove the following
claim.
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Claim 1. limk→∞ k-strong privacy implies that the tag privacy protected
against any number of Corrupt oracle usage.
Assume to the contrary the claim is wrong, then there exists integer k0
such that after k0 number of Corrupt oracles are applied, the privacy of the
tag is violated. However, by definition, (k0 + 1)−strong privacy implies that
the tag privacy is protected until (k0 + 1)
th Corrupt oracle usage. Thus
limk→∞ k-strong privacy⊂ (k0 + 1)−strong privacy.
Claim 2. (k0 + 2)−strong privacy⊂ limk→∞ k-strong privacy.
In fact, the problem is equivalent to the classical calculus problem, which
is whether or not (k0+2) < limk→∞ k. By undergraduate calculus, we know
that limk→∞ k=∞, so the claim holds.
Therefore, we have limk→∞ k-strong privacy ⊂ (k0+1)−th strong privacy
⊂ (k0+2)−strong privacy⊂ limk→∞ k-strong privacy. This is a contradiction.
Hence, the proposed claim holds.
Note that the tag’s standing against any number of Corrupt oracle
usage corresponds to strong privacy in Vaudenay’s model. Hence, limk→∞,
k-strong privacy in our model corresponds to strong privacy in Vaudenay’s
model.
Remark 4. Theoretically, one can claim that a tag can live forever regardless
of how many times it has corrupted. However, in practice, it is impossible
to create a tag standing against infinitely many number of corruptions phys-
ically. Hence, limk→∞ k-strong privacy is more plausible to define for real
world. For example, if a tag lives until tth corruption, and until its destruc-
tion it gives no clue about privacy, then for this tag, t−strong privacy is
equivalent to the strong privacy. However, this t value changes tag to tag so
it is impossible to say that t-strong privacy is equivalent to strong privacy in
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Vaudenay’s model for any t ∈ {Z} − ∞. This theoretical approach covers
this need.
Moreover, one can claim that, if a tag lives until t corruption and until its
destruction, it gives no clue about privacy, this tag also has p−strong privacy
where p >= t. Therefore, according to this perspective, for all the tags in the
system, the system satisfies limk→∞ k-strong privacy.
There can be an adversary A such that A can corrupt a target tag k-times
and A can interact with any oracle until its kth corruption. In such case, the
system should be private. Such a privacy is not handled in Vaudenay’s model;
however, k-strong privacy captures this concern.
On the other hand, k-forward privacy is similarly defined if an adversary
Aprv is defined according to the Definition 11.
Hence, the new relations between our privacy classes holds as follows:
0-Forward⊆0-Strong ⊆ . . . ⊆k-Forward⊆k-Strong.
3.4 Analysis of Two Recent Authentication
Protocols
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy level of two recent PUF
based authentication protocols according to our model.
3.4.1 Sadeghi et al.’s Authentication Protocol
Sadeghi et al. [3] use an ideal PUF (which corresponds to 1-PUF according to
our model) in their proposed protocol. They assumed that whenever a strong
adversary corrupts a tag, the adversary cannot reach to its temporary state
and the structure of PUF would be destroyed. However, we assume that a
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PUF cannot be destroyed immediately after the first corruption. Tags may
have a limited number of resistance against any strong attacks. We briefly
describe their protocol, then analyze the protocol according to our model.
Let ℓ ∈ N be a security parameter, α, β, γ, κ be polynomial bounded in
ℓ. Let F : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}2α → {0, 1}β be a pseudo-random function. Each
tag T is equipped with an ideal unique PUF function P : {0, 1}γ → {0, 1}κ
and stores a random state S ∈R {0, 1}γ . On the other hand, the reader’s R
database DB stores a set of records (ID,K) for each tag in the system, where
K = P (S). The authentication protocol steps are summarized in Figure 3.1.
In the protocol, R first sends a random challenge a ∈R {0, 1}α to a tag
T . Once T receives the challenge, T picks another random challenge b ∈R
{0, 1}α. T reconstructs the secret key K and computes response c = FK(a, b)
sends b and c to R. Then, T erases a, b, c,K from its volatile memory. Upon
R receives b, c from T , R recomputes c′ = FK(a, b) for each record (K,S) in
DB until R finds a match (c′ = c). If a match is found, R sends the ID,
otherwise sends ⊥.
Tag TID Reader R
S DB = {(ID1, K1), . . . , (Kn,IDn)}
b ∈R {0, 1}α a←−−−−−−−−−−−−− a ∈R {0, 1}α
K ← P (S)
c← FK(a, b)
b,c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If ∃(ID,K) ∈ DB
delete K, a, b, c s.t. c
?
= FK(a, b) then
return ID
else return ⊥
endif
Figure 3.1: Sadeghi et al.’s authentication protocol
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Remark 5. Note that output of a true random number generator and output
of hash function in the random oracle model are indistinguishable. Therefore
in practicality, outputs of pseudo-random functions and hash functions work
similarly.
Theorem 2. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 3.1 achieves 0-
strong privacy.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that there are one reader R and
one tag in the system (note that it is shown in [30] that a system with
many tags and one reader has at most negligible advantage). First of all,
we show that, if adversary is not allowed to use Corrupt oracle, then the
adversary cannot distinguish R from the blinder B. Then, we show that
if the adversary is allowed to use Corrupt oracle at least once, then the
adversary can distinguish R from B.
In the first case, the system runs m times by R or B. During the runs,
the adversary guesses number of t values for K and checks the correspond-
ing guessed key values at any of previous runs. Note that both m and t
are polynomially bounded in ℓ. In order to calculate the maximum success
probability, we have to consider two cases: (i) the probability that the adver-
sary guesses the correct value of the key is t
2κ
. (ii) the probability that the
adversary determines whether c is correct or not is 1− (1− ( 1
2β
))m. Since the
values m and t are polynomially bounded the corresponding RFID scheme
satisfies 0-strong privacy.
Let the adversary apply Corrupt oracle at least once. Then, the adver-
sary learns the value of K. For the consecutive protocol run, after getting
values of a, b and c, the adversary computes the real value of c by using a, b
and K and compares it with the given c value. The probability of distin-
guishing the real oracle from the blinder for only one protocol run is 1− 1
2β
. If
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the adversary observes more protocol runs, her success probability increases.
Since the advantage is non negligible, in fact close to 1, the system does not
achieve k-strong privacy for k ≥ 1.
3.4.2 Kardas et al.’s Authentication Protocol
Kardas et al. [1] also proposed another PUF based authentication protocol
and applied it into a distance bounding protocol and showed its security
enhancements. Similar to Sadeghi et al.’s model, they also assume that
whenever a strong adversary corrupts a tag, the PUF in the tag is destroyed;
however, the adversary can reach its volatile memory only once. Their as-
sumptions are weaker than Sadeghi et al.’s adversary model. In the following,
we show that their protocol achieves 1-strong privacy according to our adver-
sarial model. In this section, we first simplify Kardas et al.’s protocol without
changing the core of the protocol. Then, we analyze its privacy level in our
model. The authentication protocol steps are summarized in Figure 3.2.
Let F : {0, 1}ℓ×{0, 1}2ℓ → {0, 1}2ℓ be a one-way pseudo random function
and Pi : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ be an ideal PUF (1-PUF) function for tag Ti. Each
tag stores two random states G′1i, G
2
i ∈R {0, 1}k. On the other hand, the
reader’s database DB stores a set of records (IDi, Ki, Li) for each tag Ti
in the system, where Ki = Pi(G
1
i ) and Li = Pi(G
2
i ). The authentication
protocol is summarized in Figure 3.2.
The protocol starts withR sends a random challenge a ∈R {0, 1}α to a tag
Ti. Whenever Ti receives this challenge, it chooses another random challenge
b ∈R {0, 1}α. Ti reconstructs the secret key Ki and computes T = FK(a, b).
Then, it deletes the Ki from its volatile memory. After that, Ti reconstructs
the secret Li by re-evaluating the PUF with G
2
i (Li = Pi(G
2
i )), calculates the
response c = FLi(T ), and erases Li from its volatile memory. Ti sends c along
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with b to R. Once R receives b, c from Ti, it recomputes c′ = FLi(FLi(a, b))
for each record (IDi, Ki, Li) in DB until R a match (c′ = c) is found. If a
match is found, R sends the ID, otherwise sends ⊥.
Reader Tagi
DB = {(ID1, K1, L1), . . . , (IDn, Kn, Ln)} G1i , G2i
Pick a ∈R {0, 1}α Pick b ∈R {0, 1}α
a−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ki = Pi(G1i )
T = FKi(a, b)
delete Ki
Li = Pi(G
2
i )
c = FLi(T )
delete Li
If ∃(ID,K,L) ∈ DB b,c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s.t. c
?
= FL(FK(a, b))
then return ID
else
return ⊥
endif
Figure 3.2: Kardas et al.’s authentication protocol
Theorem 3. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 3.1 achieves 1-
strong privacy.
Proof. Let there be one tag and one reader in the system [30]. We consider
two cases. In the first case, the adversary is allowed to apply Corrupt oracle
at most once in order to maximize her success probability. As a second case,
we investigate privacy issue when the adversary is allowed to use Corrupt
oracle more than once.
After the adversary applies the Corrupt oracle, either the value of K
or L is learned, but not both at the same time since the PUF Pi is 1-PUF,
which means its function is destroyed after the 1st Corrupt oracle usage.
Similar to the calculations done in the proof of Theorem 2, if the system is
run m times by blinder or the reader and the adversary guesses number of t
values for the unrevealed key value (K or L). Then the maximum advantage
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that the adversary gets in distinguishing the reader from the blinder is t
2κ
+
1 − (1 − ( 1
2β
))m. Since m and t values are polynomially bounded, then the
system achieves 1-strong privacy.
If the adversary applies corrupt oracle more than once, then both K and
L are revealed in the worst case scenario. Similar to the calculations done
in the proof of Theorem 2, the advantage that adversary has in order to
distinguish the reader from the blinder is 1 − 1
2β
, which is non-negligible.
Thus, the system does not achieve k-strong privacy for k ≥ 2.
3.5 k-Strong Private Authentication Proto-
col
Let κ be the security parameter of the system. Let Pi : {0, 1}β → {0, 1}θ be a
k-PUF of the ith legitimate prover Pi where θ is polynomially bounded in κ.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}γ be one-way collision resistant hash function where
where γ is polynomially bounded in κ. The credentials database DB of the
readerR stores the following tag related information ((K11 , . . . , Kk+11 , ID1), . . . ,
(K1n, . . . , K
k+1
n , IDn) for j = 1, . . . , k+ 1, K
j = Pi(Gi⊕ j) for random states
Gi ∈R {0, 1}β where β is polynomially bounded in κ. Our unilateral authen-
tication protocol depicted in Figure 3.3 works as follows.
• First of all, R generates a nonce a ∈R {0, 1}α and sends it to Ti.
• Upon receiving a, Ti generates a nonce b ∈R {0, 1}α and computes H =
H(a, b). Ti reconstructs Kj = Pi(Gi⊕j) and computes H = H(Kj, H),
then immediately deletes Kj from the memory where j = 1, . . . , k + 1.
The final value of H is assigned to c and Ti sends c along with b to the
verifier.
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Reader Tagi
DB = {(K11 , . . . , Kk1 , Kk+11 , ID1),
. . . , (K1n, . . . , K
k
n, K
k+1
n , IDn)} Gi, IDi
1. Pick a ∈R {0, 1}α Pick b ∈R {0, 1}α
2.
a−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ H = H(a, b)
3. for j = 1 to k + 1
4. Kj = Pi(Gi ⊕ j)
5. H = H(Kj, H)
6. delete Kj
7. endfor
8. c = H
9. If ∃(K1, . . . , Kk+1, ID) ∈ DB b,c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Send b, c
10. s.t.
11. H = H(a, b)
12. for j = 1 to k + 1
13. H = H(Kj, H)
14. endfor
15. and H = c then
16. return ID
17. else return ⊥
18. endif
Figure 3.3: A generic PUF based authentication protocol
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• Upon receiving b and c, for each record (K1, . . . , Kk+1, ID) in DB,
R does following steps. R first computes H = H(a, b), then updates
H = H(Kj, H) ∀j = 1, . . . , k+1. The last H value is assigned to b′. If
a match (c′ = c) is found, the authentication succeeded. Otherwise, R
does these steps with another record in DB. If no match is found, the
authentication aborts.
3.5.1 Security Analysis
Throughout the chapter, we utilize the following rule. Let B = {1, . . . , k +
1} be a set and Bi = B/{i}, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}. When it is said
that Corrupt oracle applied by Bi, we mean that the adversary captures
all key values except the value of ith key Ki. Moreover, throughout all
proofs in this section, we assume that a tag is destructed at kth Corrupt
oracle usage. This assumption does not restrict role of the adversary whereas
this assumption gives the adversary the opportunity to take advantage of
performing maximum number of oracles to any tag.
Lemma 1. Let Ad be a k-strong adversary, T be a target tag and B =
{1, . . . , k + 1} be a set. Let Bi be B/{i}, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}. Then,
the advantage that Ad obtains by applying Corrupt oracle on tag T by the
rules of Bi (not getting Ki) and the advantage that the adversary gets by
applying Corrupt oracle on tag T by the rules of Bj with i 6= j are equal.
Proof. Note that a set with k+1 elements has k+1 subsets having k elements.
Thus, we can choose such two subsets (Bi, Bj) in
k(k−1)
2
ways. Let us fix two
integers i0 and j0 with i0 6= j0 and i0, j0 ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}.
Letm and n be polynomially bounded positive integers in κ. If Ad applies
Corrupt oracle on tag T by rules of Bi0 , then after kth Corrupt oracle us-
51
age, in the worst case, Ad has the knowledge ofK1, . . . , Ki0−1, Ki0+1, . . . , Kk+1.
If Ad observes m number of protocol runs until kth Corrupt oracle usage,
Ad also has knowledge of (a1, b1, c1), . . . , (am, bm, cm). Then, Ad can compute
cm+1 value in three cases:
• If am+1 is equal to any of al values for l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then with 1
probability, the adversary figures out the value of cm+1 by choosing
bm+1 = bl.
• If this is not the case, Ad guesses number of n values of Ki0 and checks
her guesses in any of the previous runs.
• In the case of failure, eventually the adversary has to guess the value
of Kk+1 or Ki0 for the corresponding protocol run.
Thus, the success probability of Ad is m2α + 2
α−m
2α
[
n
2θ
+ 2
θ−n
2θ
(
1
2γ
+ 1
2θ−n
)]
.
Similarly, if the Corrupt oracle usage applied by the rules of the set Bj0 ,
one deduces that Ad gets the same success probability. The result follows by
the fact that i0 and j0 are chosen arbitrarily.
From now on, when it is said that a tag is corrupted, it should be under-
stood that it is corrupted by rules of Bk+1 = B/{k + 1} = {1, . . . , k}.
Lemma 2. Let Ad be a k-strong adversary and Tt be the target tag. Then
Ad’s analyzing the system with many tags including Tt gives him at most
negligible advantage over her analyzing the system with only Tt.
Proof. Assume that there are one reader and n tags in the system, where n
is polynomially bounded in κ. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the reader and tag Ti
realize mi number of the protocol runs before k
th corruption. Note that our
aim is to observe the adversarial advantage difference between analyzing the
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systems with multiple tags and single tag. Thus, we have to figure out how
much Ad gets advantage by guessing the value of cmt+1 after corrupting Ti
and observing the protocol runs realized by Ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , t−1, t+1, . . . , n}.
Since the value of Gi and the PUF function Pi differ from tag to tag, the only
advantage of Ad is to find relations among the keys or the resulting c values.
By letting m = max{m1, . . . ,mt−1,mt+1, . . . ,mn}, the total advantage is
at most km(n − 1) 1
2θ
+ m(n − 1) 1
22θ
+ m(n − 1) 1
2γ
. Since n, k and m are
polynomially bounded in κ and θ is sufficiently large, the advantage is at
most negligible.
From now on, in the theorems stated below, we assume there are only
one reader R and one tag T , target tag, in the system.
Theorem 4. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 3.3 achieves tag
authentication for a k-strong adversary Ak.
Proof. Let κ be the security parameter in the RFID system. According to
Lemma 2, there are only one tag, T and one reader, R in the system. Note
that the adversary does not need to apply CreateTag, DrawTag and
Free oracles. Ak can use SendReader(π) oracle to start a protocol run
either between R and T or between R and himself. Furthermore, Ak can
use Result oracle polynomially bounded in κ number of times by sending
b and c values to the reader for corresponding a values, which are sent by
R as a result of the usage of SendReader(π) oracle. Moreover, Ak can
use SendTag oracle polynomially bounded in κ number of times to send
a challenge value a to T . Besides, Ak can use Corrupt oracle at most k
times and we assume that the adversary exactly applies Corrupt oracle k
times to increase her chance to destroy tag authentication.
By Lemma 1, we assume that Ak applies Corrupt oracle by rules of
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the set Bk+1. Moreover, let us assume that Ak observed m1 number of pro-
tocol runs between R and T and queried SendReader(π) oracle m2 times
to start protocol run between R and T . Furthermore, Ak uses SendTag
oracle m3 times. Note that m1, m2, m3 are polynomially bounded integers
in κ and in order to increase the success probability of Ak’s destroying tag
authentication, we assume that in all protocol runs, occurred as a result
of above oracle usages and observation, different a values are used. More-
over, assume that SendReader(π) oracle is used m4 times to start protocol
run between the reader and the adversary. After kth corruption, Ak uses
m5 number of SendReader(π) oracles to start protocol run between the
reader and herself. In each of these runs Ak receives different a values, then
she generates a pair (b, c) and Ak sends this pair to the reader and finally As
uses Result oracle for triple (a, b, c). Assume the adversary has y chances
to impersonate the corresponding tag without using any oracle where y is
polynomial bounded in κ. Moreover, Ak is allowed to prepare pi triples
(Kk+1, bi, ci) for corresponding impersonation trial i. Note that these triples
are prepared according to guesses of Ak on the value of the missing key.
Ak checks if any of the triples is true or false based on the protocol tran-
scripts reached so far at each impersonation round. If Ak has no success at pi
triples, then the adversary just guesses the values of b and c. Let us denote
M = m1+m2+m3+m4+m5 and P = max{p1, . . . , py}. Note thatM and P
are polynomially bounded in κ. Let us figure out the success probability of
the adversary at ith impersonation trial. The reader sends ai as a challenge
to the adversary. If ai is equal to any of the a values that were used at pre-
vious successful protocol transactions observed or created by oracle usage,
then with 1 probability, the adversary succeeds. However, the probability of
realization of this scenario is at most M
2α
. In case of failure, then Ak checks
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correctness of each pi triple. However, the success probability of Ak in this
case is at most
∑iP−2
l=(i−1)P−1[(
∏l
j=0(1 − 12θ−j )) 12θ−l−1 ]. If the adversary fails
after two cases discussed above, then she guesses the values of b and c. At
each trial, the success probability is 1
2γ−P
.
Thus, maximum success probability of Ak at the end of yth impersonation
trial is smaller than yM
2α
+(1−M
2α
)[ 1
2θ
+
∑yP−2
i=0 [(
∏i
j=0(1− 12θ−j )) 12θ−i−1 ]]+( y2γ−P ).
Let us denote above probability by B. Then,
B ≤ yM
2α
+
yP−2∑
i=0
1
2θ − i− 1 +
y
2γ − P (3.1)
≤ y
[
M
2α
+
P
2θ−1
+
1
2γ − P
]
The resulting probability is negligible since y, M and P are polynomially
bounded and α, θ and γ are big enough. Thus the system satisfies tag
authentication.
Theorem 5. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 3.3 achieves k-
strong privacy.
Proof. Assume to the contrary, the system does not satisfy k-strong privacy.
Then, there exists an adversary Ak, who can distinguish between the real
RFID system and the system simulated by a blinder B with non-negligible
probability. By definition, B simulates Launch, SendTag, SendReader
and Result oracles without knowing the tag and the reader secrets.
Let us start with how B evaluates the oracles:
• Launch(): B evaluates this oracle in a trivial way.
• SendReader(π): The output is a ∈R {0, 1}α.
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• SendTag(a): The output is b ∈R {0, 1}α, c ∈R {0, 1}γ .
• SendReader((b, c),π): returns no output.
• Result(π): If π is generated by Launch oracle and the protocol
transcript is generated by SendTag and SendReader oracles, the
output is 1. If one of the conditions does not hold, then the output is
0.
By Lemma 2, we assume that there are only one tag and one reader in
the system. Moreover, for simplicity and to increase the success probability
of Ak to destroy the privacy, we assume the database of the reader is not
updated throughout the proof. Let the system run for n times only by real
RFID system or the blinder B, where n is polynomially bounded integer in
κ. In other words, all usable oracles defined at Section 2.4.4.2 is used at most
n times. Moreover, by Lemma 1, assume that Corrupt oracle is applied by
the rules of the set Bk+1.
There are three cases to consider: The first case is guessing of the value
of Kk+1. The probability of this happening is 1
2θ
. The second case is Ak to
determine the correct value of c in at least one of the protocol runs. The
probability of this case is 1− (1− 1
2γ
)n. The last case is Ak to guess the value
that is produced by the Result oracle is correct or wrong successfully.
By contradiction assumption, since Ak destroys the privacy, either one of
two probabilities given above is non-negligible or the probability of realization
of the last case is non-negligible. However, with sufficiently large θ and γ
values, first two probabilities are negligible. Thus, the success probability of
Ak to guess the value that is produced by the Result oracle is correct or
wrong is non-negligible. However, this contradicts with Theorem 4, namely,
contradicts to the tag authentication.
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3.6 Adapting Our Protocol to Reader Au-
thentication
The privacy definition given by Paise and Vaudenay (P-V) is based on the
anonymity of the tags and unlink-ability of the interactions. The privacy
of an RFID scheme is broken when an adversary identifies a victim tag or
links its interactions [98]. Nevertheless, Armknecht et al. define privacy
as the ability of an adversary to distinguish real oracles from the blinder
B [99]. The concept of privacy in the P-V model is based on distinguishing
between different tags, whereas in the Armknecht et al.’s model the privacy
is defined based on the notion of (left-or-right) or (0-or-1) indistinguishability
game. Therefore, their results on the privacy with reader authentication are
different.
By using [99] approach, Habibi et al. claim that the highest achievable
privacy level is narrow-weak privacy with reader authentication [100]. How-
ever, in this section, we prove that it is possible to achieve k-strong privacy
and reader authentication by introducing a PUF based RFID mutual authen-
tication protocol. This is the first attempt to provide both these security and
privacy properties in the literature. For our proposed mutual authentication
protocol, we first give definitions of two functions, Ftag, Freader which com-
bine some steps of computation at tag and reader side respectively. These
functions make our next protocol more readable. The function Ftag requires
two random challenges (a, b), the initial nonce G and k number of the inter-
nal steps. Ftag does the computation from step 2 to step 6 at the tag side
(see Figure 3.3). The process depicted in Figure 3.4.
Freader takes two challenges (a,b) and the secret keys of a tag (K1, . . . , Kk+1)
and produces the output H. It simply does the computation from step 11 to
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Gi ⊕ j
PiH
Hk+1
Hj−1
H0 = H(a, b)
Kjdelete K
j
j = 1, . . . , k + 1
Figure 3.4: A generic function Ftag(a, b, Gi, k + 1) = Hk+1
step 14 at the reader side(see Figure3.3). The process depicted in Figure 3.5.
H
Hk+1
Hj−1 H0 = H(b, a)
Kj
j = 1, . . . , k + 1
Figure 3.5: Freader(b, a,K1, . . . , Kk+1) = Hk+1
Note that the notations used in the protocol are already described in
Section 3.5. The extended mutual authentication protocol works as follows.
First of all, R generates a random nonce a and sends it to Ti. As receiving
a, Ti generates a random nonce b and computes c = Ftag(a, b, Gi, k + 1) and
sends c along with b to the reader. Then, for each record (K1j , . . . , K
k+1
j , IDj)
in DB where j ∈ {1, . . . , n} , R computes c = Freader(a, b,K1j , . . . , Kk+1j ).
If a match (c′ = c) is found, then the tag authentication succeeds and R
computes d = Freader(b, a,K1j , . . . , Kk+1j ) and sends d to Ti. If no match
is found in DB, R sends random bits to Ti. Finally, upon receiving d, Ti
computes d′ = Ftag(b, a,Gi, k + 1) and if d is equal to d′, then the reader
authentication succeeds.
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Reader Tagi
DB = {(K11 , . . . , K1k , K1k+1, ID1),
. . . , (Kn1 , . . . , K
n
k , K
n
k+1, ID
n)} Gi, IDi
1. Pick a ∈R {0, 1}α Pick b ∈R {0, 1}α
2.
a−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c = Ftag(a, b, Gi, k + 1)
3. Send b, c
4. If ∃(K1j , . . . , Kk+1j , IDj) ∈ DB
b,c←−−−−−−−−−−−−
5. s.t. c
?
= Freader(a, b,K1j , . . . , Kk+1j )
6. then
7. return d = Freader(b, a,K
1
j , . . . , K
k+1
j )
8. else return d ∈R {0, 1}γ
9. endif
10.
d−−−−−−−−−−−−→ d ?= Ftag(b, a,Gi, k + 1)
Figure 3.6: A generic PUF based mutual authentication protocol
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3.6.1 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we first prove that our protocol achieves reader authentica-
tion. Then we utilize this proof in order to prove the protocol also provides
k-strong privacy. Note that, throughout all proofs in this section, we assume
that a tag is destructed at kth Corrupt oracle usage. This assumption
gives the adversary the opportunity to take advantage of performing maxi-
mum number of oracles to any tag.
Theorem 6. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 3.6 achieves reader
authentication for k-strong adversary Ak.
Proof. By Lemma 2, let there be one reader, R and one tag, T in the system.
Also, the adversary A has applied Corrupt oracle to T k times with rules
of Bk+1. Besides, Ak observes m1 number of the protocol runs between R
and T . Also assume that Ak applies following oracles with given number of
times before authentication game as described below:
1. m1 times: no oracle usage, the adversary just watches protocol run
between R and T
2. m2 times: SendReader(π) oracle to start protocol run between R
and T
3. m3 times: SendTag(a) oracle and SendReader(b, c) , where Send-
Tag(a)→ (b, c)
4. m4 times: Ak derives (b, c) and uses SendReader(b, c) andResult(d)
oracles, where SendReader(b, c)→ d.
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In order to increase the success probability of Ak, let us assume that
the value of a that is sent to tag by the adversary or derived as a result of
SendReader(π) oracle is fixed. Moreover, let us assume that different b, c
values are used by the adversary or the tag as a result of SendTag(a) oracle
usage.
Let the adversary have y number of chances in order to impersonate the
corresponding reader without using any oracle. Moreover, Ak is allowed to
prepare pi pairs (K
k+1
j , d
i
j), j = 1, . . . , pi, for corresponding impersonation
trial i. Note that these pairs are prepared according to guesses of Ak on
value of missing key. Ak checks if any pair created is true or false based on
the protocol transcripts reached so far at each impersonation round. If Ak
has no success at pi pairs, then the adversary just guesses the values of d
i.
Let us denoteM = m1+m2+m3+m4 and P = max{p1, . . . , pk} whereM
and P are polynomially bounded positive integers in κ. Let us figure out the
success probability of the adversary at ith impersonation trial. Assume that
the adversary sends a to the tag. If the tag responds with (b, c) pair value that
was used previously while using the oracles defined above, then the adversary
succeeds with probability 1. If this is not the case, then Ak checks the
correctness of each (Kk+1j , d
i
j), j = 1, . . . , pi. However, the success probability
of Ak in this case is at most
∑iP−2
l=(i−1)P−1
[(∏l
j=0
(
1− 1
2θ−j
))
1
2θ−l−1
]
. If the
adversary fails after two cases discussed above, then she guesses the values
of di. At this trial the success probability is 1
2γ−P
.
Thus, maximum success probability of Ak at the end of yth impersonation
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trial is smaller than
1
2θ
(
1− M
2α
)
+
yP−2∑
i=0
[(
i∏
j=0
(
1− 1
2θ − j
))
1
2θ − i− 1
]
+
yM
2α
+
(
y
2γ − P
)
Let us denote above probability by B. Then,
B ≤ yM
2α
+
yP−2∑
i=0
1
2θ − i− 1 +
y
2γ − P (3.2)
≤ y
[
M
2α
+
P
2θ−1
+
1
2γ − P
]
The resulting probability is negligible by the same argument since y, M
and P are polynomially bounded in κ and α, θ and γ are big enough. Thus
the system achieves reader authentication.
Theorem 7. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 3.6 achieves both
k-strong privacy and reader authentication.
Proof. Note that by Theorem 6 the system achieves reader authentication.
Thus, we only need to prove k-strong privacy.
Assume to the contrary, there exists an adversary Ak who can distinguish
the real RFID system and the system simulated by the blinder B. The
blinder simulates the oracles as it is defined at proof of Theorem 5 except
SendReader((b, c), π) oracle. In this case, B evaluates this oracle and it
outputs d ∈R {0, 1}γ . Moreover, there is one more oracle SendTag(d, π, end)
simulated by B. The blinder returns no output to this oracle.
By Lemma 2, let there be one tag and one real reader in the system.
Moreover, let us assume that the reader is not updated throughout the proof.
Let Ak apply the Corrupt oracle k times by the rules of the set Bk+1 by
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Lemma 1 and the system runs y times before distinguish-ability phase.
There are four cases to consider. The first case, as indicated at proof of
Theorem 6, is the value of Kk+1 or the value of c is determined correctly by
the adversaryAk at least one protocol run by obtained information. However,
the probabilities are 1
2θ
and 1− (1− 1
2γ
)y respectively.
The second case is to make Ak to determine the answers given from
usage of Result oracle true or false after receiving d←SendReader(b, c).
Nonetheless, this is possible only if Ak knows the value of Kk+1 but this can
only happen with probability of 1
2θ
. The third case is that the correct value of
d is determined by Ak’s at least in one of the protocol runs. This probability
is 1 − (1 − 1
2γ
)y. The last case is the value of c or d is guessed correctly by
Ak. However, the success probability is 12γ−1 .
As all calculated probabilities are negligible and finite sum of negligible
numbers are negligible. Thus we have a contradiction. Namely, Ak has at
most negligible advantage at distinguishing the real system from the blinder.
Thus, the system satisfies k-strong privacy.
3.7 The Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we revisited Vaudenay’s privacy model, which is one of the
well-known models in RFID frameworks. We went one step further and
introduced two new notions of adversary classes, k-strong adversary and k-
forward adversary. These two adversary classes cover all the classes defined
by Vaudenay’s model and yield two new privacy classes, k-strong privacy
and k-forward privacy. Contrary to Vaudenay’s model, our model covers the
security level between destructive privacy and strong privacy.
We also proposed a new extended PUF definition k-PUFs. Ideal PUFs
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are assumed to be destroyed once tampered. However, our proposal extends
this assumption to the real case, i.e., these types of PUFs are tamper proof
up to k corruptions. This new type of PUFs seems to be more plausible than
prior proposals. This approach can also be considered as a more realistic
scenario to analyze RFID authentication protocols.
Next, we give two robust PUF based authentication protocols to illustrate
different privacy levels in our new extended model. In our first protocol, we
prove that the strong privacy (∞-strong privacy in our model) in Vaudenay’s
model can be achieved by only using symmetric encryption and PUF func-
tions. In our second protocol, we prove that both strong privacy and reader
authentication can be achieved in our model (as it was not possible in the
Paise Model previously).
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Chapter 4
PUF-ENHANCED OFFLINE
RFID SECURITY AND
PRIVACY
In this chapter, we first revisit Vaudenay’s adversary model and extend it
to the oﬄine RFID system. We introduce the notion of reader compromise
attacks. Then, we define the notion of privacy+ where compromise attacks
on readers are considered. After that we propose a new RFID mutual au-
thentication protocol. In our protocol, we use physically unclonable functions
(PUF) as unique identity provider mechanisms for the tags. PUF outputs
are analogous to the biometric traits in terms of uniqueness. This property
provides a secure key derivation for low-cost RFID tags [1]. In our protocol,
we use this PUF mechanism to make RFID tags strong against side-channel
attacks. Finally, we prove that our protocol provides the narrow destructive
privacy for tag owner. Also, we prove that our protocol satisfies narrow de-
structive privacy+ in case of compromise reader attacks. To the best our
knowledge, our work is the first protocol which uses symmetric operations
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and PUF functions and satisfies these privacy properties.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 describes the
notations and adversary capabilities of the extended model are described.
Section 4.2 describes the proposed authentication protocol. Section 4.3, we
present the adversary capabilities and formal security analysis of the protocol.
Lastly, in Section 4.4, we give a brief discussion and conclude the chapter.
The results presented in Chapter 4 have been published in [30].
4.1 Extended RFID Security and Privacy Model
In this section, we present an improvement to formal specification of the
RFID security and privacy model [18] proposed by Vaudenay in ASIACRYPT
2007. We extend it by introducing notion of compromise of reader attacks
and capability of the adversaries.
In our model, an oﬄine RFID system consists of a single operator I, a
secure back-end system DB, a set of readers Ri, and a polynomial number
of tags T . Each tag T is assumed to be capable of performing basic crypto-
graphic primitives such as hashing, symmetric encryption, PUF evaluations,
and random number generation. On the other hand, each reader Ri can
perform public-key cryptography and can also handle polynomial number
of authentication protocols with different tags in parallel. We borrow the
definitions of oracles and adversary classes from Vaudenay’s model which is
explained in Chapter 2.4.4 in detail. We introduce definitions of security and
privacy notions for analysis of privacy-preserved oﬄine RFID authentication
protocols.
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4.1.1 Security, Privacy, and Privacy+
In this chapter, we focus on only security and privacy, so the correctness
property is not discussed further. Vaudenay’s correctness definition can be
combined with the new privacy definition, without compatibility issues. Also,
we utilize the tag authentication and privacy definitions of Vaudenay model.
For detailed explanations on tag authentication and privacy definition of
Vaudenay’s model, see Chapter 2.4.4.
For our new privacy definition, contrary to Vaudenay model, similar to
RFID tags, the readers can also be corrupted by a malicious adversary be-
cause the readers in this context are mobile embedded devices, which have
secure discontinuous access to the central database. In our model, we pro-
vide a new oracle for strong and destructive adversaries so as to enhance
their capabilities.
Corrupt(Ri): This oracle enables A to corrupt reader Ri and gets all
internal states of that reader.
Remark 6. Once an adversary A uses (Corrupt(Ri)) oracle, A can interact
tag T after the server’s DB updates other reader’s database and one of the
updated readers run at least one successful protocol transaction with each tag
Ti used in challenging phase of privacy game.
Considering compromise of readers, we define a new privacy notion, pri-
vacy+, for tag owner as follows.
Definition 13. (Privacy+) An RFID system S provides privacy+ notion
of P if S is still private against an adversary AP even in the case of following
conditions:
• Some of the readers are corrupted by AP .
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• All readers except the corrupted ones are updated by the server.
• All tags have at least one successful interaction with one of the updated
reader.
From Definition 13, it is clearly seen that once an adversary corrupts
a reader in the system, she captures all the tag related information in the
reader’s database. Therefore, if the system does not update the remaining
readers and the tags do not have successful interactions with one of the
updated reader, then the adversary easily impersonates the victim reader
and is able to trace any victim tag.
4.2 The PUF Based RFID Authentication Pro-
tocol
In this section, we first give the definition of PUF function used in our pro-
posal. Then, we describe the authentication protocol which is composed of
three phases; registration, reader update, and authentication phases.
4.2.1 Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
In this chapter, we use the ideal PUF mechanism, which is described in [1],
in our proposed oﬄine-RFID authentication protocol. To the best of our
knowledge, such a usage of PUF is the first in the literature.
Definition 14. Physically Unclonable Function(PUF). Let k ∈ N be a secu-
rity parameter such that β, θ ∈ N are polynomially bounded in k. An ideal
PUF function is defined as P : {0, 1}β → {0, 1}θ that holds the following
properties:
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Reader Tagi
IdR, cR Idi, Gi, ci
DB = [(Id1, K
1
1 , K
2
1 ), · · · , (Idi, K1i , K2i )]
Pick nR ∈R {0, 1}α Pick nT ∈R {0, 1}α
IdR,cR,nR−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If cR ≥ ci then
S1i = Pi(Gi)
K1i = H(S
1
i , IdR, cR)
temp = H(K1i , nR, nT )
delete S1i , K
1
i
S2i = Pi(Gi ⊕ Idi)
K2i = H(S
2
i , IdR, cR)
v1, v2 = H(K
2
i , temp)
delete S2i , K
2
i
else
v1 ∈R {0, 1}γ
endif
If ∃(Idi, K1i , K2i ) ∈ DB nT ,v1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s.t. v′1, v
′
2 = H(K
2
i , H(K
1
i , nR, nT ))
v′1
?
= v1 then
Send v′2
else
Send v′2 ∈R {0, 1}γ
endif
v′2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If v′2 = v2 && cR > ci then
cT = cR
endIf
Figure 4.1: The proposed authentication protocol
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• Any physical search trial to investigate the structure of P results in
destruction of corresponding P . Namely, after the attack, the tag having
this P cannot be evaluated anymore.
• Same inputs give same output result. Namely, let P (a1) = b1 and
P (a2) = b2, if a1 = a2, then Prob[b1 = b2] = 1.
• Any probabilistic polynomial time adversary can distinguish between
output of a P and random value with at most negligible probability.
As it can be understood from the definition, instead of studying in real
PUFs, where for the same inputs they might produce slightly different out-
puts, we study with an idealized version of PUFs [1, 3, 71] which gives same
output results for same inputs.
4.2.2 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, for a complete RFID system, we provide three phases; regis-
tration, update reader’s database, and authentication.
4.2.2.1 Registration Phase
Initially, in a stable RFID system, counter cR and cT are equal to each other.
For each tag Ti, Issuer I first setups Ti with a random Gi ∈ {0, 1}β, a
unique ID of the tag Ti, Idi and the counter cT . Then, I gets the secrets
S1i ∈ {0, 1}θ, S2i ∈ {0, 1}θ from Ti PUF evaluations. The record {Idi, S1i , S2i }
is inserted into the central server’s database DB. After that, I setups each
reader Rj in the systems with a unique ID of the reader Rj, Idj and the
counter cR. Lastly, the server starts secure communication with each reader
to update their database. The update mechanism works as explained in the
next subsection.
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4.2.2.2 Update Reader’s Database
The update protocol of reader’s database is carried out during the registration
phase and whenever a compromised reader is detected. The protocol works as
follows. When the server starts a secure communication with the reader Rj,
the server first gets IdR, cR from the target reader. The cR is incremented
by one. Then, for each tag Ti in DB, the server computes a new record
{Idi, K1i , K2i } where K1i = H(S1i , IdR, cR) and K2i = H(S2i , IdR, cR). Finally,
the generated records and the new counter cR are sent to Rj in order to
update the reader’s database and its counter.
4.2.2.3 Authentication
The protocol steps are summarized in Figure 4.1. The detailed protocol steps
are described as follows.
As soon as a tag Ti is in the authentication region, the reader chooses
nR ∈ {0, 1}α and sends it along with its IdR and cR to Ti. Then, Ti first checks
whether cR is greater than or equal to ci. If condition is not satisfied, Ti sends
random bits to the reader. Otherwise, Ti generates a random nT ∈ {0, 1}α
and computes the secret value S1i = Pi(Gi). This is where the PUF function
is used. Since Pi is specific to Ti and cannot be cloned, S1i value can only be
calculated by that tag. Session key (K1i ) corresponding to that counter epoch
(cR) is calculated by concatenating S
1
i , IdR and cR and then by hashing the
result. Then, a temporary hash is computed (temp = H(K1i , nR, nT )) and
both secrets S1i , K
1
i are deleted from the volatile memory. After that, the
tag computes another pair of secrets by evaluating the function Pi with Gi
(S2i = Pi(Gi ⊕ Idi)) and a hash (K2i = H(S2i , IdR, cR)). Finally, another
hash is calculated over the concatenation of K2i and temp to get the session
vectors vi and v2. S
2
i and K
2
i are both deleted from the memory. The tag
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sends nT and v1 to the reader.
For each record {Idi, K1i , K2i } in the reader’s database, the reader calcu-
lates v′1, v
′
2 = H(K
2
i , H(K
1
i , nR, nT )) and compares v
′
1 to v1. If a match is
found, then she identifies the tag and sends v′2 to Ti. If no match is found in
the database, then the reader sends random bits with bit-length of γ to Ti.
Finally, Ti compares v′2 that it has received from the reader to v2. If they are
equal, then the reader is genuine and the tag updates ci if it is less than cR.
Otherwise, the tag figures out that reader is compromised.
4.3 Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Our proposed protocol uses the PUF mechanism presented in [1]. This mech-
anism provides a secure key derivation for low-cost RFID tags so that it makes
the RFID tags tamper-proof against malicious strong adversaries. We divide
this section into two parts. In the first part, we state and prove some lemmas,
which describe the capabilities of a strong adversary on PUF circuitry, are
used in the proofs of security analysis results. In the second part, we provide
security analysis of the protocol.
4.3.1 Security Analysis Tools
The following theorem and the proof are derived from [1].
Theorem 8. Let S1i , S
2
i be secrets of a tag Ti for some i in the above-
mentioned protocol (see Figure 4.1). Assume that there is an adversary A
with a full side-channel capability on the tag Ti. If Pi is an ideal PUF, then
A can only access either the secret S1i or the secret S2i , but not both in Ti.
Proof. (sketch) The secret Gi and Idi are fed into the Pi function to compute
the real keys S1i and S
2
i . The real keys only appear during the execution of
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the protocol. Notice that S1i and S
2
i never appear in the memory of Ti at the
same time because S1i is first used as an input of a one-way hash function,
and then completely erased from the memory. Next, in a similar way, S2i is
computed by evaluating Pi(Gi⊕Idi) and used in the hash function. Whenever
A applies a side channel attack to Ti, the physical characteristics of Pi will
be broken and will no longer be evaluated correctly. If A applies side-channel
attack to extract S1i then the structure of Pi will be destroyed and S
2
i cannot
be computed. Similarly, if A applies side-channel attack to generated S2i she
cannot obtain S1i since it is already erased. Hence, A can access either S1i or
S2i but not both.
Lemma 3. Let Ad be destructive adversary and Ti be a target tag. During
a protocol transcript, the advantage of Ad’s of corrupting Ti before second
deletion (delete S2i , K
2
i ) over corrupting Ti before first deletion (delete S1i ,
K1i ) is negligible.
Proof. Let Ad corrupt tag Ti just before the first deletion , then the adversary
gets the values of S1, K1, nT , nR and temp of the corresponding protocol
run. Then, in order to beat the system in any aspect like security, privacy,
the adversary has to find the values of S2 or K2. Thus, Ad has to solve a
PUF function output or hash function output. Similarly, let us assume Ad
corrupts the tag just before the second deletion. Then the adversary knows
the values of S2, K2, nT , nR, temp, v1 and v2 values of the corresponding
protocol. Then, in order to beat the system, the adversary has to find the
values of S1 or K1. Hence, similar to the above deduction, Ad has to solve
a PUF function output or hash function output. Therefore, there is no real
advantage difference for the adversary of corrupting a tag before first deletion
and the second deletion.
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Lemma 4. Let Ad be destructive adversary. Then Ad’s investigating the
system with many readers and tags gives him negligible advantage when it is
compared with the situation that her investigating the system with just one
reader and one tag.
Proof. Before starting the proof, let us introduce some notations. Let iv
k
1j
,
iK
d
k , in
k
ej
and iS
d be notations used at protocol description where i is tag
index, k is reader index, j is protocol run index, d ∈ {1, 2} and e ∈ {R, T}.
Assume that there are l readers and n tags in the system where l and n
are polynomially bounded. Moreover, the number of protocol runs between
reader k′ and tag i′ is mi′
k′ for k′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} and i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} before
corruption of tag i′. Besides, let the adversary starts a protocol run between
reader k′ and tag i′ pi′
k′ times and starts a protocol run between the tag
i′ and himself as a replacement of reader k′ ri′
k′ times for k′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}
and i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} before corruption of tag i′. Furthermore, let the ad-
versary starts a protocol run between himself as a replacement of tag i′ ti′
k′
times for k′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} and i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} before corruption of tag i′.
Moreover, let m = maxi′,k′{mi′k′}, p = maxi′,k′{pi′k′}, r = maxi′,k′{ri′k′},
t = maxi′,k′{ti′k′} and let M = m + p + r + t. Note that M is polynomially
bounded as m, p, r and t values are polynomially bounded. After Ad’ ob-
serving or corrupting the tags, Ad has at most k.M.l ivk1j values such that
iv
k
1j
=MSBγ{H(iK2k , H(iK1k , inkRj , inkTj))}.
By Lemma 3, let us assume that all tags are corrupted before the second
deletion. Let us fix tag Ty and reader Rz. In order to prove the lemma,
we have the figure out how much advantage Ad gets to guess the value of
yv
z
1myz+1
by observing, creating or corrupting all protocol runs except all
protocol runs between (Ty, Rz) pair and Ty and himself as a replacement of
Rz and reader Rz and himself as a replacement of Ty. Now, let us take a
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pair (u, w) 6= (y, z). There are two cases to consider. First of all, let u = y
and w 6= z. Then if the adversary finds the value of Su1, then the adversary
can calculate the value of uK
1
w. Otherwise, the adversary has to find relation
the among keys or S values or resulting v1 values. The maximum success
probability is M(l− 1)( 1
2θ−1
+ 1
24γ
+ 1
22γ
+ 1
2γ
). Let C denote this probability.
As a second case, if u 6= y, then Ad again has to find relation the among
keys or S values or resulting v1 values. However, in this case, the maximum
success probability isMl(n−1)(( 1
2θ
+( 1
22θ
+ 1
22γ
+ 1
2γ
+ 1
22γ
max{ 1
22γ
, 1
2θ
}) Let D
denote this probability and let β = max{θ, γ}. Then C+D ≤M(ln−1) 1
2β−2
.
Since n, l and M are polynomially bounded and the value of β is sufficiently
large, the maximum total advantage is negligible.
In the next section, these theorems and lemmas will be used in the proof
of security and privacy analysis of the proposed protocol.
4.3.2 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we first prove that our protocol achieves tag authentication
and destructive privacy. Then, we also prove that our protocol satisfies reader
authentication and destructive privacy+.
Theorem 9. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 4.1 achieves tag
authentication if H is a hash function (Definition 3).
Proof. Assume to the contrary, the protocol described in Figure 4.1 does
not achieve tag authentication. That means, the adversary As behaves like
a legitimate tag to a legitimate reader with non-negligible probability. By
Lemma 4, let us assume that there are only one legitimate reader R and
one tag T in the system and for simplicity, R is not updated throughout
the proof. By the argument above, the strong adversary As does not need
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to apply CreateTag,DrawTag andFree oracles. Let As observe pro-
tocol runs between the reader and the tag m times. Moreover, let As uses
SendReader(π) oracle p times to start protocol run between the reader and
the tag and uses SendTag oracle r times to start protocol run between him-
self and the tag. Here, the values of m, p and r are polynomially bounded.
Note that, As can use Corrupt oracle at most one time as the tag T has
PUF function inside. However, we assume that As applies this oracle exactly
one time as this assumption increases his chances to win the game.
Let the adversary have chance to impersonate the corresponding tag k
times, where k is polynomially bounded. In order to achieve the imperson-
ation, at each round As creates ui triple (S2, K2, v1i)j, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
j ∈ {1, . . . , ui} and each ui is polynomially bounded. Note that, if the space
of PUF is smaller than the space of hash function, these triples are created
on guesses of As on the values of S2s. Otherwise, they are created on guesses
of As on the values of K2s. Since the hash function is pre-image resistant,
guesses are not made on the third component. The adversary checks whether
they are true or not at each triple at each impersonation trial based on the
protocol transcripts that have been reached so far. If the adversary could not
find any match at the end of calculations, then the adversary just guesses
the value of v1i .
Let M = m + p + r and U = max{u1, u2, . . . , uk} and so M and U are
polynomially bounded. Moreover, let β = max{θ, 2γ}. By Lemma 4, let
us assume that corruption made before the first deletion. Note that, if the
value of nR sent by the reader at each impersonation trial is one of those nR
values which is used at previous protocol runs, then the success probability
of destroying tag authentication is 1 by choosing corresponding nT value.
However, the probability of realization of this scenario is at most 1−(1−M
2α
)k.
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Otherwise, the probability of As’s generating correct value of v1 in at least
one impersonation trial is at most 2−∏kU−1j=0 (1− 12β−j ) + (1− 12γ )k. In order
to see the total probability is minimum, let us use ln(1− x) ≈ −x for small
x values. Then the success probability is at most 3− e−Mk2α − e− kU2β−kU − e− k2γ .
By contradiction assumption, this probability is non-negligible, so at least
one of the values of M , U and k is non-negligible. However, this contradicts
with the fact that M , U and k are polynomially bounded.
Theorem 10. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 4.1 achieves de-
structive privacy if the protocol achieves tag authentication, P is a PUF (Def-
inition 14) and H is hash function(Definition 3).
Proof. Assume to the contrary, the system does not achieve destructive pri-
vacy property. That means, there is a destructive adversary Ad, who can
distinguish between the real RFID system and the system which is simu-
lated by a blinder B with non-negligible probability. Note that, B simulates
Launch, SendTag, SendReader and Result oracles without knowing the
tag and the reader secrets.
More formally, let there exists an oracle Odest such that Ad plays the
following game with this oracle. Odest chooses a number b ∈R {0, 1}, if b = 1,
real RFID system is used, otherwise B simulates the system. Ad watches
the system for polynomially bounded number of times and the adversary is
allowed to use corrupt oracle as well. At the end, Ad guesses a number b′. If
|Prob(b = b′)| = 1
2
+ a where a is non-negligible, Ad wins the game, else the
adversary loses. Note that, by contradiction assumption, Ad wins the game.
Let us start with how B evaluates oracles:
• Launch(): Evaluated in a trivial way.
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• SendTag(IdR, cR, nR, vtag): The output is nT ∈R {0, 1}α, v1 ∈R
{0, 1}γ .
• SendReader(π): The output is nR ∈R {0, 1}α and the the real values
of IdR and cR.
• SendReader((nT , v1),π): The output is v2 ∈R {0, 1}γ .
• SendTag(v2): returns no output.
• Result(π): If π is generated by Launch oracle and the protocol tran-
script is generated by SendTag and SendReader oracles, the output
is 1. If one of the conditions does not hold, then the output is 0.
By Lemma 4, let us assume that there are only one legitimate reader R and
one tag T in the system and for simplicity, R is not updated throughout
the proof. Let the system be run n1 times only by real RFID system or the
blinder according to b value the oracle Odest chooses and let at n1-th run,
Ad applies Corrupt oracle to the tag T . By Lemma 3, let us assume that
corruption is applied before second deletion. Thus, Ad have the knowledge of
{(nR1, nT 1, v11, v21), (nR2, nT 2, v12, v22), . . . , (nRn1 , nT n1 , v1n1 , v2n1)} and S2,K2,
tempn1 .
There are five cases to consider. First two cases are Ad’s determining
the value of S1 or K1. The probability of these happening are 1
2θ
and 1
22γ
,
respectively. The third case is Ad’s determining value of temp at least one
protocol run. The probability of this case is 1 − (1 − 1
22γ
)n1 . The fourth
possibility is Ad’s determining value of v1 at least one protocol run. The
probability of this case is 1 − (1 − 1
2γ
)n1 . The last case is Ad’s determining
value of v2 being random.
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By contradiction assumption, as Ad wins the game against the oracle,
then one of the four probabilities above is non-negligible or realization of
the last case is non-negligible. However, with sufficiently large θ and γ val-
ues, the four possibilities listed above are negligible. Thus, by assumption,
the probability of Ad’s determining v2 value being random is non-negligible.
However, this statement contradicts with Theorem 9, i.e. contradiction to
tag authentication. Thus, proposed protocol satisfies destructive privacy
property.
Theorem 11. The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 4.1 achieves reader
authentication if H is a hash function (Definition 3).
Proof. By Lemma 4, without loss of generality, there are one reader R and
one tag T in the system. Let Ad observe previous p run of tag T and R before
Ad starts a protocol run with T . As a result of the observations, Ad gets
the following protocol transcripts (nR1 , IdR, cR, nT1 , v11 , v21), . . . , (nRp , IdR,
cR, nTp , v1p , v2p). Note that, Ad’s aim is to impersonate the reader R by
convincing T . The most logical move for Ad is choosing one of the values of
nR1 , nR2 , . . . , nRp as nR value. W.l.o.g., let Ad sends nR1 , IdR, cR to tag T .
There are two cases to consider. First of all, if T responds with nT1 , v11 , then
the probability that the adversary returns the correct value of v2 is 1. If this
is not the case, then there are two cases, which are Ad’s calculating the value
of v2 or guess the value of v2. For the first case, Ad has to now at least one of
the values of (S1, S2), (S1, K2), (K1, S2) and (K1, K2). The corresponding
probabilities are 1
22θ
, 1
2θ+2γ
, 1
2θ+2γ
, 1
24γ
. Let q = max{ 1
22θ
, 1
2θ+2γ
, 1
24γ
}. For
the second case, Ad guess the value of v2 with possibility 12γ . Thus, the
probability that Ad’s convincing the tag T is 12α + 2
α−1
2α
max{m, 1
2γ
}. Note
that the probability given above negligible provided that α, γ and θ are large
enough.
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Theorem 12. The RFID protocol illustrated in Figure 4.1 provides destruc-
tive privacy+ if the protocol achieves tag authentication, P is a PUF (Def-
inition 14) and H is hash function(Definition 3).
Proof. Assume that a reader RC is compromised. Then the adversary ARC
gets the information (Id1, K1
1, K2
1, . . . , Idn, Kn
1, Kn
1) of tags Ti for i =
1, 2, . . . , n, where n is polynomially bounded. Due to the assumption at
Remark 6, after DB updates all other reader, the value of cR changes. More-
over, as the value of cR changed, then the values of Ki
1 = H(Si
1, IdR, cR) and
Ki
2 = H(Si
2, IdR, cR) for i = 1, . . . , n are changed. Note that, the adversary
ARC does not have the values of Si1, Si2 for i = 1, . . . , n due to the pre-
image resistance property of hash function. Thus, from previous knowledge
of (Id1, K1
1, K2
1, . . . , Idn, Kn
1, Kn
1), ARC cannot calculate new Ki1, Ki2 val-
ues for i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, the only legitimate information that ARC
has after system re-setup is Id’s of all tags. Therefore, by Theorem 9 and
Theorem 10, the system is private against the adversary ARC . Hence, the
RFID system provides destructive privacy+.
4.3.3 Security & Privacy and Performance Compar-
isons
Considering memory storage for tag identifiers or keys and other information,
our protocol requires 3β-bit (Id, G, and c ) memory in tag side where β is
at most the length of a hash output. Contrary to tags, server has no limited
resource, so we do not concern on the server-side memory usage. In terms
of computational cost, our protocol requires at most four hash computation
and two PUF evaluations overhead at the tag side. On the other hand, the
computational complexity at the server side is at most O(n), where n is the
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number of tags in the system.
Table 4.1 summarizes the comparison of our protocol with other proto-
cols, where n is the number of tags in the system. Our protocol and [39]
have reader authentication whereas only our protocol provides destructive
privacy, and destructive privacy+. While considering computational com-
plexity at the server side, the complexity required for each scheme is roughly
proportional to the number of tags in the system.
[106] [39] Our Protocol
Reader Authentication + + +
Privacy - Weak Destructive
Privacy+ - Weak+ Destructive+
Crypto Primitive Hash Hash Hash & PUF
Reader Complexity O(n) O(n) O(n)
Table 4.1: The security, privacy and performance comparisons
4.4 The Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we first extend Vaudenay’s adversarial model [18] for oﬄine
RFID system and introduce the notion of compromise reader attacks. We de-
fine the notion of privacy+ and the game behind this privacy notion. Then,
we propose an RFID mutual authentication protocol based on PUF func-
tions. We prove that our protocol achieves destructive privacy for tag owner.
To the best our knowledge, it is the first protocol which uses only symmetric
cryptographic primitives and PUF functions and provides destructive pri-
vacy+ even in case of compromising reader attacks. Our protocol can be
efficiently implemented in low-cost RFID tags because the tags need only
low cost cryptographic primitives such as hash and PUF functions.
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Chapter 5
A QUADRATIC RESIDUE
BASED RFID
AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL
Designing authentication protocols without lowering security and privacy lev-
els negatively affects the efficiency of the entire system. In addition, achiev-
ing the security and privacy properties, the complexity in tag and server side
can vary dramatically from one protocol to another. Hence, while handling
security and privacy issues, it is also important to realize them with less
computational complexity in the server and tag side.
In order to resolve these security and privacy issues, numerous RFID au-
thentication protocols have been recently proposed in the literature [10–16].
Many of them failed to provide security and privacy and the computation on
the server side is also very high. Recently, Yeh et al.proposed an improvement
of the RFID authentication protocol [107] which utilizes quadratic residue
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for security and privacy [31]. It requires constant time at the server side
for identification; however, this proposal has lack of a formal security and
privacy analysis.
In this chapter, we first present a security analysis of Yeh et al. authenti-
cation protocol according to Vaudenay’s model. We prove that this protocol
satisfies at most destructive privacy; but, the tag and reader authentication
are secure against at most weak adversary. Then, we propose a unilateral
authentication protocol which achieves narrow strong privacy. After that,
we propose an enhanced version of proposed protocol, which satisfies mutual
authentication with reader authentication against stronger adversaries. It
achieves destructive privacy according to Vaudenay’s model. Note that, our
proposed protocol and enhanced version of it has constant-time complexity
to identify and authenticate a tag.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1, we give a brief
discussion on formal model on the security. Section 5.2 describes Yeh et al.’s
proposed protocol and gives its security and privacy analysis. In Section 5.3,
the first proposed protocol with security and privacy analysis is given in a
detail. In Section 5.4, analysis of our second mutual protocol is given in a
detail. In Section 5.5, we conclude the chapter.
The results presented in Chapter 5 have been published in [32,33].
5.1 Formal Tools for Security and Privacy Anal-
ysis
We divide this section into three parts. In the first part, preliminaries and no-
tations are described. After that, we summarize Vaudenay’s privacy model.
Finally, we give brief information about ProVerif which is a tool used in
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security analysis.
5.1.1 Vaudenay’s privacy model
In order to analyze the protocols in this chapter, we use Vaudenay’s privacy
model [18]. Vaudenay’s model is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.4.4. Note
that, in this chapter, in all protocol descriptions, tags only include TID as
a tag related information. Hence, when Result oracle is applied, for the
current protocol run, the notion of privacy is meaningless. Thus,we look for
privacy for protocol runs where Corrupt oracle does not take place. As a
reference, following remark can be given.
Remark 7. In this chapter, the adversary is not allowed to distinguish be-
tween the real system and the blinder at protocol runs where Corrupt oracle
takes place.
5.1.2 Security Analysis
Securing a system is a complex problem since it requires a careful analysis of
the underlying assumptions about cryptographic functions and trusted par-
ties, and an accurate implementation of hardware and software. Satisfying
all these requirements is virtually impossible without the use of formal ana-
lytical techniques [108] which are invaluable tools for identifying weaknesses
in security protocols.
In order to verify formally whether an authentication protocol achieves a
certain security property, we first create a model which specifies the capability
of an adversary. Then, we describe the interactions of the adversary in this
model and the definition of the security property within the model. Finally,
by using this model, a formal tool checks whether the goals in the security
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protocol are achieved or not. Recently, several different symbolic formal
models have been proposed in the literature [109–111]. In our analysis, we
use ProVerif [109] which is automatic tool to verify a wide range of security
of cryptographic protocols.
In order to describe an authentication protocol and its interactions, we
used the applied pi-calculus [112]. The grammar used in the applied pi-
calculus is described below, where M and N are terms, n is a name, x is a
variable and u stands either for a name or for a variable.
P,Q,R, ::=
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
vn.P name restriction
let x =M in P else Q term evaluation
if M = N then P else Q conditional
in(u, x).P message input
out(u,N).P message output
Properties of the processes described in the applied pi-calculus can be
proved by automated tools ProVerif [113]. ProVerif first translates the ap-
plied pi-calculus process into a set of Horn clauses. These clauses account
for the initial knowledge of the attacker and the inference rules she can ap-
ply to broaden her knowledge pool for the messages. ProVerif can prove
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reach-ability properties that are typical of model checking tools such as cor-
respondence assertions, and observational equivalence. ProVerif can also
reconstruct an execution trace that falsifies the desired property: when a de-
sired property cannot be proved. Furthermore, in ProVerif analysis, protocol
analysis is considered in accordance with an infinite number of sessions, an
unbounded message space and parallel sessions.
5.2 Yeh et al.’s Proposed Protocol and Its
Privacy Analysis
In this section, we first present Yeh et al.’s authentication protocol [31] by
considering the server and the reader as a single entity, just reader, since
the channel between these two entities is assumed to be secure. Then, we
analyze the protocol according to Vaudenay’s privacy model. We prove that
this protocol satisfies destructive privacy. The protocol steps are described
as follows.
Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}α be a hash function and PRNG : {0, 1}α →
{0, 1}α be a pseudo-random number generator. Let r, s, t, n ∈ {0, 1}α. Each
tag T is equipped with a unique TID and stores the value n and r. These
values are given by reader in the initialization phase. Reader stores the values
h(TID), TID, r, rold where rold = r at the beginning.
In the protocol, the reader R first sends a random challenge s ∈R {0, 1}α
to a tag T . Once T receives the challenge, T picks another random challenge
t ∈R {0, 1}α. T constructs x, y,X,R and T as follows: x = h(TID)⊕r⊕s⊕t,
y = r ⊕ t, X = x2 mod n, R = (r2 mod n) ⊕t, T = t2 mod n. After
these calculations, the tag sends X,R, T, h(x), h(y) and h(t) to R. Then, R
gets (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4) by solving X = x
2 mod n and T = t2
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mod n by using the factors of n, which are p and q. After thatR, determines
correct values of x and t by comparing h(xi)
?
= h(x) and h(ti)
?
= h(t). Then,
R determines the correct value of r in a similar way. R computes h(TID) and
seeks TID from database and compares received r with r or rold. If received r
is valid, then computes acknowledgment message xack = TID ⊕ t⊕ r or rold,
sends h(xack) to T and updates rold as r as PRNG(r). Then T checks
whether h(xack)
?
= h(TID) ⊕ r ⊕ t. If it is valid, T updates r as PRNG(r),
otherwise the protocol aborts.
Before starting the security and privacy analysis of the protocol, we can
assume, without loss of generality, there are one reader and one tag in the
system since the variables which change tag to tag at calculation steps are
h(TID) and r which have same bit length as s. Thus, by deriving more s
values, i.e. more protocol runs, we can recover the advantage loss due to
working with one tag instead of many tags.
Theorem 13. Yeh et al.’s Proposed Protocol achieves tag authentication and
reader authentication if the adversary Aw belongs to weak class.
Proof. Let the adversary Aw observe ℓ protocol runs between the reader and
the tag. Let us assume that Aw tries to impersonate the tag at ℓ + 1th
run. If the value of s sent by the reader is equal to the one of the s values
sent at one of the previous protocol runs, Aw impersonates the tag with
success probability 1. Otherwise, Aw has to guess the values of h(TID) and
r for corresponding run correctly. Thus, the success probability for Aw to
impersonate the tag is ℓ
2α
+(1− ℓ
2α
) 1
22m
, which is negligible. Hence, the system
achieves tag authentication if the adversary is weak.
Similarly, if Aw tries to impersonate the reader, then Aw sends a chal-
lenge s to the tag. Upon receiving the challenge, the tag responses with
X,R, T, h(x), h(y), h(t) according to which t value the tag chooses. However,
87
Tag TID Reader R
n, r, TID p, q, n, TID, r, rold
t ∈R {0, 1}α (1) hello,s←−−−−−−−−−−−− s ∈R {0, 1}α
x = h(TID)⊕ r ⊕ s⊕ t
y = r ⊕ t
X = x2 mod n
R = (r2 mod n)⊕ t
T = t2 mod n
(2)X,R,T,h(x),h(y),h(t)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 1. Solves X = x2 mod n and T = t2 mod n
to get (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4)
2. Compares h(xi)
?
= h(x) and h(ti)
?
= h(t)
to determine x and t
3. Solves R = (r2 mod n)⊕ t to get (r1, r2, r3, r4)
4. Compares h(ri ⊕ t) ?= h(y) to determine r
5. Computes h(TID) = x⊕ r ⊕ s⊕ t
6. Seeks TID record using h(TID)
then compares received r
?
= r or rold else abort
7. Prepares ACK message, xack = TID ⊕ t⊕ r or rold
1. Check h(xack)
?
= h(TID)⊕ r ⊕ t (3) h(xack)←−−−−−−−−−−−−− 8. Updates rold as r as PRNG(r)
if not abort
2. Updates r as PRNG(r)
Figure 5.1: T.-C. Yeh et al.’s improved scheme
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as Aw does not know the value of r, Aw can not figure out the value of t.
Moreover, since Aw does not know the factors of n, which are p and q, Aw
can not the roots of X and R and T . Besides, Aw has to guess correct value
of TID. Thus, the probability that Aw sends correct h(xack) to the tag is 122m ,
which is negligible. Therefore, the system achieves the reader authentication
if the adversary is in class of weak.
Theorem 14. Yeh et al.’s proposed protocol achieves destructive privacy but
does not achieve narrow strong privacy.
Proof. Let there are one reader and one tag in the system and let Ad be a
destructive adversary. Assume to the contrary, the protocol does not achieve
destructive privacy. That is, the adversary Ad can distinguish between the
real RFID system and the system simulated by the B with non-negligible
probability.
Let us start with how B evaluates oracles:
• Launch(): Evaluated in a trivial way.
• SendReader(π): The output is s ∈R {0, 1}α.
• SendTag(s, π): The output is X,R, T, h(x), h(y), h(t).
• SendReader((X,R, T, h(x), h(y), h(t)),π): The output is h(xack).
• Result(π): This oracle works as defined in Remark 2
Let the system is run ℓ times only by the real RFID system or B and let
Ad applies Corrupt oracle at ℓ + 1th protocol run. Ad gets the values of
TID, ℓ and rℓ+1, tℓ+1, xℓ+1, yℓ+1 as a result of Corrupt oracle usage.
There are three ways for Ad to distinguish between the real reader from
the blinder. The first way is Ad’s guessing the correct value of r at any
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protocol run. If this is the case, then by using the relation R = (r2modn)⊕ t
formula, Ad gets the value of t for the corresponding round. Moreover, Ad
gets the values of x, y, X, T values of the corresponding round. Furthermore,
asAd can calculate next rounds’ r value, in a similar wayAd gets the values of
t, x,y, X, T values for each advancing protocol run. Therefore, if Ad correctly
guesses r value at least 1 protocol run, then Ad can check correctness of
the protocol at next protocol runs. Therefore, in this case, the adversary
distinguishes the real system from the blinder. However, realization of this
case has probability at most 1− (1− 1
2α
), which is negligible. The next way
for Ad is to guess the correct value of h(ack) at any protocol run. Similarly,
the realization of this case has probability at most 1 − (1 − 1
2α
), which is
negligible.
The last way is Ad’s determining the value that is produced by Result
oracle is right or wrong. By contradiction assumption, Ad’s success proba-
bility at this case is non-negligible as the success probability of previous two
ways are negligible. However, this contradicts with the Theorem 13 as in our
case, for past protocol runs, destructive adversary acts like weak adversary
as r values of previous protocol runs can not be deduced from the knowledge
of rℓ+1. Thus, the protocol achieves destructive privacy.
Let As be a narrow strong adversary. In this case, let As corrupts the
tag before starting any protocol run. As indicated above, As gets the value
of r, and due to the nature of PRNG functions, As can calculate the value of
r in any advancing run. Therefore, she can calculate the value of t, x, y, X
and T at each protocol run. Hence, As can distinguish the real system from
the blinder. Thus, the protocol does not achieve narrow strong privacy.
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Tag TID Reader R
n, TID p, q, n, TID
t ∈R {0, 1}α (1) s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s ∈R {0, 1}α
x = h(TID)⊕ s⊕ h(t)⊕ t
X = x2 mod n, T = t2 mod n
M = h(x||t) (2) X,T,M−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 1. Solves X = x2 mod n and T = t2 mod n
to get (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4)
2. Compares h(xi||tj) ?=M to determine x and t
3. Computes h(TID) = x⊕ s⊕ h(t)⊕ t
4. Check h(TID) exists in database
Figure 5.2: Our proposed narrow strong private scheme
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5.3 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we first present a novel scalable RFID authentication protocol
which is based on quadratic residue. Then, we give security and privacy
analysis of it according to Vaudenay’s model.
Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ be a hash function. Let s, n, t ∈ {0, 1}α. Each
tag T is equipped with a unique secret TID and stores the value n. These
values are given by reader R in the initialization phase. R stores the values
h(TID) and TID. The authentication protocol is summarized in Figure 5.2.
In the protocol, R first sends a random challenge s ∈R {0, 1}α to a tag
T . Once T receives the challenge, T picks another random challenge t ∈R
{0, 1}α. T constructs x,X, T and M respectively as shown in Fig. 2, then
sends X,T and M to R. Once R receives X,T and M , it gets (x1, x2, x3, x4)
and (t1, t2, t3, t4) by solving X = x
2 mod n and T = t2 mod n by the
help of factors on n. After that R, determines correct values of x and t
by comparing h(xi||tj) ?= M . Now, R can compute h(TID) and then check
existence of TID in the database.
5.3.1 Security and Privacy Analysis
Before starting the security analysis of the proposed protocol, Note that, we
can assume there is one reader and one tag in the system. Since the variables
which change tag to tag at calculation steps are h(TID) which has same bit
length as s. Thus, by deriving more s values, i.e. more protocol runs, we
can recover the advantage loss due to working with one tag instead of many
tags.
Theorem 15. The proposed RFID protocol achieves tag authentication if the
adversary Aw belongs to the weak class.
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Proof. Let the adversary Aw observe ℓ protocol runs between the reader and
the tag. First of all, let us assume that Aw tries to impersonate the tag at
ℓ + 1th run. There are two cases to consider. If the challenge value s sent
by the reader is equal to the one of the s values sent at previous protocol
run, then with 1 success probability, Aw impersonates the tag. However, the
probability of realization of this scenario is ℓ
2α
. If this is not the case, then
the only way for Aw to impersonate the tag is to guess the value of h(TID)
correctly. The success probability in this case 1
2α
. Hence, Aw impersonates
the tag with probability ℓ
2α
+ (1− ℓ
2α
) 1
2α
, which is negligible. Therefore, the
system achieves tag authentication if the adversary is weak.
Theorem 16. The proposed RFID protocol achieves narrow strong privacy.
Proof. Before starting the proof steps, note that, for proposed protocol, in
terms of privacy analysis, there is no real difference between the adversary’s
applying Corrupt oracle only one time and more than one time. Since,
at each Corrupt oracle usage, the adversary gets the values of TID and
n, which do not changes among protocol runs and session specific t and x
values and there is no real connection between any of two protocol runs’
corresponding values. Therefore, in the proof, the adversary applies the
Corrupt oracle only once.
Let there are one reader and one tag in the system and let As be a narrow
strong adversary. Assume to the contrary, the protocol does not achieve
narrow strong privacy. That is, the adversary As can distinguish between
the real RFID system and the system simulated by the B with non-negligible
probability.
Let us start with how B evaluates oracles:
• Launch(): Evaluated in a trivial way.
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• SendReader(π): The output is s ∈R {0, 1}m.
• SendTag(s, π): The output is X,T,M .
Let the system is run ℓ times only by the real RFID system or B. Let As
applies Corrupt oracle at ℓ+1st protocol runs and after that oracle usage,
the system run k more times. Note that, As gets the values of TID, n, tℓ+1
and xℓ+1 as a result of Corrupt oracle usage.
Note that, there are two ways for Aw to distinguish the real system from
the blinder. The first one is to guess t value correctly at any of previous n
protocol runs or next k runs. The other way is to guess one of the X, T and
M value correctly. Hence, the total success probability of the adversary is
ℓ+k
2α
+ (1 − ℓ+k
2α
) 3
2α
, which is negligible. Of course, one can run this process
defined above polynomially bounded time and increase the adversary’s chance
but the resulting success probability will be at most negligible.
5.4 An Enhanced Version of the Proposed
Protocol
In this section, we propose an enhanced version of the proposed protocol
which provides mutual authentication. We prove that our protocol depicted
in Figure 5.3 satisfies reader authentication against strong adversary and has
destructive privacy level.
The protocol steps of this protocol consists of the unilateral authentica-
tion protocol and the last message sent by reader to the tag. The reader
prepares xack = TID||t||s and sends h(xack) to the tag. The tag checks va-
lidity of h(xack) by comparing its value with h(TID||t||s). All the steps of
the second protocol are summarized in Figure 5.3.
94
5.4.1 Security and Privacy Analysis
Theorem 17. The protocol depicted in Figure 5.3 satisfies tag authentication
against weak adversary and satisfies reader authentication against narrow
strong adversary.
Proof. First of all, note that by Theorem 15, the protocol satisfies tag au-
thentication against weak adversary. Let us prove the reader authentication
part. Let the adversary As be a narrow strong adversary and As observes n
protocol run between the reader and the tag. Let us assume that As corrupts
the tag at ℓ + 1th round and tries to impersonate the reader at ℓ + 2th run.
Note that, As gets the value of TID and tℓ+1 as a result of Corrupt oracle
usage. Let us do our analysis in the worst case such that in the first ℓ + 1
protocol runs, the reader sends the same s value to the tag as a challenge.
As sends the same s value to the tag as a challenge so as to increase his
chance to impersonate the reader. There are two cases to consider. The
first case is tag’s choosing t among previous chosen t values. In this case,
the adversary impersonates the reader with 1 possibility. If this is not the
case, adversary has to guess the correct value of t chosen by the tag to cre-
ate h(xack). Therefore, As impersonates the reader with probability at most
ℓ+1
2α
+ (1− ℓ+1
2α
) 1
2α−ℓ−1
, which is negligible.
Note that, one can give more impersonation chance to the adversary and
increases his chance to impersonate the reader. However, at the end, the
success probability remains negligible.
Theorem 18. The protocol demonstrated at Figure 5.3 achieves destructive
privacy.
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Tag TID Reader R
n, TID p, q, n, TID
t ∈R {0, 1}α (1) hello,s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s ∈R {0, 1}α
x = h(TID)⊕ s⊕ h(t)⊕ t
X = x2 mod n
T = t2 mod n
M = h(x||t) (2) X,T,M−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 1. Solves X = x2 mod n and T = t2 mod n
to get (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4)
2. Compares h(xi||tj) ?=M to determine x and t
3. Computes h(TID) = x⊕ s⊕ h(t)⊕ t
4. Check h(TID) exists in database
-if exists
prepares ACK message, xack = TID||s||t
-otherwise
Check h(xack)
?
= h(TID||s||t) (3) h(xack)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− prepares ACK message, xack ∈ {0, 1}∗
Figure 5.3: Enhanced version of proposed protocol
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Proof. Let there are one reader and one tag in the system and let Ad be a
destructive adversary. Assume to the contrary, the protocol does not achieve
destructive privacy. That is, the adversary Ad can distinguish between the
real RFID system and the system simulated by the B with non-negligible
probability.
B evaluates oracles in the same way as indicated at the proof of Theo-
rem 16 with addition:
• SendReader((X,T,M), π): The output is h(xack).
• Result(π): This oracle works as defined in Remark 2
Let the system is run ℓ times only by the real RFID system or B and let
Ad applies Corrupt oracle at ℓ + 1st protocol run. Ad gets the values of
TID, n and tℓ+1, xℓ+1 as a result of Corrupt oracle usage.
There are three cases to consider. The first case is Ad’s guessing the value
of t in any of previous ℓ protocol runs. However, as there is no connection
between tℓ+1 and previously chosen t values, the realization of first case is
negligible. The second case is Ad’s guessing the correct value of h(xack).
Similarly, the probability of realization of this case is negligible.
The last way is Ad’s determining the value that is produced by Result
oracle is right or wrong. By contradiction assumption, Ad’s success proba-
bility at this case is non-negligible as the success probability of previous two
ways are negligible. However, this contradicts with the Theorem 17 as in our
case, for past protocol runs, destructive adversary acts like weak adversary.
Thus, the protocol achieves destructive privacy.
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5.4.2 Formal Analysis
In this section, we use ProVerif tool in order to formally prove the security
property of our enhanced protocols such as reader authentication and tag
authentication.
To encode the protocol into the pi-calculus, we first determine the re-
quired cryptographic primitives with function symbols, and rewrite rules and
equations over terms. Let hash() be a universal hash function. Let xor be
the function which satisfies ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}α, xor(x, y) = x ⊕ y. Note that,
ProVerif cannot evaluate XOR functions properly and so we provide all possi-
ble reduction functions (xor1, . . . , xor8) which help ProVerif to simulate XOR
function. Let two large primes, (P,Q) be a factors of a common modulus N.
Then, let smodulus denote a type of pair of (P,Q) and pmodulus denote a type
of public modulus (N=PQ). The reader stores factors of a public modulus N
P and Q and tag stores the modulus, publicmod(P and Q).
We also simulate quadratic residue functions, one for taking modulo
square, one for taking modulo square root. ∀x,X ∈ {0, 1}α and pmodu-
lus N ∈ {0, 1}α, square(x,N) is equal to x2 mod N and ssquare(X,N)
gives all possible solutions to X−2 mod N .
The public channel between reader and tags are described as free c :
channel. The adversary is also allowed to use this channel for her attack.
Our mutual authentication protocol is expected to satisfy (informally)
the following properties:
• Authentication of tag to reader: if the reader identifies tag, it responds
so that at the end of the protocol, tag has approval to engage with
reader in a session, only if reader permits it.
• Authentication of reader to tag: similar to the above.
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• Secrecy of session keys (combination of s and t).
In our model, we assume secret is a private key shared between tag and
reader which is unknown by the adversary. Our interest in this model is to
verify the secrecy of the bitstring (t) generated by tag. Therefore, as soon as
tag authenticates reader, tag broadcasts secret XORed with the generated t
(out(c, secret ⊕ t)). If there is no way that an adversary can derive secret
by applying the rules, then the protocol is safe. Namely, the authentication
procedure has not been compromised. In order to challenge the adversary,
we write the query syntax, as the following: query attacker(secret).
The behavior of the reader is encoded into following process, Reader.
In this process, the reader waits any message from tag on channel in(c :
channel, data). It sends any message to tag through the same channel (out(c :
channel, data)).
1. let Reader(TID:bitstring ) = new s:bitstring;
2. (* Message 1 *) out(c, s);
3. (* Message 2 *)
4. in(c, (X:bitstring, T:bitstring, M:bitstring));
5. let x = ssquare(X,P and Q) in
6. let t = ssquare(T,P and Q) in
7. let (=M) = hash((x,t)) in
8. let HTID = hash(TID) in let HT = hash(t) in
9. let (=HTID) = xor1(xor1(xor1(x,HT),t),s)
10. in event readerAuthTag(s,t);(* Message 3 *)
11. out(c, hash((TID,s,t))); 0.
The behavior of the tag is encoded into following process:
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12. let Tag(TID:bitstring, N : pmodulus) =
13. (* Message 1 *)
14. in(c, s:bitstring); new t:bitstring ;
15. let HT = hash(t) in let HTID = hash(TID) in
16. let x = ssquare(X,P and Q) in
17. let X = square(x,N) in let T = square(t,N) in
18. let M = hash((x,t)) in
19. (* Message 2 *) out(c,(X,T,M)); (* Message 3 *)
20. in(c, ack:bitstring);
21. let (=ack) = hash((TID,s,t)) in
22. event tagAuthReader(s,t);
23. out(c, xor(secret,t)) ;0.
These two processes are executed multiple times in parallel using the
following syntax:
24. process
25. let N = publicmod(P and Q) in out (c,N);
26. new TID:bitstring;
27. (!Reader(TID) | !Tag(TID,N ) | phase 1; out(c,TID))
In this process, we first created a public modulus N, which is sent through
channel c. Then we create a new TID for a tag identifier. This TID and the
private products of N (P and Q) are given to reader. ProVerif first converts
these processes and adversary actions into a set of Horn clauses [114] so as
to automatically prove queries. Then, it runs the processes and searches for
a valid security gap based on requested queries. The output of ProVerif con-
firms that the attacker cannot derive the term (secret) so the authentication
procedure can be performed successfully without being compromised. Also,
the attacker is not be able to cheat both reader and tag even if we provide
TID of the victim tag to adversary in phase 1.
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5.5 The Summary of the Chapter
Nowadays, several RFID applications have been deployed in our daily lives
such as contact-less credit cards, e-passports, ticketing systems, and etc. The
importance security and privacy concerns has been gradually increasing for
RFID systems.
In this chapter, we first give a formal security and privacy analysis of
Yeh et al.’s authentication protocol. We proved that this protocol provides
at most destructive privacy according to Vaudenay’ model whereas the tag
and reader authentication is secure against at most weak adversary. Then,
we introduced an unilateral authentication protocol and we formally proved
that this protocol achieves narrow strong adversary. We also proposed the
enhanced version of the protocol that provides reader authentication. We
proved that the second protocol satisfies destructive privacy and the reader
authentication is secure against narrow strong adversary.
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Chapter 6
OPTIMAL SECURITY
LIMITS OF RFID K-PCD
PROTOCOLS
In this chapter, we focus on the low-cost distance-bounding protocols that
have bit-wise fast phase and no final signature. As for the classification, we
introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols
where each response bit depends on the current and the k previous chal-
lenges. We call the 0-PCD protocols as current challenge dependent protocols
(CCD). Then, we provide trade-off curves between the optimal security limits
of mafia and distance frauds for CCD protocols and k-PCD protocols. After
that, we give the security analysis of k-PCD distance bounding protocols
and show the success probabilities against mafia and distance fraud attacks.
Our results show that when we increase the number ‘k’, the security level
of distance bounding protocols enhanced as expected. We also demonstrate
the results calculated via developed computer program and observe k-PCD
trade-off curve. We show that the curve for k-PCD protocols is below the
102
trade-off cure for k−1-PCD protocols for all k ≥ 1. Finally, we give a simple
and generic method of extending CCD protocols to k-PCD protocols.
The composition of the chapter is following. Section 6.1 gives general no-
tations and definitions. In Section 6.2 we briefly explain the current challenge
dependent (CCD) protocols and give its security limits. In Section 6.3, con-
jectures and open questions of k-PCD protocols and some relevant definitions
are given. Section 6.4 introduce the way of constructing k-PCD protocols
and gives their security levels.
The results presented in Chapter 6 was published in [34] and have been
submitted to a Journal [35].
6.1 General Notions, Definitions
Distance bounding protocols are generally composed of two types of phases:
slow phase and fast phase. In some protocols there is only one slow phase
at the beginning of the protocol [78, 95], on the other hand some other pro-
tocols [79, 92] composed of three phases; slow phase-I, fast phase, and slow
phase-II. The slow phases consist of the time-consuming operations such as
random nonce generations, commitment and signature calculations. The fast
phase includes non-time consuming response generations and rapid bit ex-
changes. Particularly during the slow phase-II the prover has to calculate a
final signature. In the slow phase, both parties constitute the session secrets
(for example, the session secret in the HK protocol presented in Figure 6.1
consists of two registers) that are used to produce response bits during the
fast phase. Throughout the fast phase, both parties use the same response
generating function which produces a response by using the session secrets
and given a challenge value. In this chapter, we mainly focus on the distance
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bounding protocols in which there is no final signature and having bit-wise
fast phase.
In what follows we study on how to achieve the optimum security against
mafia fraud and distance fraud. For that, we first define a class of protocols
without a final signature and, in which each response bit depends on the cur-
rent challenge, Current Challenge-Dependent (CCD) protocols. It is defined
as follows.
Definition 15 (CCD Protocol). Let f : Fm+12 → F2 be a Boolean function.
A CCD protocol P is a distance bounding protocol that satisfies the following
properties:
• During the fast phase, each response bit ri is computed as ri := f(ci, yi0, . . . ,
yim−1), where ci is the i-th challenge bit and (y
i
0, . . . , y
i
m−1) is the i-
th string of the session secret shared by both prover and verifier for
i = 1, . . . , n, where n is the number of rapid bit exchanges.
• There is no final slow phase.
The protocol P is denoted as f(ci, yi0, . . . , yim−1) → ri CCD protocol. The
function f is called the response function of the protocol P.
One popular example of CCD protocols is Hancke and Kuhn (HK) pro-
tocol [78]. The protocol consists of two phases: Slow phase and fast phase
(or rapid bit exchange phase). As depicted in Figure 6.1 the protocol steps
are as follows.
• Slow phase - The prover and the verifier exchange their randomly
generated nonce. From these random numbers and a shared secret x
both party compute two n − bit registers y0 and y1, using a pseudo-
random function h. These registers are used as session secrets during
the fast phase.
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Verifier (x)
NV ∈R {0, 1}ℓ
Prover (x)
NP ∈R {0, 1}ℓ
y0||y1 := h(x,NV , NP )
||y0|| = ||y1|| = n
NV -
NPﬀ
Start fast phase
for i = 1 to n
Pick ci ∈R {0, 1}
Start clock ci -
riﬀ
f(ci, y
i
0, y
i
1) = ci · yi1 ⊕ c¯i · yi0
ri := f(ci, y
i
0, y
i
1)Stop clock
End fast phase
Check r1, r2, . . . rn
and ∆ti ≤ tmax
Figure 6.1: Hancke and Kuhn’s distance bounding protocol
• Fast phase - The verifier sends a random challenge ci to the prover,
then the later replies with ri, by using the challenge and shared session
secrets such that f(ci, y
i
0, y
i
1) = y
i
ci
, where i = 1, 2 . . . n. For each
rapid bit exchange the verifier measures the round trip time ∆ti. After
n rapid bit exchanges the verifier checks the correctness of ri’s and
∆ti ≤ tmax where n is the security parameter and tmax is the maximum
allowed time delay for each rapid bit exchange.
The response function of the protocol can be described as the following
Boolean function:
f(ci, y
i
0, y
i
1) = ci · yi1 ⊕ (c¯i) · yi0 = yici (6.1)
where ⊕ and · are the addition and the multiplication operations of the
binary Galois Field respectively.
Let us denote PEmaf the success probability of correctly guessing one bit
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response for mafia fraud of an attack E, and similarly PEdis for distance fraud
of an attack E. The security levels of a given protocol P are defined as
follows.
Definition 16. Pmaf (P) = maxE PEmaf and Pdis(P) = maxE PEdis. That is,
Pmaf (P) is the maximum of PEmaf over all the mafia fraud attacks E mounted
on P, and similarly Pdis(P) is the maximum of PEdis over all the distance fraud
attacks E mounted on P.
The success probability of mafia and distance fraud against HK protocol
is (3/4)n for the attacks given in [34, 78]. Therefore, Pmaf (HK) ≥ 3/4
and Pdis(HK) ≥ 3/4. It has been an open question that these security
levels are optimum for CCD protocols. Also, it is not known whether it is
possible to improve the security level against mafia fraud without sacrificing
the security level against the distance fraud and vice-versa. In general, we
have the following open questions for CCD protocols:
• What is the best security levels for both mafia fraud and distance fraud
among all CCD protocols?
• What is the optimum achievable security level for mafia fraud of a CCD
protocol?
• For a CCD protocol, what is the minimum value of Pmaf if Pdis is ideal
(i.e. 1
2
)?
The above-mentioned questions are answered in [34]. We show that there
is a trade-off between mafia fraud and distance fraud, namely Pmaf (P) +
Pdis(P) ≥ 3/2. It is also proven that for any CCD protocol there is a security
limit concerning the mafia fraud such that Pmaf (P) ≥ 3/4 for any CCD
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protocol P . As a consequence of this result it is shown that if Pdis(P) = 1/2
then the protocol is completely vulnerable to mafia fraud (i.e., Pmaf (P) = 1).
In order to improve the security levels against these frauds without using
a final signature, the notion of k-Previous Challenge Dependent (k-PCD)
protocols is introduced, in which each response bit depends on the current
and the k previous challenges during fast phase. The definition of the k-PCD
protocol as follows.
Definition 17 (k-PCD Protocol). Let g : Fm+k+12 → F2 be a Boolean
function. A k-PCD protocol P is a distance bounding protocol that satisfies
following properties
• During the fast phase, each response bit ri is computed as ri := g(ci, . . . ci−k,
yi0, . . . , y
i
m−1) where cj is the j-th challenge bit and (y
i
0, . . . , y
i
m−1) is the
i-th string of the session secret shared by both prover and verifier for
i = 1, . . . , n, where n is the number of rapid bit exchanges.
• There is no final slow phase.
The protocol P is denoted as g(ci, . . . , ci−k, yi0, . . . , yim−1)→ ri k-PCD proto-
col. The function g is called the response function of the protocol P.
Remark 8. From Definitions (1) and (2), a CCD protocol is a class of k-
PCD protocol where k = 0.
6.2 Optimal Security Limits for CCD Proto-
cols
In this section, we demonstrate the security trade-off between mafia and
distance frauds for CCD distance bounding protocols. We use the character-
istics of the response function f used in a CCD protocol, during the security
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analysis against mafia and distance frauds. We suppose that all the chal-
lenges and the shared session secrets, which are used to produce response
bits, are uniformly random. Let m be the security parameter. For a given
response function f, let us define the following sets:
A = {y = (y0, y1, . . . , ym−1) ∈ Fm2 : (6.2)
f(0, y0, . . . , ym−1) 6= f(1, y0, . . . , ym−1)}
B = {y = (y0, y1, . . . , ym−1) ∈ Fm2 :
f(0, y0, . . . , ym−1) = f(1, y0, . . . , ym−1)}
Let a and b be the cardinality of the sets A and B, respectively. Then,
it clearly holds a + b = 2m. We also define a generic distance fraud attack
that can be mounted on all CCD protocols and this attacks is depicted in
Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1 A generic distance fraud attack for CCD Protocol (n)
Require: n: Number of rounds
for i← 1 to n do
t← f(0, yi0, . . . , yim−1) + f(1, yi0, . . . , yim−1)
if t = 0 then
Send 0
else if t=2 then
Send 1
else
Send a random bit
end if
end for
We also describe a generic mafia fraud attack that can be mounted on all
CCD protocols. In this attack, the adversary first relays the messages (e.g
nonce or commitments etc.) between the verifier and the prover, during the
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slow phase. Then, during the fast phase she executes Algorithm 6.2. We
assume that, the protocol is public. Therefore, a and b can be computed
during the off-line phase.
The following statement gives a trade-off between mafia fraud and dis-
tance fraud for CCD protocols.
Theorem 19. Let P be a f(ci, yi0, . . . , yim−1) → ri CCD protocol. Assume
that ci and y
i
js used during the fast phase of P are uniformly random. Then,
(i) Pmaf (P) ≥ 3/4, and (ii) Pmaf (P) + Pdis(P) ≥ 3/2.
Algorithm 6.2 A generic mafia fraud attack for CCD protocol (n,a,b)
Require: n: Number of rounds
Require: flip: Deciding on flipping the response
if b ≤ a then
flip← 1
else
flip← 0
end if
for i← 1 to n do
Send a random challenge c′i ∈ {0, 1}
Record the prover’s response r′i
end for
/*Then, Mafia continues the protocol with the verifier*/
for i← 1 to n do
record i-th challenge of the verifier in ci
if c′i = ci then
Send r′i
else
Send r′i ⊕ flip
end if
end for
Proof. Let us first consider the distance fraud attack described in Algorithm
6.1. For any challenge ci, the adversary always produces a correct response if
yi0, y
i
1, . . . , y
i
m−1 are in the set B. Otherwise, i.e., when they are in the set A,
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she successfully predicts the response with a probability of 1/2 because ci,
and yij s are uniformly random. Thus, the success probability of Pdis for the
attack given in Algorithm 6.1 is equal to
b
2m
·1+ a
2m
· 1
2
=
a+ 2b
2m+1
=
1
2
+
b
2m+1
.
Concerning the mafia fraud attack given in Algorithm 6.2, let the adver-
sary receive the r′i responses from the prover for her predicted challenges c
′
i.
Then, she executes the attack against the verifier. Since cis are randomly
produced by the verifier, there are two equally likely cases. (a) If ci = c
′
i the
adversary knows the answer then sends r′i. (b) If ci 6= c′i she has to predict
the response bit ri. The probability that r
′
i and ri are equal is
b
2m
, and that
are not equal is
a
2m
. The adversary chooses the larger probability in order
to decide whether she flips the response bit (i.e., r′i ⊕ 1). Then, we have
Pmaf =
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
·max{ a
2m
,
b
2m
}. Since a + b = 2m, max{ a
2m
,
b
2m
} ≥ 1
2
and
this implies that Pmaf ≥ 3
4
.
If b ≤ 2m−1 (b ≤ a), then, Pmaf = 1
2
+
a
2m+1
for the attack. So, we
have Pdis + Pmaf =
3
2
. On the other hand, when b ≥ 2m−1 (b ≥ a), Pmaf =
1
2
+
b
2m+1
≥ 3
4
. Thus, Pdis(P) + Pmaf (P) ≥ 3
2
.
The first part of Theorem 19 indicates that there is a security limit for
CCD protocols concerning the mafia fraud, and the second part attests the
security trade-off between mafia and distance frauds. Figure 6.2 depicts the
trade-off curve between the success probabilities of these frauds for any CCD
protocol.
One interesting result of Theorem 19 is that CCD protocols cannot attain
the ideal security level against the distance fraud without being vulnerable
against mafia fraud. This is also stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. For a CCD protocol P, if the security level for the distance
fraud is ideal (i.e. Pdis(P) = 1/2) then, Pmaf (P) is 1.
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Figure 6.2: The trade-off between distance and mafia for CCD protocols
Proof. The probability Pdis(P) satisfies the condition in Theorem 1, so Pmaf (P) =
3/2− 1/2 ≥ 1.
Remark 9. Recall that the security levels of the HK protocol against the
mafia and distance frauds are both 3/4. Security levels of HK protocol lie on
the trade-off curve.
6.3 Optimal Security Limits for k-PCD Pro-
tocols
In this section, we give the security analysis of k-PCD distance bounding
protocols. In this respect, we first describe the concept of neighborhood,
which is helpful for security analysis of the distance fraud. Then, we intro-
duce two generic attacks for mafia and distance frauds that can be mounted
on all k-PCD protocols.
While designing k-PCD distance bounding protocol, there are n-round
one-bit challenge/response during fast phase. There is an exceptional case
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for the first round of this phase. In the first round, the verifier sends k initial
challenges before sending a challenge c1. For example, in the first round of
a k-PCD protocol, the verifier first sends c−k+1, . . . , c−1, c0 and c1 then waits
for r1.
6.3.1 Security Regions for Distance Fraud
Let us consider an adversary who tries to cheat on the distance against a
verifier. While producing a response bit ri, the adversary may use some of
the received previous challenges in her attack. This can increase the success
probability of the adversary. However, reception of the challenges at earlier
time depends on how far the adversary is away from the verifier. Therefore,
in order to make the attack analysis simpler, we describe k + 2 spherical
regions (Z0, . . . , Zk+1), in which the adversary can communicate with the
verifier (see Figure 6.3.1). Let d0 be the maximum radius of Z0 that is the
legal authentication region, and t0 be the elapsed time for a signal to travel
the distance d0. Zi is the annulus region between two concentric spheres with
radius of di−1 and di−1 + di where di = (i + 1) · d0 and 0 ≤ i ≤ k. Zi is the
outside of Zi−1. We assume that the speed of the signal is constant.
When the adversary is in the region Z0, she always accesses to all the
challenges and produces valid responses on time. However, when the distance
between the adversary and the verifier is d0+δd (δd > 0), any signal traveling
this distance takes t′0 > t0, i.e., t
′
0 = t0 + δt. In order to run her attack
successfully, the adversary should send each current response (ri), at least 2δt
before receiving the current challenge (ci). When δt > k · t0, she is in region
Zk+1, she should send the response ri before receiving ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci.
However, when the adversary is in Zu, where u < k + 1, she accesses some
of the previous challenges to send ri. This increases the attacker’s success
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d1
Z
0
Z1
Zk+1
.......
......
Figure 6.3: Regions for distance fraud
probability. As a result, while analyzing the security of a k-PCD protocol
against distance fraud, the region of the adversary should be considered.
In the next subsection, we focus on the security of k-PCD protocols
against mafia and distance frauds for arbitrary number of k values. For the
sake of simplicity for distance fraud analysis, we assume that the adversary
is in Zk+1.
6.3.2 Security Trade-off for k-PCD Protocols
Let f be the function that outputs the response bit ri from the challenges
ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci and the precomputed session secrets y
0
i , y
1
i , ..., y
m−1
i . The
function f is executed n times to form the whole set of responses. For
y = (y0, y1, ..., ym−1) ∈ Fm2 , let αy be
αy =
∑
ci−k,ci−k+1,...,ci∈{0,1}
g(ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci, y)− 2k.
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Also, we define the following sets:
A = {y ∈ Fm2 : |αy| = 2k},
B = {y ∈ Fm2 : 0 < |αy| < 2k},
C = {y ∈ Fm2 : αy = 0},
where | · | denotes the absolute value.
The set A includes the session secrets that produce the same response
bit for any ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci. The set B consists of the session secrets that
produce the responses, majority of them are equal, for any ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci.
The set C contains the session secrets that produce the responses, half of them
are equal, for any ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci.
Let a, b and c be the cardinality of the sets A, B, and C, respectively.
Then a+b+c = 2m. We assume that all the challenges and the precomputed
session secret bits, which are used to compute response bits, are uniformly
random.
Theorem 20. Let P be a f(ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci, yi0, . . . , yim−1) → ri k-PCD
protocol. Assume that ci’s and y
i
j’s used in the fast phase of the protocol P are
uniformly random. Then Pmaf (P ) ≥ 1/2 + 1/2k+2 and Pmaf (P ) + Pdis(P ) ≥
1 + 1/2k+2.
Proof. Considering distance fraud attack depicted in Algorithm 6.3, for any
challenge value, the adversary always guesses a correct response if yi is in the
set A. If it is in the set B, she predicts the response with probability between
1/2 + 2
k+1−1
2k+1
and 1/2 + 2
k+1
2k+1
by choosing the frequent one. However, if it is
in the set C, she can predict the response with probability 1/2. Therefore,
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Algorithm 6.3 A generic distance fraud attack for k-PCD protocol (n)
Require: n: Number of rounds
cp ← {0, 1}
for i← 1 to n do
if αyi ≥ 2k−1 then
Send 1
if f(ci−k, . . . , ci−1, 0, y
i
0, . . . , y
i
m−1) = 1 then
cp ← 0
else
cp ← 1
end if
else
Send 0
if f(ci−k, . . . , ci−1, 0, y
i
0, . . . , y
i
m−1) = 0 then
cp ← 0
else
cp ← 1
end if
end if
ci−t−1 ← ci−t for t = 0, . . . , k − 1
ci ← cp
end for
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the success probability Pdis for this attack is computed as follows:
Pdis ≥ a
2m
· 1 + b
2m
· 2
k + 1
2k+1
+
c
2m
· 1
2
≥ 1
2
·
(
a
2m
+
b
2m
+
c
2m
)
+
1
2
· a
2m
+
1
2k+1
· b
2m
≥ 1
2
.
Considering the mafia fraud attack described in Algorithm 6.4. After the
first k-1 queries, the adversary carries out the attack against the verifier. The
adversary knows the correct response (i.e., r′i = ri) if c
′
i−k = ci−k, c
′
i−k+1 =
ci−k+1, 1. . . and c
′
i = ci. The probability of this event is 1/2
k+1 since all the
challenge bits are produced uniformly random. For the remaining cases, the
adversary has to predict the corresponding response bit ri.
The attacker has to predict the response bit ri corresponding to a different
challenge bits (ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci). If the corresponding session secret yi is in
the set A, then the probability that r′i = ri is 1 by definition. The probability
of the prediction will be between 1/2+ 2
k+1−1
2k+1
and 1/2+ 2
k+1
2k+1
if yi is in the set B
since this happens only if both the input vectors (ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci, yi) and
(c′i−k, c
′
i−k+1, . . . , c
′
i, yi) produce the same response even though the vectors
are not equal. Similarly, the probability is 2
k−1
2k+1−1
if yi is in the set C. Then,
the probabilities that r′i 6= ri are deduced straightforward.
The attacker has two strategies for predicting a response value corre-
sponding to a different pair of challenge bits.
(i) Attacker sends the same response value received from the prover (r′i )
and the success probability of mafia fraud (P noflipmaf ) is computed as follows.
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Algorithm 6.4 A generic mafia fraud attack for k-PCD protocol(n,a,c)
Require: n: Number of rounds
flip: Deciding on flipping the response
Send a random challenge c′0, . . . , c
′
k−1 ∈ {0, 1}
if c ≥ (2k+1 − 1) · a then
flip← 1
else
flip← 0
end if
for i← k to n do
Send a random challenge c′i ∈ {0, 1}
Record the prover’s response r′i
end for
/*Then, Mafia continues the protocol with the verifier*/
Record first k challenge of the verifier
for i← k to n do
record i-th challenge of the verifier in ci
if c′i = ci , c
′
i−1 = ci−1, . . . , c
′
i−k = ci−k then
Send r′i
else
Send r′i ⊕ flip
end if
ci−t−1 ← ci−t for t = 0, . . . , k − 1
end for
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P no−flipmaf =
1
2k+1
+
2k+1 − 1
2k+1
· ( a
2m
· 1 + b
2m
· P no−flipb
+
c
2m
· 2
k − 1
2k+1 − 1)
(ii) Attacker sends the complement of the response value and the success
probability of mafia fraud with this strategy is computed as follows.
P flipmaf =
1
2k+1
+
2k+1 − 1
2k+1
· ( a
2m
· 0 + b
2m
· (1− P no−flipb )
+
c
2m
· 2
k
2k+1 − 1)
Both P noflipmaf and P
flip
maf probabilities depend on the characteristic of func-
tion f . The adversary chooses the larger probability. It can be seen that
P no−flipmaf + P
flip
maf =
1
2k
+
2k+1 − 1
2k+1
= 1 +
1
2k+1
Hence, we get
Pmaf = max(P
no−flip
maf , P
flip
maf ) ≥
1
2
+
1
2k+2
Therefore,
Pdis + Pmaf ≥ 1
2
+
1
2
+
1
2k+2
= 1 +
1
2k+2
.
We compare mafia fraud attacks P no−flipmaf , P
flip
maf with an approximation
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(neglecting b since P no−flipb ≈ 1/2 (See Remark 10)) :
P flipmaf ≥ P no−flipmaf ⇐⇒ c ·
1
2k+1 − 1 ≥ a
Therefore, it can be seen that, if c ≥ a · (2k+1− 1) flipping the response is
more preferable and no-flipping for the other cases. Note that, our approxi-
mation does not related with the theoretical results, it is just for simplifying
the choice between P noflipmaf and P
flip
maf .
Remark 10. Note that, the set B consists the session secrets that produce the
responses, majority of them are equal, for any ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci. Therefore,
P no−flipb can be expressed as
P no−flipb =
1
b
·
2k−1∑
i=1
P no−flipbi · bi and b =
2k−1∑
i=1
bi
where bi is the cardinality of {y ∈ Fm2 : |αy| = 2k − i}
and P no−flipbi =
(2
k+i
2 )+(
2k−i
2 )
(2
k+1
2 )
.
It can be seen that
P no−flipbi = 1/2 +
i2 − 2k−1
22k+1 − 2k and
P no−flipbi ≥ 1/2 ⇐⇒ i ≥ 2
k−1
2
Therefore, P no−flipb ≈ 1/2 is not an unrealistic assumption.
Corollary 2. For a k-PCD protocol P, if a · (2k+1− 1) ≥ c is satisfied then,
Pdis(P) ≥ 1/2 + 1/2k+2 and Pmaf (P ) + Pdis(P ) ≥ 1 + 1/2k+1.
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Proof. By the given condition,
a · (2k+1 − 1) ≥ c ⇐⇒
a · (2k+1) ≥ c+ a ⇐⇒
a
2m
≥
(
a
2m
· 1
2k+1
+
c
2m
· 1
2k+1
) (6.3)
Using the inequalities in Theorem 20 and Equation 6.3;
Pdis ≥ a
2m
· 1 + b
2m
· 2
k + 1
2k+1
+
c
2m
· 1
2
≥ 1
2
·
(
a
2m
+
b
2m
+
c
2m
)
+
1
2
· a
2m
+
1
2k+1
· b
2m
≥ 1
2
+
1
2
·
(
a
2m
· 1
2k+1
+
b
2m
· 1
2k+1
+
c
2m
· 1
2k+1
)
≥ 1
2
+
1
2k+2
.
Therefore,
Pdis + Pmaf ≥ 1
2
+
1
2k+2
+
1
2
+
1
2k+2
= 1 +
1
2k+1
.
For different k values, the corresponding Pmaf + Pdis values are depicted
in Figure 6.4. It s clearly seen that the summation goes to 1 when k values
increase. For all k ≥ 8, Pmaf + Pdis ≡ 1.
6.4 The Construction of a k-PCD Protocol
In the previous section, we have already proved that k-PCD protocols can
provide better security level than the CDD protocols. In this section, we
introduce a method to improve the security of CCD protocols by adapting
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Figure 6.4: The Pmaf + Pdis for different k values
them to k-PCD protocols. In this context, we first give the notion of a
natural extension. Then, we apply this extension on an existing protocol,
HK protocol, to show the security enhancement.
Let P be a CCD protocol with the response function f(ci, yi0, . . . , yim−1)→
ri and P ′ be a k-PCD protocol with the response function g(ci−k, . . . , ci, y0, . . . , ym−1)→
r′i. We give the definition for a natural extension of a CCD protocol to pro-
vide a k-PCD protocol as follows.
Definition 18 (Natural Extension for CCD to k-PCD). P ′ is called a natural
extension of P if g(ci−k, . . . , ci, y0, . . . , ym−1) is a Boolean function of the vari-
ables f(Q(ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci), y
i
0, . . . , y
i
m−1) and T (ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci), where
Q and T are Boolean functions of k + 1 variables.
We study HK protocol as an example of CCD protocols which has the
security level as 3/4 against both mafia and distance frauds. We first ap-
ply the following natural extension for HK protocol to obtain an optimum
security level for mafia fraud among k-PCD protocols.
121
g(ci−0, . . . , ci−k, y0, y1) = f(ci, y
i
0, y
i
1) (6.4)
⊕ f(c¯i−1, yi−10 , yi−11 )
.
.
.
⊕ f(c¯i−k, yi−k0 , yi−k1 )
= yici ⊕ yi−1c¯i−1 . . .⊕ yi−kc¯i−k ,
where c¯i−1 is the complement of ci−1. It is clearly seen that the response of
each round depends on the current challenge and the complement of previous
number of k challenges. In order to apply this extension into HK protocol,
the verifier should send k random challenge in the initialization of the fast
phase. The protocol steps are depicted in Figure 6.5.
In order to analyze this protocol, we look at how the response bits are
distributed according to the challenge bits. Therefore, for each k values
we generate two n-bit registers from a hash function (SHA-256). Then, we
examine the distribution of the cardinality of the set A, B, and C for each k
values. Note that if c/((2k+1 − 1)a) ≥ 1, then the adversary can apply the
attack described in Algorithm 6.4.
We did simulation on different k values and we observed that almost
all of the ratios are greater than 1 and this means that we can apply the
attack described in Algorithm 6.4. Hence, using this attack against this
construction the success probability of mafia fraud would be Pmaf = 1/2 +
1/2k+2 (Corollary 2). To demonstrate the correctness of the corollary, we
also simulate this attack for different k values and we see that there is no
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Verifier (x, k) Prover(x, k)
NV ∈R {0, 1}ℓ NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ NP ∈R {0, 1}ℓ
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
y0||y1 := h(x,NP , NV )
||y0|| = ||y1|| = n
Start fast phase
c1, . . . , ck ∈R {0, 1} c1,...,ck−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Store c1, . . . , ck
for i = k + 1 to n+ k
ci ∈R {0, 1}
Start Clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Stop Clock
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ri = yici ⊕ yi−1c¯i−1 , . . . ,⊕yi−kc¯i−k
End fast phase
Check rk+1, . . . rk+n
△t ≤ tmax
Figure 6.5: The proposed k-PCD Protocol
statistically significant difference between the observed success probability
and the expected probability.
Now, let us analyze this protocol against distance fraud. In the security
analysis, we consider the prover being in different regions. When the prover
in region Z1, the security level is same as the original HK protocol (i.e. 3/4)
since the prover has access to all the previous challenges. When the prover
is in region Z2, the prover cannot access to both ci and ci−1, then the success
probability would be 1/4 ∗ 1+ 3/4 ∗ 1/2 = 5/8. Similarly, when the prover is
in the region Zk+1, the success probability would be 1/2
k + (1− 1/2k) ∗ 1/2.
In order to enhance this protocol against distance fraud, we can extend this
response function similar to [34]. The new response function would be as
follows.
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g(ci−k, ci−k+1, . . . , ci, y0, y1) = f(ci, y
i
0, y
i
1) (6.5)
⊕ ci−1
⊕ f(c¯i−2, yi−20 , yi−21 )
.
.
.
⊕ f(c¯i−k, yi−k0 , yi−k1 )
= yici ⊕ ci−1 ⊕ yi−2c¯i−2 . . .⊕ yi−kc¯i−k ,
In this response function, the challenge value ci−1 is not in the evaluation
of the function f but it is used only for masking. Since the adversary cannot
reach ci and ci−1 in region Z2, even though the adversary has unbounded
computational resources, the success probability of computing the correct
response cannot be more than 1/2. More generally, the prover in region Zk
where k ≥ 2, she has no access to specifically ci−1 the success probability
would be at most 1/2 for single round.
6.5 The Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we have explained RFID distance bounding protocols and
briefly reviewed current challenge dependent protocols. We also introduced
the notion of k-PCD protocols. Thus, we have shown that when we increase
the dependency parameter k, security level against mafia fraud attack and
distance fraud attack increase as they are expected. We have supported these
expectations by calculating success probabilities of distance fraud and mafia
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fraud attacks for k-PCD protocols. On the other hand, trade-of curve of
k-PCD protocol is plotted and compared other versions. We also prove the
conjecture that the best trade-off curve for k1-PCD protocols lies above the
best trade-off curve for k2-PCD protocols where k1 < k2. Finally, we provide
a way of constructing k-PCD protocols with only two registers and prove
that this construction achieves the computed security.
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Chapter 7
ACHIEVING OPTIMUM
SECURITY: AN RFID
DISTANCE BOUNDING
PROTOCOL BASED ON
PUFS
In this chapter, we first analyze the security of Sadeghi et al.’s PUF based
RFID authentication protocol [3] by our stronger adversarial model in which
an adversary has access to the volatile memory of the tag. We show that
their protocol is not secure in this model and we propose a new technique
to avoid this attack even if the adversary has the ability to access volatile
memory.
Next, we apply this technique to propose a new PUF based RFID dis-
tance bounding protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
proposal that introduces a PUF based RFID distance bounding protocol. It
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is well-known that obtaining the long-term key of a tag is crucial in order to
successfully perform the terrorist and the distance frauds. One of the main
problems of existing distance bounding protocols is storing the long-term key
into its memory which can be obtained by a fraudulent prover. Our protocol
has the advantage that the long-term key will not be stored in the memory
of the tag but will be reconstructed by using a PUF circuit.
Our first PUF based distance bounding protocol is based on the well-
known Hancke and Kuhn’s scheme [78]. Although their original protocol is
known to be simple and efficient, the adversary’s probability of success is
high (namely (3/4)n for both the distance and the mafia frauds, and 1 for
the terrorist fraud). By the use of PUF, the adversarial capabilities of the
terrorist fraud is reduced to that of the mafia fraud. In this way, we improve
the security of Hancke-Kuhn’s protocol against the terrorist fraud from 1 to
(3/4)n under an assumption that the victim tag is required to be alive after
compromising.
Moreover, we propose our second distance bounding protocol which is an
extension of the first one involving a hash-based final signature. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first protocol that achieves the ideal security
levels (1/2)n against all frauds without any assumption.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 7.1, we illustrate
the notion of PUF functions and its characteristics. Section 7.2 describes
the adversary capabilities for both PUFs and distance bounding protocols.
In Section 7.3, we propose our first distance bounding protocol and analyze
its security. In Section 7.4, we present our second protocol and analyze its
security. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter.
The results presented in Chapter 7 was published in [1].
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7.1 Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
In this chapter, we will focus on an ideal PUF P such that P : {0, 1}ℓ →
{0, 1}m where the challenge ci is mapped to the response ri. P is said to be
an ideal PUF if the following properties are satisfied.
1. If ci = cj, then we have ri = rj for a PUF on a particular device.
Presenting the same challenge to the PUF on a different device will
produce a different response.
2. The mapping between ci and ri is unpredictable and random. For
instance, if ri and rj differ in only a single bit, knowledge of ci does not
reveal usable information to predict cj.
3. Any attempt to physically tamper with the device implementing P
causes to change its physical characteristics. Namely, P is then de-
structed and can no longer be evaluated correctly.
We note that the third property of the idealized PUF can be achieved
by integrating PUF circuit with the chip on the tag. To do so, Tuyls et
al. in [71] propose Integrated PUFs (I-PUFs). For further information we
recommend reading [3, 71]. In this work, we use the ideal PUF for distance
bounding protocols and show how the security is enhanced to ideal levels.
7.2 Adversary Capabilities
In this section, we first present a stronger adversarial model for analysis of
PUF based RFID authentication protocols which considers the accessibility
to the internal state of tags. We next discuss the notion of white and black
box models for distance bounding protocols. We aim to unify and express
the adversarial capabilities of PUFs and distance bounding protocols.
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7.2.1 Adversary Capabilities on PUFs
In a PUF based authentication protocol, the shared secrets are stored in
its physical characteristics instead of storing them in a non-volatile memory.
These keys are reconstructed whenever needed during the execution of the
protocol. As soon as the keys are reconstructed, they are stored in a volatile
memory of the RFID chip. In some previous articles (e.g., [3, 71]), it is
assumed that the communication between a PUF circuit and a chip is not
tractable by any side-channel attack.
Unlike the previous works, in this chapter, we propose a more stronger
adversary model where an attacker has the ability to compromise the tag
and reaches the state in the volatile memory. Since the structure of the PUF
circuit has been destroyed, the attacker is no longer able to re-evaluate the
PUF again. Thus, a malicious tag owner can perform only one side-channel
attack on the tag and access the volatile memory only once. For instance,
Halderman et al. recently demonstrated a side-channel attack for DRAM,
called cold boot attack [115]. In this attack, they first powered off the system
and later showed how to extend the main memory persistence by ’freezing’
the DRAM chips in order to maintain the memory cell state. In this way,
an adversary will be able to retrieve any password or cryptographic key that
was not disappeared before the system is switched off.
The protocol of Sadeghi et al. [3] is facing a similar attack described
above. Their protocol is briefly described as follows (Figure 7.1). Let l ∈ N
be a security parameter, and F:{0, 1}k × {0, 1}2α → {0, 1}β be a public
pseudorandom (PRF) function. Each tag T is equipped with a PUF function
P:{0, 1}γ → {0, 1}k and is initialized with a random state S1 ∈R {0, 1}γ .
The credential of each tag (ID,K), where K ← P (S) and is stored in the
database DB of the reader. The reader R first picks a random nonce a to the
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tag TID. Then, TID picks a random nonce b and evaluates the PUF function
K = P (S). TID computes c = FK(a, b) and sends the message c along with
the random nonce b and immediately erases K, a, b and c from its volatile
memory. Upon receiving of b and c, R evaluates c′ = FK(a, b) for each tuple
(ID,K) in DB until there is a match. If a matching (ID,K) is found, then
it accepts TID and returns ID; otherwise, it rejects by sending ⊥ back.
Tag TID Reader R
S DB = {(ID1,K1), . . . , (Kn, IDn)}
b ∈R {0, 1}α a←−−−−−−−−−−−−− a ∈R {0, 1}α
K ← P (S)
c← FK(a, b)
b,c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If ∃(ID,K) ∈ DB
delete K, a, b, c s.t. c
?
= FK(a, b) then
return ID
else return ⊥
endif
Figure 7.1: Sadeghi et al.’s authentication protocol
The authors claim that their protocol achieves destructive-privacy under
the assumption that K is inaccessible. However, we show that their proto-
col suffers from the same above-mentioned cold-boot attack. Assume that
an adversary sends a random nonce a to the tag TID. TID then generates
another random nonce b and reconstructs a secret K by evaluating the PUF
with input S. The secret K is stored in the volatile memory during the com-
putation of c = FK(a, b). The adversary compromises TID while c = FK(a, b)
is computed and can capture the secret K. Hence, the tag can be successfully
cloned although the structure of the PUF circuit has been destroyed.
In order to thwart this attack, instead of using only one key we propose to
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use two different keys K,L which are consecutively generated as outputs of
the PUF function. Note that K and L never appear in the volatile memory
at the same time. First, K is used as an input of one-way PRF function,
and then completely deleted from the memory. Next, in a similar way, L
is generated and used in the PRF function. Hence, whenever an adversary
applies the above-mentioned attack he will be able to obtain only one of
the keys, and hence will not have sufficient information to defeat the privacy.
Also, since the PUF circuit has been destroyed he will not be able to perform
the same attack again. Thus, applying our technique avoids the tag cloning.
7.2.2 Adversary Capabilities on Distance Bounding Pro-
tocols
In the analysis of our protocols, Dolev-Yao adversary model are consid-
ered [116]. In this model, the adversary can perform polynomial number
of computations and cannot obtain the secret keys from the honest parties.
This assumption is then relaxed with the terrorist and distance frauds, where
the prover has access to the keys [52]. However, he disagrees to share these
keys with any third party. The adversary may use one of the three strategies
to query a prover such as pre-ask strategy, post-ask strategy and early-reply
strategy. The detailed explanations of these strategies are addressed in [52].
As in the conventional distance bounding protocols, we also assume that
the verifier is an honest party where it faithfully follows the protocol specifi-
cations without cheating. Mafia fraud is a kind of man-in-the-middle attack
where an adversary defeats both honest parties i.e., verifier and prover. Un-
like mafia fraud, in distance and terrorist frauds, the prover himself is dishon-
est. The previous distance bounding protocols consider that the prover has a
full control on the execution of the algorithm in the device. As it is discussed
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in Section 7.1, PUFs can be used to provide resistance against side-channel
attacks. Therefore, an adversary can be limited to the execution of the algo-
rithm inside the device. In order to analyze distance bounding protocols, the
generic capabilities of the adversary are addressed in [52]. The capabilities
are categorized in two models, white-box model and black-box model. The
following definitions of these two models are excerpted from [52].
White−box model
Terrorist fraud Terrorist fraud
Mafia fraud Mafia fraud
Distance fraudDistance fraud
Black−box model
Figure 7.2: Relations between the frauds in the white-box and the black-box
models.
Definition 19. (Black-box model) In this model, the prover cannot ob-
serve or tamper with the execution of the algorithm.
Definition 20. (White-box model) In this model, the prover has full ac-
cess to the implementation of the algorithm and has a complete control over
the execution environment.
Regarding to the white-box and the black-box models Figure 7.2 presents
the relation between the distance, mafia and terrorist frauds. An arrow from
X to Y means that, for any fraud in X that succeeds with probability pX ,
then there exists an attack in Y that succeeds with probability pY such
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that pY ≥ pX . Two side arrow means that the success probabilities of two
corresponding frauds are equal [52].
It is interesting to note that in the black-box model, the success proba-
bilities of the mafia and the terrorist frauds are equal (Figure 7.2).
7.3 Our First Distance Bounding Protocol
We now propose the first PUF based distance bounding protocol which is
efficient for implementation in low cost devices. In the next section, we ex-
tend this protocol by adding a final signature to enhance the security against
both mafia fraud, terrorist fraud and distance fraud.
The former achieves the security level of (3/4)n against mafia and distance
frauds and (3/4)n against the terrorist fraud under an assumption that the
tag is wanted to be still functional, where n is the number challenge/response
bits during the fast phase. We show in the next section that the latter
achieves the ideal security level against all the frauds (i.e., (1/2)n).
7.3.1 Protocol Descriptions
Our first distance bounding protocol is based on Hancke and Kuhn’s scheme
[78], which is the starting point of this work. Although their protocol is
simple and efficient the adversary’s probability of success is high. The steps
of our protocol are summarized below and depicted in Figure 7.3.
7.3.1.1 Initialization
Let Pi : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ be a (unique) ideal PUF of the i-th legitimate
prover Pi. The credentials database DB of the verifier V stores a tuple
(Ki, Li) where Ki = Pi(G
1
i ) and Li = Pi(G
2
i ) for random states G
1
i , G
2
i ∈R
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{0, 1}k. Let also F : {0, 1}ℓ×{0, 1}2ℓ → {0, 1}2ℓ be a one-way pseudo-random
function. We denote n as the main security parameter of the fast phase where
3n = 2ℓ. |S| denotes the bit-length of a bit-string S.
Our protocol consists of two phases: a slow phase and a fast phase.
Slow phase:
• First of all, V generates a random nonce rV and sends it to Pi.
• Upon receiving rV , Pi generates a random nonce rP and reconstructs
Ki = Pi(G
1
i ). Pi computes T = FKi(rP , rV ), then immediately deletes
Ki from the memory. After that, Pi reconstructs the secret key Li =
Pi(G
2
i ) and computes the message FLi(T ). Similarly, Pi immediately
deletes Li from the memory. The value FLi(T ) is divided into three
registers v1, v2 and v3 where |v1| = |v2| = |v3| = n. Finally, Pi sends
rT and v1 to V .
• Upon receiving rT and v1, for each tuple (Ki, Li) in DB V searches
v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3 = FL(FK(rP , rV )) such that v
′
1 = v1. If not found, V aborts
the protocol.
Fast phase:
• The fast phase consists of n bit-wise challenge-response exchange. For
each round j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, V picks a random challenge bit cj and sends
it to Pi.
• Pi immediately responds rj = vj2 if cj = 0, otherwise rj = vj3.
7.3.1.2 Verification
Whenever the fast phase is finished V verifies that the responses from Pi are
correct and checks whether △tj ≤ △tmax ∀ j = 1, . . . , n where △tmax is a
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timing bound.
Verifier Proveri
DB = {(K1, L1), . . . , (KN , LN)} G1i , G2i
Slow phase
Pick rV ∈R {0, 1}l Pick rP ∈R {0, 1}l
rV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ki = Pi(G1i )
T = FKi(rP , rV )
delete Ki
Li = Pi(G
2
i )
v1, v2, v3 = FLi(T )
|v1| = |v2| = |v3| = n
delete Li
If ∃(K,L) ∈ DB rP ,v1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s.t. v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3 = FL(FK(rP , rV ))
and v′1 = v1 then
goto Fast phase
else return ⊥
endif
Fast phase
for j = 1, . . . , n:
cj ∈R {0, 1}
Start timer
cj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if cj = 0 then
rj = v
j
2
else rj = v
j
3
endif
Stop timer
rj←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 7.3: Our first PUF based distance bounding protocol without a final
signature
7.3.2 Security Analysis of The First Protocol
Mafia, terrorist, and distance frauds are the three main security concerns
when considering distance bounding protocols.
The following Theorem 21 indicates that no adversary (e.g., a malicious
tag owner) can access to both secrets Ki and Li. Thus, the use of PUF in
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the protocol makes the RFID tags as tamper proof against any malicious
adversary.
Theorem 21. Let Ki, Li be secrets of a tag Ti for some i in the above-
mentioned protocol (see Figure 3). Assume that there is an adversary A with
a full side-channel capability on the tag Ti. If Pi is an ideal PUF, then A can
only access either the secret Ki or the secret Li, but not both in the same tag
Ti.
Proof. (sketch) The pre-keys G1i and G
2
i are used as input for Pi function to
reconstruct the real keys Ki and Li. The real keys only appear during the
execution of the protocol. Note that Ki and Li never appear in the memory
of Ti at the same time because Ki is first used as an input of a one-way PRF
function, and then completely deleted from the memory. Next, in a similar
way, Li is generated and used in the PRF function. Whenever A applies a
side channel attack to Ti, the physical characteristics of the PUF Pi will be
broken and will no longer be evaluated correctly. If A applies side-channel
attack to extract Ki then the structure of Pi will be destroyed and Li cannot
be generated. Similarly, if A applies side-channel attack to extract Li she
cannot obtain Ki since it is already deleted. Therefore, A can access either
Ki or Li but not both. Hence, A will not be able to get the complete key of
Ti.
Theorem 21 indicates that a malicious prover cannot obtain the secret
keys, and thus cannot evaluate the registers v1, v2, v3. In the black-box model,
note that it is already proven that the capability of terrorist fraud is equiv-
alent to the mafia fraud [52] (see also Figure 7.3). Hence, for the black-box
model, we combine the security analysis of both mafia and terrorist frauds.
Note that a malicious prover can access to the registers v1, v2, v3 by ap-
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plying side-channel attack only once. Furthermore, she can complete only
the current session successfully because of the destruction of PUF. However,
since the registers v1, v2, v3 are randomized this does not give any future
advantage to the adversary.
For a distance bounding protocol, an adversary is able to use three dif-
ferent strategies to conduct her attack such that early-reply, pre-ask, and
post-ask [52]. We denote by A a malicious adversary. Let also denote by
MF , TF and DF the mafia fraud, the terrorist fraud and the distance fraud,
respectively. Let F be a fraud and S be the strategy used by the adversary
A. Let PrF |S be the success probability in the black-box model of the fraud F
(MF/DF/TF ) using the strategy S (early/pre/post). Note that the strate-
gies can also be combined and this is denoted by an &. Next, we describe
the success probability of each fraud as follows.
7.3.2.1 Mafia and Terrorist Fraud Analysis in Black-box Model
The adversary uses pre-ask or post-ask strategies in order to achieve mafia
or terrorist fraud.
In pre-ask strategy strategy [52], A first relays the slow phase be-
tween V and P . Then A executes the fast phase with P . A sends predicted
challenges c′j to P and get the responses r′j corresponding to her challenges.
With this a strategy, A obtains only one of the register. Afterward, A exe-
cutes the fast phase with V and receives the challenges cjs. There are two
equal likely cases, (i) if cj = c
′
j A sends the correct response with probability
of 1; otherwise, (ii) A guess the response with probability of 1/2. Hence, the
success probability of mafia fraud and terrorist fraud for n-round fast phase
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is computed as follows.
PrMF |pre = PrTF |pre =
(
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
)n
=
(
3
4
)n
.
In post-ask strategy [52], A first relays the slow phase, then executes
the fast phase with V . The probability of sending a correct response for a
challenge is 1/2. Then, A queries P with the correct challenges received
during the fast phase to check whether she is succeed on cheating. The
success probability of mafia fraud for this strategy is:
PrMF |post = PrTF |post =
(
1
2
)n
.
To maximize the success probability the attacker chooses the best strat-
egy. Hence, the success probability of both mafia and terrorist frauds are
(3/4)n.
7.3.2.2 Terrorist fraud analysis in the white-box model
In pre-ask strategy strategy, terrorist fraud performs the attack as fol-
lows.
• The terrorist fraud first gets the random nonce from the verifier and
relays them to the prover.
• The prover executes the protocol and when v1, v2 and v3 are computed,
the prover compromise the tag and reaches the internal state and views
rP , v1, v2, v3, Li.
• The prover sends this four (rP , v1, v2, v3) to the terrorist.
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• Now, the terrorist fraud can impersonate the prover with the success
probability of 1.
However, this tampering causes the destruction of the prover’s chip. This
attack may not be accomplished by the prover because of the destruction.
In this case, in the white-box analysis of the terrorist fraud, tampering the
tag would be infeasible. The following remark considers this case.
Remark 11. If the tag is required to be functional after an attack, the cor-
ruption of the tag would not be allowed. Hence, the success probability of
terrorist fraud with pre-ask strategy will be the same as the success probabil-
ity with pre-ask strategy in the black-box model, (3/4)n.
In post-ask strategy strategy, terrorist fraud performs the attack as
follows.
• A first relays the slow phase, then executes the fast phase with V .
• The probability of sending a correct response for a challenge is 1/2.
• Then, A queries P with the correct challenges received during the fast
phase to check whether she succeeds on cheating.
• The success probability of mafia fraud for this strategy is:
PrTF |post =
(
1
2
)n
.
To maximize the success probability, the attacker chooses the best strat-
egy. Hence, the success probability of terrorist fraud is (3/4)n when the
target tag is not allowed to be destroyed. Otherwise, it is 1.
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7.3.2.3 Distance Fraud Analysis in Black-box Model
In distance fraud, the tag owner herself is fraudulent who tries to cheat on
her proximity from V . It is important to highlight that unlike the existing
protocols, the tag owner cannot control the internal executions of the tag in
our protocol. The fraudulent prover can query its tag to get the responses. In
distance fraud, since the prover is outside of the legal authentication region
she should send the responses earlier in order to pass the proximity check
(i.e., round trip time measurement). This is called early-reply strategy [52].
To ease our analysis, we denote the fraudulent tag owner by A, and the tag
by T .
In pre-ask combined with early-reply strategy strategy, A first
relays the slow phase between V and T , then executes the fast phase with T .
A can only obtain n-bit responses corresponding to her predicted challenges.
Since A is not inside the neighborhood of V , she sends her responses in
advance. Two cases occurs for each round of the fast phase. (i) A predicts
V ’s challenge correctly, then she sends a correct corresponding response in
advance. (ii) A cannot predict V ’s challenge correctly, but she can send a
correct answer with probability of 1/2. Thus, the distance fraud success
probability is:
PrDF |pre&early =
(
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
)n
=
(
3
4
)n
.
Now, let us look at the success probability of the adversary with post-ask
combined with early-reply strategy. Similar to the mafia fraud analysis,
it is clear that using the post-ask strategy is equivalent to randomly guessing
the responses,
PrDF |post&early =
(
1
2
)n
.
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The distance fraud attacker chooses the strategy with the maximum suc-
cess probability. Consequently, the success probability of distance fraud is
(3/4)n.
7.3.2.4 Distance Fraud Analysis in White-box Model
In white-box model, distance fraud, A, has chance of compromising the tag
and can execute the protocol algorithm with polynomial number of times.
However, A cannot access to both secrets in the chip by Theorem 21, so A
cannot perform such attack.
The distance fraud can perform pre-ask combined with early-reply strat-
egy strategy. A first relays the slow phase between V and T . Then, A can
access to both registers only once and can use these registers to realize her
attack. In her strategy, two cases occurs for each round of the fast phase.
(i) A predicts V ’s challenge correctly when two register bits are equal, then
she sends a correct corresponding response in advance. (ii) A cannot not
predict V ’s challenge correctly because the register bits are different, but she
can send a correct answer with probability of 1/2. Thus, the distance fraud
success probability is:
PrDF |pre&early =
(
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
)n
=
(
3
4
)n
.
7.4 Our Enhanced Distance Bounding Proto-
col
We are now ready to propose our extended protocol which is resistant to all
the frauds.
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7.4.1 Protocol Descriptions
In what follows, we present our second protocol which is an extension of the
first one by adding a final signature. This protocol consists of three phases.
The first two phases are exactly the same with the previous protocol.
In the third phase, the prover computes the following final signature as
follows. It first evaluates the PUF with G1i to reconstruct Ki and computes
Ttemp = h(c1, . . . , cn, T,Ki) where h denotes a collusion resistant and one-way
hash function. Then, it erasesKi from memory and reconstructs Li = Pi(G
2
i )
and computes fsign = h(Ttemp, Li) and deletes Li. The prover sends fsign to
the verifier, then the verifier checks the correctness of this message.
7.4.2 Security Analysis of Extended Protocol
In the extended protocol, the challenges received by the tag are digested in
fsign. Therefore, in order to pass the authentication, the adversary must send
a valid final signature to the verifier.
7.4.3 Security analysis in Black-Box Model
Considering the black-box model, there are two strategies for both mafia and
terrorist frauds:
(i) In the pre-ask strategy, the adversary first executes the fast phase
with the prover by sending c′1, . . . , c
′
n challenges, then prover replies with the
corresponding responses r′1, . . . , r
′
n. In the final phase, the adversary gets
f ′sign = h(c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n, T,Ki). The final signature is valid if and only if all the
challenges c1, . . . , cn sent by the verifier are equal to the ones predicted by
the adversary. Thus, it is clear that the probability of fsign = f
′
sign is equal
to (1/2)n.
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Verifier Proveri
DB = {(K1, L1), . . . , (KN , LN)} G1i , G2i
Slow phase
Pick rV ∈R {0, 1}l Pick rP ∈R {0, 1}l
rV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Ki = Pi(G1i )
T = FKi(rP , rV )
delete Ki
Li = Pi(G
2
i )
v1, v2, v3 = FLi(T )
|v1| = |v2| = |v3| = n
delete Li
If ∃(K,L) ∈ DB rP ,v1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s.t. v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3 = FL(FK(rP , rV ))
and v′1 = v1 then
goto Fast phase
else return ⊥
endif
Fast phase
for j = 1, . . . , n:
cj ∈R {0, 1}
Start timer
cj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if cj = 0 then
rj = v
j
2
else rj = v
j
3
endif
Stop timer
rj←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Ki = Pi(G
1
i )
Ttemp = h(c1, . . . , cn, T,Ki)
delete Ki
Li = Pi(G
2
i )
fsign = h(Ttemp, Li)
fsign←−−−−−−−−−−−−− delete Li
Figure 7.4: Our enhanced PUF based distance bounding protocol with a final
signature
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(ii) In the post-ask strategy, the adversary first plays with the verifier and
guesses all the responses during the fast phase. If she passes the fast phase
then it is easy to get the valid final signature from the prover by forwarding
the challenges of the verifier. However, the probability of guessing all the
correct responses during the fast phase is equal to (1/2)n. Thus,
PrMF = PrTF =
(
1
2
)n
.
Similarly, the security of the extended protocol for distance fraud is also
bounded by (1/2)n because in order to receive a valid final signature from
the tag the fraudulent prover should have queried the tag with all correct
challenges in advance. Hence, the use of final signature enhances the security
level of our extended protocol against the distance fraud to the ideal level
(1/2)n.
7.4.4 Security Analysis in White-Box Model
Note that, in the white box model, terrorist fraud collaborates with the
prover. By the definition of PUFs, the prover has only one opportunity for
compromising the tag because of the destruction of PUF.
Considering the white-box model, there are also two strategies for both
distance and terrorist frauds such as pre-ask strategy and post-ask strategy.
In both strategies, the fraudulent prover needs the computation of the final
signature correctly. However, Theorem 21 indicates that a malicious prover
cannot obtain both the secret Ki and Li by corruption. Since one of the keys
will be still unknown by the adversary, the final signature cannot be com-
puted in advance by the adversary. The success probability of the adversary
is bounded by either the probability of predicting of a valid final signature or
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The Protocol
Black-Box Model White-Box Model
Mafia Terrorist Distance Mafia Terrorist Distance
First (3/4)
n
(3/4)
n
(3/4)
n
(3/4)
n
(3/4)
n
/ 1∗ (3/4)
n
Extended (1/2)
n
(1/2)
n
(1/2)
n
(1/2)
n
(1/2)
n
(1/2)
n
∗If the tag is required to be functional after the corruption,
the success probability of terrorist fraud is (3/4)
n
, otherwise 1.
Table 7.1: The security analysis of our distance bounding protocols
predicting the challenge bits in advance. Therefore, we can concluded that
the success probability of both terrorist fraud and distance fraud is at most
(1/2)n.
7.5 The Summary of the Chapter
Relay attacks are indeed practical threats for RFID systems since using only
cryptographic primitives it is not easy to thwart mafia, distance and terrorist
frauds. Distance bounding protocols are used to mitigate these threats. How-
ever, the existing distance bounding protocols cannot achieve ideal security
level against all frauds.
In this chapter, we present the first PUF based distance bounding au-
thentication protocol. Note that the protocols based on PUFs are known to
be powerful since attacks can be easily prevented and the use of expensive
cryptographic primitives can be minimized. In our protocol, we use the idea
of key storage mechanism based on PUFs for public-key cryptography pre-
sented by Tuyls and Batina [71] (which is also later used for symmetric key
storage by Sadeghi et al. [3]). We modified their protocol in such a way that
all the keys are not constructed at the same time. This enables us to achieve
a stronger assumption and there is no way to extract the whole secret key
from the tag. We show that our first protocol achieves the security level of
(3/4)n against mafia and distance frauds and (3/4)n against terrorist fraud
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under the assumption of the tag is still functional. We also extend our pro-
tocol by adding a final signature to enhance the security levels. Namely, we
achieve the security level (1/2)n against for all mafia, terrorist and distance
frauds. To the best our knowledge, this is the first chapter that achieves the
ideal security level (1/2)n against all frauds.
An interesting further question is whether it is possible to find an efficient
protocol without a final signature having the ideal security level against all
frauds.
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Chapter 8
ARCS: ANONYMOUS RFID
AUTHENTICATION BASED
ON CLOUD SERVICES
Every potential application of RFID systems may require a different ap-
proach. As an illustration, manufacturers of consumer goods require a full
range of compliance-tagging and verification solutions. When working to
meet RFID compliance mandates, today’s one foremost exigency is the need
to implement a scalable solution that not only satisfies but also allows for
future growth. Traditional RFID inventory management solutions are ex-
pensive for large amount of items, in the sense that they require self-server
maintenance and significant IT intervention.
Moreover in some applications, multiple read points may be required to
track the products throughout the workplace. In conventional systems, mul-
tiple number of databases can be established which cause several operational
problems such that synchronization of the databases, expensive system, diffi-
cult and separate management. To realize the benefits of RFID, retailers will
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need to upgrade their IT infrastructure in a number of areas, and their in-
terfaces with other business will have to be closer. The verification of tagged
items by RFID systems provides full traceability from sender (e.g. manufac-
turer) to receiver by maintaining a single database placed in a server. This
provides assurance that a product has been shipped and delivered. This is
where cloud computing may come in to provide flexibility to access to the
database and authenticate the tagged items/individuals. A cloud system
can be simply considered as a server farm that has great computational and
storage capacity. In fact, this can greatly reduce the start-up costs as well
as the drain that can be put on the IT staff for the RFID system mainte-
nance. Thanks to cloud computing, retailers will not need to upgrade their
IT infrastructure.
The real value and return on investment of RFID technology come from
how the information derived from RFID tags and systems is applied to en-
terprise applications that control core business processes (inventory manage-
ment, supply chain management, warehouse tracking, and location control
applications). An RFID system using cloud service as a back-end database
and computational capacity is strongly relevant when there is multiple facility
providers (such as library, sport center, museum etc.) which are connected
to an executive enterprise. In addition, centralizing the above RFID applica-
tions and integrating them with an executive systems will require a new level
of systems integration capabilities. Figure 8.1 depicts an illustration of such a
scenario, where each facility provider is connected to an executive enterprise
through a cloud service. Using a unified cloud database empowers a single
authentication system to more effectively manage pricing, events, reduces
inventory losses, expands service offerings, and provides entire RFID infras-
tructures using a single system. The cloud paradigm provides the ability to
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offer a single card to each user to get service from multiple applications.
Besides the usability and availability of cloud computing, the main ques-
tion is to understand and manage the public concern such as the confiden-
tiality and privacy issues. Therefore some skeptic questions may arise. Can
we provide the confidentiality and privacy of the user’s data in the public
cloud domain? Can we maintain an authentication mechanism by using a
remote cloud service like in our private database?
In RFID literature some protocols require exhaustive search on private
identity [6,117] or asymmetric calculation [118–124] in order to have a strong
authentication mechanism. For large systems, these strong private protocols
may result in the need of heavy and expensive servers that have fast compu-
tational capacity or large storage.
Motivated from the innovations offered by cloud computing, the primary
focus of this chapter is to propose a security and privacy model for the ex-
isting RFID systems melded with the cloud computing paradigm in order
to improve the scalability, to boost the performance and to maintain the
security and privacy of whole systems. We first define the system procedures
for our new model. Contrary to the previous models [18–25,27], we have an
additional oracle that an adversary can query the cloud system. Then, the
adversary classes are described and we give our security and privacy defini-
tion. Moreover, in order to illustrate our model, we propose two different
RFID authentication protocols as case studies. We prove that the first pro-
posal is destructive private and the second proposal is narrow-strong private
according to our model. Both protocols are used to authenticate tags with-
out violating privacy of the tag owner against the cloud owner but the tag
related data are stored in the cloud in a encrypted form. Therefore, we finally
present an efficient private information retrieval mechanism based on single
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keyword search in order to retrieve tag related data from the cloud without
violating the tag anonymity against the cloud. In this search protocol, we use
only hash functions and Bloom filter in order to privately retrieve tag data.
We prove that our search scheme satisfies data, query, and result pattern
privacy.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 8.1, we give
the problem statement and motivation behind this study. In Section 8.2,
we introduce our novel privacy model which introduces system procedures,
adversary oracles and adversary capabilities. Then we describe the security
and privacy definitions with respect to the adversary classes. In Section 8.3,
we propose a privacy preserving RFID authentication protocol which works
with a cloud service and give its security and privacy analysis. In Section 8.4,
we propose a more secure privacy-preserved authentication protocol and give
its security and privacy analysis. Section 8.5 gives our private single-keyword
search protocol and presents its security and privacy analysis. Finally we
conclude the chapter in Section 8.6.
The results presented in Chapter 8 have been published in [36] and sub-
mitted to [37].
8.1 Problem Statement and Motivation
In this section, we illustrate how cloud computing can be utilized in an RFID
authentication system as a cost effective computation and storage services.
This illustration helps us to examine the restrictions of the technology, the
capabilities of adversaries and the challenging issues in RFID application
development and deployments.
Let us describe the scenario for the system depicted in Figure 8.1. Assume
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Figure 8.1: The scenario of cloud based RFID system
that we have an enterprise company that provides several social facilities
(such as library, museum, sport center, etc.) that are physically placed in
different areas. All the facility providers and the enterprise are connected to
the cloud service via Internet. Each facility has its own access control based
on the RFID system which is connected to the cloud computing. In order to
benefit from some of these facilities, the clients first buy a membership from
the enterprise. The enterprise company delivers an RFID membership card
to its clients. Then, with the help of an RFID card, a client could use any
of these facilities to authenticate itself to the centralized services.
In this scenario, all the clients’ information (such as name, birthday,
photo, biometric data etc.) are stored in the database of the cloud in an
encrypted form. Whenever a legitimate client wants to access a facility, the
facility provider will certainly identify and authenticate the person with the
help of the cloud service. If the authentication protocol used between a user
card and a valid reader in the facility does not consider privacy of the clients,
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the cloud owner could profile and trace the user. However, for privacy of card
owner the cloud should not be able distinguish transactions comes from the
readers in the facilities.
Besides, after the facility provider authenticates a card, it may need the
card related information such as its owner’s private information. These in-
formation are stored in the cloud’s database. Whenever the facility provider
requests a card’s information from the cloud, the privacy of the card owner is
violated if the cloud is able to distinguish the request. In order to handle this
issue, a Private Information Retrieval Protocol (PIR) should be run between
the facility provider and the cloud service in order for retrieving tag data
from the cloud while hiding the identity of the tag being retrieved.
The design of a secure privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocols
rely on an accurate security and privacy analysis. In the literature, several
models have been proposed to formalize security and privacy in the context
of RFID system; however, none of them considers this scenario.
8.2 Our Privacy Model
Our privacy model borrows and extends the concepts from previous mod-
els [18,22]. Contrary to [22], we consider an RFID system consists of a cloud
service, multiple tags, multiple readers where a tag and a reader carry out
an identification protocol with the help of the cloud service. Each tag stores
a state, the cloud keeps a database of all valid tags. Namely, the cloud is
the central back-end server which is connected to multiple readers. A reader
authenticates tags with the help of the cloud. Adversaries are allowed to
interact with all tags and readers and the cloud. Our model is similar to the
classical RFID model with many tags, many readers and a back-end server.
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The main difference between our model and the classical model is that in
our model the privacy of tag owner against the back-end server’s owner is
also taken into account. Moreover, the tag related information such as tag
owner’s information, photos, etc, are stored only in the database of the cloud
but not in the reader. This information is stored in an encrypted form and
the cloud cannot decrypt this.
In our model, we do not consider the physical characteristics of the radio
links, which are studied in [125]. For privacy, we consider only the content of
the exchanged messages between tags, readers, and the cloud. In this section,
we first present the system procedures and the oracles that an adversary can
query. Then, the adversary classes are described. Finally, we define our
security and privacy definitions.
8.2.1 System Procedure
Throughout the chapter we use similar the oracle definitions introduced in
[18,126]. An RFID scheme is defined with the following procedures.
• SetupCloud(1ℓ) : This algorithm first produces a public-private key
pair (KCP , KCS) for cloud service where ℓ is the security parameter,
then initializes its database DB.
• SetupReader(1ℓ) : This algorithm produces a public-private key pair
(KRP , KRS) for reader where ℓ is the security parameter, then stores
its secrets in its non-volatile memory.
• SetupTagKP (ID): This algorithm generates a tag secret K and the
initial state S of a tag with identifier ID. If this tag is legitimate, the
pair (ID,K) is inserted into the database.
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• Ident: An interaction protocol between a tag and the reader to com-
plete the authentication transcript.
Experiment ExpbS,A[k,P ]:
1. Training phase
• A may perform any number of oracles, limited by its class
P .
2. Challenge phase
• C initializes the system, chooses a random bit b, and Se-
tupReader(1k) and sends S’s public parameters to A.
• A interacts with the whole system, limited by its class P .
• A outputs a guess bit b′.
ExpbS,A is successful if b
?
= b′.
Figure 8.2: Experiment for privacy of Hermans et al.
8.2.2 Adversary Oracles
Privacy is defined as a distinguish-ability game (or experiment Exp) between
a challenger and an adversary. This game is defined as follows. First of all,
the challenger picks a random challenge bit b and then sets up the system
S with a security parameter k. Next, the adversary A can interact with the
RFID system by the help of following generic oracles. First of all, A creates
a new tag of identifier IDT . Then, A interacts with following two collections
of oracles.
Definition 21. (Adversary Oracles-I)
• Launch()→ π : It makes the reader R start a new Ident protocol
transcript π.
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• CreateTag(IDT ) : It creates a free tag T with a unique identifier
IDT by using SetupTagKCP . It also inserts T into DB.
• DrawTagb(Ti, Tj) → vtag: on input a pair of tag references, this
oracle generates a virtual tag reference, as a monotonic counter, vtag
and stores the triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) in a table D. Depending on the value
of b, vtag either refers to Ti or Tj. If Ti is already references as the left-
side tag in D or Tj as the right-side tag, then this oracle also returns
⊥ and adds no entry to D. Otherwise, it returns vtag.
• SendReader(m,π)→ m′: This sends the message m to the reader R
in the protocol transcript π and outputs the response m′.
• SendCloud(m,π)→ m′: This sends the message m to the cloud C in
the protocol transcript π and outputs the response m′.
• SendTag(m, vtag)b → m′: on input vtag, this oracle retrieves the
triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) from the table D and sends the message m to either
Ti (if b = 0) or Tj (if b = 1). It returns the reply from the tag (m′). If
the above triple is not found in D, it returns ⊥.
• Free(vtag)b : on input vtag, this oracle retrieves the triple (vtag, Ti, Tj)
from the table D. If b = 0, it resets the tag Ti. Otherwise, it resets the
tag Tj . Then it removes the entry (vtag, Ti, Tj) from D. When a tag
is reset, its volatile memory is erased. The non-volatile memory, which
contains the state S, is preserved.
• Corrupt(Ti)→ S : It returns volatile and non-volatile memory of the
tag Ti.
• Result(π)→ x : When π completes, returns x = 1 if the tag is iden-
tified, x = 0 otherwise.
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In our model, we also define two another oracles as follows.
Definition 22. (Adversary Oracles-II)
• Corrupt(Ri)→ S : It returns volatile and non-volatile memory of the
reader Ri.
• Corrupt(Cloud)→ S : It returns volatile and non-volatile memory
of the cloud.
The advantage of the adversary AdvS,A(k) is defined as:
∣∣Pr [Exp0S,A(k) = 1]− Pr [Exp1S,A(k) = 1]∣∣ .
8.2.3 Privacy Classes
Contrary to previous models proposed in the literature, we consider two
types of adversaries such as insider and outsider adversaries. The cloud is
expected to be the insider adversary who runs the protocol between a legiti-
mate reader and itself correctly, but might save the messages to distinguish
the tags. Namely, the cloud is honest but curious during its protocol runs.
However, for the outsider adversaries, similar to Vaudenay privacy class [18],
we introduce four privacy classes of polynomial-time bounded adversaries,
determined by A’s access to Result or Corrupt oracles. These classes are
formally defined as follows.
Definition 23. (Adversary Classes) An adversary A is a p.p.t. algorithm
which has arbitrary number of accesses to either the oracles described in Def-
inition 21 or the oracles described in Definition 22.
• Insider A cannot access to any oracles except Corrupt(Cloud) ora-
cle described in Definition 22.
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• Weak A uses only the oracles given in Definition 21 except Corrupt(Ti)
oracle.
• Destructive A uses only the oracles given in Definition 21 but cannot
use any oracle on a tag after using Corrupt(Ti).
• Strong A uses only the oracles given in Definition 21 without any
restrictions.
• Narrow A has no access to Result oracle.
• Wide: A has access to Result oracle.
Strong ⇒ Destructive ⇒ Weak Active Insider
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Narrow Strong ⇒ Narrow Destructive ⇒ Narrow Weak Passive Insider
Table 8.1: The adversary classes
Remark 12. In a real-life system, Insider adversary make sense when the
RFID system owner would like to outsource his/her services to a cloud. In
this attack, the cloud is able to access all the data and can analyze any in-
teractions with itself. Therefore, the system owner may want his/her system
to be secure against this attack.
According to the capability of the attacker Insider adversary could be
two types: passive and active.
Definition 24. (Passive Insider Adversary) A passive Insider adversary is
one who follows the protocol and does not modify any data but is curious to
get some information and may keep all the data and its intermediate compu-
tations. In case the adversary is the cloud owner then one may call the cloud
owner as semi-honest party.
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Definition 25. (Active Insider Adversary) An active Insider adversary is
one who covers the passive adversary and can actively modify the local data
or internal computations. In case the adversary is the cloud owner then one
may call the cloud owner as malicious party.
We also define X+ and X∗ privacy notion variants, where X refers to the
basic privacy notion. + refers to the notion that arises when the adversary
has also access to Corrupt(R) oracle. But ∗ refers to the notion that arises
when the capabilities of the adversary are further restricted with respect
to Corrupt oracle. The restricted Corrupt oracle will only return the
non-volatile state of the corrupted party (tag, reader or the cloud) but not
the volatile memory state. With this restriction, we exclude trivial privacy
attacks on multi-pass protocols in which the tags are required to store some
information in volatile memory during the session of the protocols.
8.2.4 Notion of Security and Privacy
Definition 26. (Correctness) An RFID scheme is correct if the identification
of a legitimate tag only fails with negligible probability with respect to system’s
security parameter.
Definition 27. (Tag Authentication) An RFID system achieves tag authen-
tication if for every strong adversary and for every tag in the system, the
probability of attacker’s impersonating any tag is at most negligible. The ad-
versary may interact with the tag they want to impersonate. The adversary
can corrupt all tags but not the impersonated tag.
Definition 28. (Privacy [22]). A privacy preserving protocol, modeled by an
RFID system S, is said to computationally provide privacy notion X, provided
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that for all polynomially bounded adversaries A, it holds that AdvXS,A(k) ≤ ǫ,
for negligible ǫ.
8.3 The First Authentication Protocol
Our first case study protocol is based on low-cost symmetric primitives such
as Physically unclonable functions and hash functions. We treat hash func-
tions as random oracles. Namely, the function H responds to every query
with a truly random response chosen uniformly from {0, 1}α. The function
always gives the same response for a given input word. Moreover, our first
protocol also uses PUF function described Definition 14. In our proposal,
the PUF function has the following mapping: P:{0, 1}α → {0, 1}α.
8.3.1 The Protocol
In this section, we first give a brief explanation about how to distribute the
secrets for each party in the RFID system. Then we present the steps of the
authentication protocol.
Let I be a trusted issuer who sets up the system parameters and the
secrets of each party. I first selects a random master secret S ∈R {0, 1}α and
creates a counter ctr which is initially set to zero. The cloud stores the master
secret S and the counter ctr. Integration of a reader into system is very simple
by just sending a triple (IDR, SR = H(S, IDR, ctr), ctr) to the reader via a
secure channel. I defines a group size (say l) and creates a counter g which
specifies the order of the group a tag belongs to. During the registration
of a tag Ti, I first selects a random unique IDi ∈R {0, 1}α, and a random
challenge Gi and computes the masked master secret MSi ← S⊕Pi(Gi) and
specifies the order of the tag gi and set its counter ctri ← 0. Ti stores the
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values (MSi, IDi, Gi, gi, ctri).
The protocol steps are depicted in Figure 8.3. When a reader (e.g. NFC)
R is connected to the cloud, the cloud sends a triple SR ← H(S, IDR, ctr),
IDR ∈R {0, 1}α and ctr to the reader via secure channel. When a tag T
comes in the range of the reader, the reader first chooses a random number
a ∈R {0, 1}α and sends the triple (a, IDR, ctr) to T . Then, T first gener-
ates four random nonce mt1 ←R {0, 1}α, mt2 ←R {0, 1}α, mt3 ←R {0, 1}α,
b ←R {0, 1}α. T evaluates the PUF Pi with Gi and XOR it with MSi to
recover master key S ← Pi(Gi) ⊕MSi. Then, T computes the session se-
cret Kg ← H(H(S, IDR, ctr), gi). Then, T computes m1 ← H(Kg, a, b, 1),
m2 ← H(Kg, a, b, 2) ⊕ IDi,m3 ← H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 1). T checks whether ctr
is greater or equal to its counter ctri. If ctr < ctri, T sets mi ← mti for
i = 1, 2, 3. T finally sends (b,m1,m2,m3) to the reader. T deletes S from
memory. Upon receiving m1, m2, m3 and b, for all possible value of g, R
computes m′1 ← H(H(SR, g), a, b, 1) to find a match m′1 ?= m1. If a match
is found, then R derives ID′i ← H(H(SR, g), a, b, 2) ⊕ m2. T also checks
whether the integrity of ID′i is protected by simply checking the equality of
m3
?
= H(K ′g, ID′i, a, b, 1). Now, If every steps are on the right line, R authen-
ticates T . R finally calculates m4 ← H(K ′g, ID′i, a, b, 2) and sends it to T . T
checks whether both conditions hold ctr > ctri and H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 2) ?= m4.
If these conditions hold, then T updates its counter ctri ← ctr. Finally,
T deletes Kg from the memory. The last messages sent by the NFC is for
updating counter in case of the fact that a facility is closed down.
Remark 13. Note that whenever a strong adversary tries to apply a physical
attack on a target tag, she cannot reach either the valid secret Kg or the valid
master secret S. In order to achieve a micro-probing attack on the tag, she
should first make a hole on the coating by using Focused Ion Beam. In this
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Tag NFC Cloud DB
Gi,MSi, ctri, IDi, gi SR, IDR, ctr S, ctr
a←R {0, 1}α
mtj ←R {0, 1}α for j = 1, 2, 3 a, ctr, IDR←−−−−−−−−−−−− Secure Channel
b ∈R {0, 1}α SR, IDR, ctr←−−−−−−−−−−−−
S ← Pi(Gi)⊕MSi
Kg ← H(H(S, IDR, ctr), gi)
m1 ← H(Kg, a, b, 1)
m2 ← H(Kg, a, b, 2)⊕ IDi
m3 ← H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 1)
If ctri > ctr
mj ← mtj for j = 1, 2, 3
delete S
m1, m2, m3, b−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If ∃(SR, g) s.t
K ′g ← H(SR, g) and
m1
?
= H(K ′g, a, b, 1) then
ID′i ← H(K ′g, a, b, 2)⊕m2
IfH(K ′g, ID′i, a, b, 1) 6= m3
m4 ←R {0, 1}α
else
If m4
?
= H(Kg, IDi, a, b, 2) and ctri < ctr m4←−−−−−−−−−− m4 ← H(K ′g, ID′i, a, b, 2)
ctri ← ctr
deleteKg
Figure 8.3: A destructive private authentication protocol+∗
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case, the structure of the PUF most probably gets a damage that the response
of the PUF would be very high level noisy and the PUF control will detect
such level of noise and destroys the PUF. The response will not be valid and
the master secret S and the session key Kg will not be computed correctly.
Remark 14. When a reader is compromised or a facility closed down, the
cloud increments its counter ctr = ctr + 1. Then, for each existing NFC R,
the cloud computes SR = H(S, IDR, ctr) and sends the triples (SR, IDR, ctr)
to the reader.
After the reader authenticating the tag, the reader will run a Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol which is explained in Section 8.5.
8.3.2 The Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we provide the security and privacy analysis of the protocol
depicted at Figure 8.3.
Remark 15. Throughout this section, one can assume that there is one
reader and many tags in the system. There is no loss in the generality with
this assumption. To see that, for fixed a and b values, different IDR val-
ues produce different Kg values. However, all these Kg values have same
randomness (they are indifferent) in the view of the adversary. Thus, the
adversary cannot distinguish whether only one or more readers are used in
the system. Hence, one NFC is enough for the analysis. Moreover, we use a
slightly enhanced version of CreateTag oracle in the proof of the privacy
by adding extra parameter to the function which specifies the group of the tag.
Theorem 22. The proposed protocol depicted in Figure 8.3 satisfies tag au-
thentication against destructive adversary.
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Proof. The proof is pretty trivial. Note that the adversary cannot get the
values of either Kg or S regardless of how many tags she is allowed to use or
corrupt. Moreover, by Definition 27 the adversary is not allowed to corrupt
the target tag. It is a so low probability that the adversary get the ID of the
target tag. Even if this event is realized, the adversary’s producing correctm3
value is at most negligible since reader sends the challenge values a randomly.
Thus, the system satisfies tag authentication.
Theorem 23. The proposed protocol depicted in Figure 8.3 satisfies destruc-
tive privacy.
Proof. The only way for adversary to destroy the privacy is to choose right
tags from the same group and left tags from different groups and to ex-
pect having the same response to a specified challenge value. First of all,
the adversary creates two tags by calling T1 =CreateTag(ID1, 0) and
T2 =CreateTag(ID1, 1) oracles. Then she applies vtag1 =DrawTag(T1, T2)
and uses SendTag(a, ctr, IDR, vtag1) for l times and stores the answers
mi11 ,m
i
21 ,m
i
31 , b
i
1 where i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Similarly, the adversary creates an-
other two tags by calling T3 =CreateTag(ID3, 0) and T4 =CreateTag(ID4, 2)
oracles. Then she applies vtag2 =DrawTag(T3, T4) and uses SendTag(a, ctr,
IDR, vtag2) for k times and stores the answer of the m
j
12 ,m
j
22 ,m
j
32 , b
j
2
where j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If bi01 = bj02 for some i0 and j0 but mi011 6= mj021
then the answer is the right tags. Otherwise the answer is the left tags. The
probability of having wrong result after these observations is negligible. Note
that the adversary does not need to create more tags as described above since
having more protocol runs with these two tag groups has the same effect of
creating new tags and having protocol rounds for the adversary. Therefore,
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with given parameters the success probability of the adversary is
1−
k−1∏
i=0
(1− l
2α − i).
Let P =
∏k−1
i=0 (1− l2α−i), then
ln(P ) =
k−1∑
i=0
ln(1− l
2α − i) ≈ −
k−1∑
i=0
l
2α − i >
(k − 1)l
2α
.
So,
1− P < 1− e (k−1)l2α .
Note that, the probability above is negligible as k, l are polynomially bounded
in α. Thus, the proposed protocol satisfies destructive privacy.
Theorem 24. The proposed protocol depicted in Figure 8.3 is resistant against
passive insider adversary according to Definition 24.
The correctness of the last theorem is obvious as the cloud does not even
know whether NFC has a protocol transaction with any tag at a specified
time. In this protocol, the role of the cloud is just initialize the reader for
ctr and IDR values.
8.3.3 The Protocol Enhancement
It is clearly seen that our protocol does not provide security against the ad-
versary who reaches the volatile memory of the tag as soon as the secret S
is constructed from the PUF evaluation. In [30], Kardas et al. proposed
an approach for splitting key into parts and each part can be constructed
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from the PUF evaluation. The authors also proved that the malicious ad-
versary cannot reach both parts of the secret. This makes their protocol
secure against the adversary who has access to volatile memory of the victim
tag. Therefore, when we use the same approach for constructing the secrets
digested in hash, our protocol satisfies destructive privacy.
8.4 The Second Authentication Protocol
Our second proposed protocol is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
and we work on the additive property of ECC.
8.4.1 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we first give a brief explanation about how to set up the
secrets for each party in the RFID system, then we present the identification
protocol.
Let I be the trusted issuer which sets up the system parameters and
the secrets of each party. I first constructs the elliptic curve and selects a
generator P . Then I generates a random private key y for the cloud and
computes the corresponding public key Y = yP . I also generates a random
unique private key n for each NFC and computes the corresponding public
key N = nP . For each tag, I selects a random unique identifier id and also
computes the ECDSA signature pair (r, s) on the IDx = xcoord(idP ). Note
that, the secrets of the tag are id, r, s, the secret of reader is n, the secret of
the cloud is y. On the other hand, the public values of the tag are Y, P , the
public values of the reader and the cloud are N, Y, P . Moreover, tag related
other information are stored on one or more independent clouds.
In our proposal, the cloud can distinguish whenever a NFC reader is cor-
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Tag NFC Cloud DB
id, r, s, Y, P n, N, Y, P y, Y, N, P
r1 ∈R Z∗ℓ
r2 ∈R Z∗ℓ R1←−−−−−−−− R1 ← r1P
R2 ← r2P
d1 ← xcoord(r2R1)
d2 ← xcoord(r2Y )
m1 = id+ r2 +H(d1, d2, 1)
m2 = r +H(d1, d2, 2) Secure Channel
m3 = s +H(d1, d2, 3) R2,m1,m2,m3−−−−−−−−−−−−→ R2−−−−−−−→ if R2 isOnCurve
D2 ← y(R2 +N)
else
D2←−−−−−−− D2 ← random
d1 ← xcoord(r1R2)
d2 ← xcoord(D2 − nY )
IDx ← xcoord((m1 −H(d1, d2, 1))P −R2)
r ← m2 −H(d1, d2, 2)
s← m3 −H(d1, d2, 3)
Check Validity (IDx, r, s)
Figure 8.4: A narrow strong private authentication protocol+∗
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rupted or simulated and disallow any interactions from the corrupted reader.
Moreover, the cloud server and NFC have some sort of authentication mech-
anism such that the transactions between NFC and the cloud is not observed
by the adversary (It can be thought that NFC and the cloud server have
secure channel like SSL/TLS connection).
An overview of the proposed protocol is given in Figure 8.4. First of all,
the reader R generates a random number r1 which is used for soundness
and ensuring privacy. R computes a point on the elliptic curve with r1
(R1 = r1P ), then R sends it to tag T . T verifies that R1 = O, the point at
infinity and chooses a random number r2 and calculates R2 = r2P . Then, T
computes d1 = xcoord(r2R1), d2 = xcoord(r2Y ), m1 = id+ r2 +H(d1, d2, 1),
m2 = r + H(d1, d2, 2), and m3 = s + H(d1, d2, 3) and sends R2,m1,m2,m3
to the reader. The reader sends R2 to the cloud and the cloud computes
D2 = y(R2 + N) and sends to the reader. After that R computes d1 =
xcoord(r1R2), d2 = xcoord(D2 − nY ), IDx = xcoord((m1 −H(d1, d2, 1))P −
R2),r = m2 − H(d1, d2, 2) and s = m3 − H(d1, d2, 2). Finally, the reader
checks whether the signature pair (r, s) is the valid signature on IDx by
using ECDSA verification algorithm.
Remark 16. Any *-adversary(weak∗ , destructive∗ or strong∗) can never
see the cloud server’s replies for queried R2 values. The reason for this claim
is, if the adversary does not corrupt the reader, then since NFC and the
cloud server have secure channel, the adversary can not observe D2 values.
Moreover, if the adversary corrupts the reader, then due to the detection
argument, the cloud server does not return any reply to the adversary.
Similar to the protocol in Section8.3, after the reader verifying the signa-
ture pair (r, s) on IDx for the tag, the reader will run a PIR protocol with
the cloud, which is explained in Section 8.5., in order to get the tag related
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information.
8.4.2 The Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we are going to provide the security and privacy analysis of
the protocol depicted in Figure 4.
Theorem 25. The proposed protocol is correct according to Definition 26
Proof. Let T be a valid tag with the identifiers id, r, s, Y and let reader sends
R1 and the tag produces r2 as a nonce at a protocol run. The correctness of
the protocol can be shown by following arguments.
d1 = xcoord(r2R1) = xcoord(r1R2) = d1
d2 = xcoord(D2 − nY ) = xcoord(yR2 + yN − nY )
= xcoord(r2Y ) = d2
IDx = xcoord((m1 −H(d1, d2, 1))P −R2
= xcoord((id+ r2)P −R2) = xcoord(idP )
r = m2H(d1, d2, 2) = r +H(d1, d2, 2)
−H(d1, d2, 2) = r
s = m3H(d1, d2, 3) = r +H(d1, d2, 3)
−H(d1, d2, 3) = s.
Thus, if a tag is valid, then after a successful protocol run, reader successfully
authenticates the tag.
Theorem 26. Let A be a strong adversary+. Then, A cannot steal the all
secret values of a tag, id, r, s, if the tag remains uncorrupted.
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Proof. Since the secrets of NFCs are not used in tag side calculations, with-
out loss of generality we can assume that there is only one NFC in the system.
This assumption does not result in loss of the generality as one can regain
the advantage loss due to having one NFC for analysis by running more
protocols on the NFC to be used for analysis. Let us fix a tag T and let
W = {T0, T1, . . . , Tk} be the set of other tags in the system where k is poly-
nomially bounded in l, where l is the security parameter. Let the adversary
does not apply the Corrupt oracle to T and she tries to figure out the se-
crets of this tag. However, the adversary can apply any number of Corrupt
oracle to tags in set W . First, may be the most remarkable observation is
the adversary does not need to deal with tags in the set W to gain secrets
of the target tag since the tag related secrets are not relevant to other tags’
secrets in a deterministic way and if the adversary applies some oracle in the
set W , the only useful information for her to get some (r1, R1) and (r2, R2)
pairs. However, the adversary can get the same amount of information by
preparing more (r1, R1) and (r2, R2) pairs beforehand or having more proto-
col run between the tag and the NFC. Therefore, tag authentication of target
tag is not related to the number of tags in the system, but it is related to
the number of pairs she prepares beforehand and protocol transactions she
can observe or commit with the target tag.
Note that, if the adversary applies Corrupt oracle on the reader, the ad-
versary may get the values of d1, d2, IDx, r and s. However, knowledge of
the value of these parameters is not enough for adversary to figure out the
value of id. To get the value of id, the adversary has to figure out the value of
the chosen r2 value at least one protocol transaction. Therefore, the adver-
sary creates a (r2, R2) pairs before starting the attack. Then, the adversary
uses SendReader(π) oracle for b times to initiate protocol run between the
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NFC and the target tag, where a and b are polynomially bounded in l. Note
that, the adversary does not need to know the value of r1, that is why she
does not use SendTag(R1) command for precomputed r1 values. Therefore,
the probability for the adversary to get the value of r2 at least one protocol
transaction is less than
(1− a
#E − b)
b ≈ e −ba#E−b ,
where #E represents the order of the point P (as P generator of the curve,
then #E represents the number of the points on the curve). Since the values
a and b are polynomially bounded in l, then the probability is negligible.
Corollary 3. The proposed protocol depicted in Figure 8.4 satisfies tag au-
thentication against strong adversary+.
Proof. This corollary is direct consequence of Theorem 26.
Lemma 5. Let A be a strong adversary+∗. Then, A can not get the value
of D2 at any protocol transaction. Moreover, the adversary can never figure
out the cloud secret y.
Proof. Remark 16 states the first fact that the adversary can never see the
cloud server’s replies for queried R2 values. This deduction directly implies
that the adversary can not get the value of y. However, even if the adversary
receives some legitimate (R2, D2) pairs, then the adversary has polynomially
bounded number of discrete logarithm problem for the elliptic curve under
the assumption that she has the knowledge of the value of N . However
by Definition 4 and Remark 1, it is infeasible for the adversary to solve this
problem. Thus, the adversary gets the secret of the cloud only with negligible
probability.
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Theorem 27. The proposed protocol depicted in Figure 8.4 satisfies narrow-
strong∗ privacy.
Proof. Let l be a security parameter. Since the secrets of NFCs are not used
in tag side calculations, without loss of generality we can assume that there
is only one NFC in the system. This assumption does not result in loss of
the generality as one can regain the advantage loss due to having one NFC
for analysis by running more protocols on the NFC to be used for analysis.
Let An be a narrow-strong adversary
∗. Firstly, let the adversary applies
Corrupt oracle on the reader and get the values of n,N, Y, P . Since the
secrets of the reader in non-volatile memory does not change protocol run to
protocol run, it is enough for the adversary apply this oracle to the reader
only once.
Let An call CreateTag oracle two times and creates the tags T0, T1.
Then, let the adversary call the DrawTag oracle to have vtag1, which refers
either T0 or T1 and applies the Corrupt oracle for both tags to learn the
secrets in these tags’ non-volatile memory. Note that, it is enough for the
adversary to apply Corrupt oracle only once per tag as their secrets in the
non-volatile memories do not change protocol run to protocol run.
Note that, the adversary has to learn the values of d1 and d2 in at least one
protocol transaction to learn id, r and s values to figure out vtag1 represents
which tag. By Lemma 5, the adversary can not learn the cloud’s secret. Thus,
she has to figure out the value of r2 value at least one protocol transaction (In
this way, the adversary can calculate the value of D2 and then the value of
d2). Therefore, let the adversary create a (r2, R2) pairs before applying other
oracles. After that, the adversary only applies SendTag(vtag1, R1) oracle
for a fixed point R1 on the curve for p1 times, where p1 is polynomially
bounded in l. The reason for the adversary only applying one oracle is that
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different R1 values has no effect at destroying privacy and applying oracles
on reader does not give any advantage to the adversary. Then, the advantage
of the adversary to destroy the privacy is bounded above by
1− (1− a
#E − p1 )
p1 ≈ 1− e
−p1a
#E−p1 .
since, p1 is polynomially bounded in l, the probability stated above is negli-
gible. Thus, creating just two tags is not enough for the adversary.
Now, let the adversary creates two more tags T2, T3 and applies DrawTag
oracle to get vtag2. Similarly, the adversary only uses SendTag(vtag1, R1)
oracle for the same R1 point for p2 times, where p2 is polynomially bounded
in l. In this case, the analysis of the adversary’s advantage to destroy the
privacy for just these two tags T2 and T3 is similar to the analysis of the
adversary’s advantage to destroy the privacy for tags T0 and T1. However,
the adversary has more tools. If one of the R2 value returned from vtag2 is
equals one of the R2 value returned from vtag1, then adversary also breaks
the privacy. Thus, the total advantage of the adversary is less than
2− (1− a
#E − (p1 + p2))
p1+p2 + (1− p1
#E
)p2
≈ 2− e
−(p1+p2)a
#E−(p1+p2) − e−(p1p2)#E .
For the sake of generalization, let the adversary create 2k − 4 more tags
and as a total has k vtag reference and let she follows the same steps as
described above paragraphs of this proof. Let M = p1 + . . . + pk and T =
172
max{p1, . . . , pk} , then the total advantage of the adversary is less than
(
k
2
)
+ 1− (1− a
#E − (M))
M +
(
k
2
)
(1− T
#E
)T
≈
(
k
2
)
+ 1− e −Ma#E−M − e−(T
2)
#E .
The probability above is negligible as a, M , T are polynomially bounded in
l. Thus, the proposed protocol satisfies narrow-strong∗ privacy.
Theorem 28. The proposed protocol depicted in Figure 8.4 is resistant against
passive insider adversary according to Definition 24.
Proof. According to Definition 23, the insider adversary AI is only allowed
to use Corrupt(Cloud), so she cannot learn tag related secrets and NFC
secrets. Therefore, in terms of insider adversary, the only privacy concern
is link-ability. Thus, we play the following game with the adversary. Let
there be two tag, T0 and T1, the oracle O chooses b ∈R {0, 1}, and the tag
Tb has p protocol transaction, after that the oracle chooses b
′ ∈R {0, 1} and
Tb′ has k protocol transaction. After that step, the adversary returns 1 if she
believes b == b′, and returns 0 otherwise. If her guess is correct, she destroys
the privacy, otherwise we conclude that the system satisfies privacy against
insider attacks.
Let before starting play the game, AI prepares S (r1, R1) pairs and H (r2, R2)
pairs. Then O chooses b ∈R {0, 1}, b′ ∈R {0, 1}, the oracle and the adversary
plays the game described above. Before returning the guess, the adversary
analyzes the followings: If any of R1 point or R2 point in these p transactions
is equal to the any of R1 or R2 points prepared before the game started by the
adversary, then she destroys the privacy, as in each transaction, she knows
the value of d2 and if the above condition satisfied, the she also learns d1 value
of an protocol ran. Thus, she learns the r and s secret of Tb, so she can link
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this tag’s transactions. If this is not the case, similar to the above approach,
if any of R1 point or R2 point in k transactions with Tb′ is equal to the any of
R1 or R2 points prepared before the game started by the adversary, then she
destroys the privacy. Moreover, if any of chosen R1 by NFC in k transactions
is equal to any of chosen R1 by NFC in p transactions, she again destroys
the privacy. If any of mentioned analysis does not work, the adversary flips
a coin, and returns her guess. Therefore, the advantage of the adversary is
bounded above by
1
2
+ 3− ((1− S
#E
)(1− H
#E
))p + ((1− S
#E
)(1− H
#E
))k
+ (1− p
#E
)k ≈ 1
2
+ 3− (e− pH+S#E + e− kH+S#E + e− kp#E ).
Since, S, H, p and k are polynomially bounded in l, then AI ’s advantage
to destroy the privacy is negligible. Hence, the system is resistant against
insider adversaries.
8.4.3 Performance Considerations
Our proposal requires only one-way hash functions, scalar-ECC point multi-
plications and the generation of a random number. In order to work on 80-bit
security level, the elliptic field size should be at least 160-bits. We can im-
plement our proposal in one of the recent ECC architectures [127,128]. The
architecture [127] for ECC coprocessor needs less than 15 kGE consumes 13,
8 µW of power and takes around 85 ms for one scalar-ECC point multiplica-
tion [127]. Wenger and Hutter [128] proposed an ECC coprocessor that only
needs 9 kGEs, consumes 32, 3µW of power and requires about 286 ms for one
scalar-EC point multiplication. For the implementation of hash functions, in
architecture of [129], we need 330 operation clocks for one hash function of
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160-bit data and 19.5 µW power consumption at 100 kHz operation clock.
8.5 Private Information Retrieval: Private Key-
word Search
In the previous sections, we proposed two identification and authentication
mechanisms. In these protocols, the readers are able to authenticate RFID
tags and gets their ID value. The readers do not store tag related information
such as the information about the tag owner but these data are stored in an
encrypted form in the database of the cloud. After authenticating a tag, the
reader needs to access the tag data with the help of the ID. During the
access, the cloud service should not be able to violate the privacy of the tag
owner. In other words, the query created by the reader should be randomized
and the result should not directly address ID value. Motivated by this
need, in this section, we first provide a related work for private information
retrieval. Then, we define the privacy definitions for single-keyword search
and finally propose a private and efficient keyword search based on symmetric
cryptography and Bloom filter.
8.5.1 Related work
Several scientific studies have been done on private information retrieval
(PIR) since the PIR problem was first formulated in [130]. PIR problem
is formulated as follows. The database with n-bit string x where the user,
holding some retrieval index i, wishes to learn the ith data bit xi. The trivial
solution of the PIR is sending the whole database from the cloud to the user
and this solution provides perfect privacy. However, in practice the size of
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the database could be very large and the solution is not reasonable. Chor et
al. proved that any perfectly private trivial PIR solution has a communica-
tion with lower bound greater than or equal to the database size [130]. There
are two approaches in order to thwart this issue. In the first approach, the
database is replicated at k number of servers that can communicate only with
the user not among themselves. The servers could learn no information about
the index of the retrieved item regardless of its computational power. The
PIR with this setting is called information-theoretic PIR. In these schemes,
The user constructs the queries in a such way that they give no information
to the servers about the user’s interest. However, using the results from the
queries, the user can construct the desired record. This approach can also be
extended that when up to t of the servers are allowed to cooperate against
the user. These kinds of theoretical PIR approaches have been extensively
researched [131–135]. The second approach is the computational PIR, which
relaxes the user’s privacy requirement to computational privacy, or adds the
requirement of database privacy that states that the user may learn a sin-
gle data item but nothing else. Chor and Gilboa in [136] first proposed a
multi-server computational PIR scheme which based on one-way function.
Following this work, several more efficient computational protocols, based
on various hardness assumptions, were constructed [137–142].
8.5.2 The Privacy Model for Private Search
The common privacy definition for search mechanisms in private search is
that the cloud learn nothing but only views search results. We establish
a set of privacy requirements over this privacy definition for single private
keyword search protocol. Tag related information stored in the cloud should
not give any advantage to the cloud because of the data privacy. The data
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privacy definition is given as follows.
Definition 29. Data privacy. A single keyword-search protocol achieves
data privacy if for all polynomially bounded adversary, given the retrieved
encrypted data, learns no information about the data.
As soon as tag owner enters a facility and the tags is identified and au-
thenticated by the reader of the facility. When the reader needs to retrieve
tag data from the cloud, it will generates a query. If the cloud can distinguish
a query from others, the privacy of the tag owner would be violated. The
query privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 30. Query Privacy. A single keyword-search protocol achieves
query privacy if for all polynomially bounded adversary, given the queries,
learns no information about on which data (i.e. tag) the query is applied.
On the other hand, the cloud observes the queries and the result set of
the queries. These information may give some advantage to the cloud for
identifying which tags is queried. The definition of the result pattern privacy
is given as follows.
Definition 31. Result Pattern privacy. A single keyword-search proto-
col achieves result pattern privacy if for all polynomially bounded adversary,
given queries and the retrieved a set of encrypted data, learns no information
about on which data (i.e. tag) the query is applied.
8.5.3 Our Private Keyword Search
Our private keyword search system consists of four parties such as DB, DO,
CLD,R, where DB is a database, DO is the owner of the database, CLD is the
cloud service which provides storage and computation service, and R is the
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set of authorized readers which can query CLD. Our private search scheme
consist of building index, query generation, search and tag data retrieval
phases.
Let κ be the security parameter and ℓ be block size. Each tag has a unique
ID and their data is encrypted as follows. First of all, DO constructs the tag
key K from a cryptographic hash function (H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ), K =
H(ID). Then, DO encrypts the data with a secure symmetric encryption
algorithm, d′ = EncK(ID||data). The database DB is created by the a
variety number of blocks DB = {d1, . . . , dn} where n is the number of tags
in the system and each di consists of the encrypted tag data and an empty
Bloom filter, di = {d′i, BFi}.
8.5.3.1 Building Index
Our indexes use Bloom filter, which was first proposed in 1970 by Burton
H. Bloom [143]. Bloom filter is a memory efficient and probabilistic data
structure that represents a set of keywords. The Bloom filter is used for
testing whether an element is a member of a given set or not.
Let us explain how a Bloom filter (BF ) is created. Let BF = (b1, . . . , bm)
be an array of bits with length of m. Initially, all bits are set to zeroes.
Assume that k number of independent hash functions (h1, . . . , hk) are used
for the Bloom filter. Each hash function takes κ bits and output the value
between 1 and m. In order to add a tag ID into BF , k number of index
values (r1 = h1(ID), . . . , rk = hk(ID)) are derived from the hash functions.
For each value of i = 1, . . . , k, the bit with the offset ri on BF is set to one.
Now, in order to check whether a tag ID is membership of the BF , k
index values (r1 = h1(ID), . . . , rk = hk(ID)) are computed by the same
process above. Then, check for each value of i whether the bit with the offset
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ri on BF is zero. If at least one of the bits is zero then this implies that the
tag ID is not stored in the set. Note that when the element is already in the
set, the Bloom gives always the correct answer. However, it may give some
false answer when the element is actually not in the Bloom. The size of the
Bloom filter and the number of elements, which are added into Bloom filter
affects the probability of false positives. For a given false positive probability,
these parameters can be optimized. For the computing the probability and
optimizing parameters we refer to [143,144].
In our proposal, let p be defined as the false positive probability of a
Bloom and ℓ be the number of elements that are added into the Bloom. Then,
the size of Bloom mand the number of hashes k used for Bloom indexes are
optimized according to the value of p and ℓ. For each tag in the database,
DO first creates an empty Bloom filter and computes the encryption of the
tag data by d = EncK(ID||data) where K = H(ID). Then, DO computes
the set W = (H(ID, 1), . . . ,H(ID, ℓ)) adds each element in the set W into
the Bloom filter using the approach mentioned above. Note that the tag ID
values are kept secret against CLD.
8.5.3.2 Query Generation
As soon as a reader, R, authenticates a tag and R gets tag’s ID. R then
generates a query by computing k index values of ID1 = H(ID, 1) (r1 =
h1(ID1), . . . , rk = hk(ID1)) in order to retrieve the tag data from the cloud.
For each value of i = 1, . . . , k, the bit with the offset ri on the Bloom is set
to one. The result bit-string of the Bloom is assigned to a query. It is clearly
seen that this query is deterministic and can be distinguished from the other
queries and so this construction violates tag owner privacy. Therefore, in
order to hide search pattern against the cloud, we use a modified version of a
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randomization method similar to [145]. The randomization method of [145]
does not really provide query privacy because the authors stated that the
privacy is violated when the number of genuine keyword is known by the
adversary. However, all the keywords used in our query construction are
meaningful.
Before constructing a query, R randomly selects s number of elements
(w ∈R {1, . . . , ℓ}) and adds them into a set W . Note that the number of
selection can be done in the number of
(
ℓ
s
)
ways and when ℓ increases the
success probability of the distinguishing two queries would decrease. Then,
for each element w ∈ W , IDw = H(ID,w) is computed and IDw is added
into the Bloom filter. The final output of the Bloom is assigned into a result
query q(.) = BFi.
We highlight that when the ID values are known by the cloud, the cloud
can distinguish with high probability whether the queries (Bloom filters) are
generated from the same search term or not correctly. However, when the ID
values are kept secret against the cloud, the success probability is negligible.
8.5.3.3 Search
Upon receiving of a search query q(w), CLD scans DB for each di ∈ DB if BFi
contains all elements of q(w), then the encrypted tag data d′i is added into
the result set. Let p be the false positive probability and n be the number of
the tags in the database. Then, the expected size of the result set would be
np. The success probability of distinguishing two queries based on the result
set is 1/np. When n or p increases, the size of result set increases and the
probability increases.
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8.5.3.4 Tag Data Retrieval
Upon receiving of the result set, Result, R computes the encryption key
K = H(ID) where ID is the tag identifier. Then, it scans each tag data
d′j ∈ Result as follow. R first decrypts DecK(di) and then checks whether
the decryption starts with ID. If a match is found, it returns the tag data,
otherwise it continues with the remaining candidate tag data in the set.
8.5.4 Security Analysis
Theorem 29. The proposed protocol satisfies data privacy with non-negligible
probability according to Definition 29.
Proof. Note that, the theorem states that whether or not the adversary learns
the content of the data. Thus, it is independent of the query applied. Let the
adversary pre-calculate the hash values of some IDs which is polynomially
bounded in the security parameter κ and all the data in the database is
provided to the adversary, i.e. n data. The adversary does the following:
for each H(ID) that she has calculated, decrypts every data and compares
whether or not it starts with corresponding value of ID. Therefore in the
worst case (all data are encrypted with different keys and all precomputed
hash values are different), the probability that the adversary retrieves any
data value is less than
poly(κ)−1∑
i=0
k × n
2κ − i <
k × n× poly(κ)
2κ − poly(κ) ,
which is negligible as polynomial growth cannot compensate exponential
one. Therefore, the proposed protocol satisfies the data privacy with non-
negligible probability.
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Theorem 30. The proposed protocol satisfies query privacy with non-negligible
probability according to Definition 30.
Proof. Let a query for IDi0 is given to the adversary where i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then, let us provide another query which is for IDj0 where j0 ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let us calculate the expected number of t’s such that BFi[t] = BFj[t] = 1
for two different cases i0 = j0 and i0 6= j0. Note that
Case 1: (i = j) First of all, we have to calculate the expected number
of common random word is used in both query. The formula below gives the
desired result
c0 =
s∑
i=0
i
(
s
i
)(
ℓ−s
s−i
)
(
ℓ
s
) .
Thus, it is guaranteed that these arrays have c0k common 1’s. For the re-
maining slots, the expected number of common 1’s can be calculated the
formula given below
c1 =
(s−c0)k∑
i=0
i
(
(s−c0)k
i
)(
m−sk
(s−c0)k−i
)
(
m−c0k
(s−c0)k
) .
Therefore, expected number of common 1’s if i = j is c0k + c1.
Case 2: (i 6= j) For this case the expected number of t’s such that
BFi[t] = BFj[t] = 1 can be calculated the formulate given below
c2 =
sk∑
i=0
i
(
sk
i
)(
m−sk
sk−i
)
(
m
sk
) .
Therefore, the difference between the expected number of 1’s between two
cases is c = c0k + c1 − c2.
Note that, the size of Bloom filter has almost no effect on the value of c for
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small c0 values. The decrease or increase in the value of Bloom size decreases
or increases the value of c0+c1 and c2 almost in the same amount. Therefore,
we have to focus on decreasing the value of c0. This can be achieved in two
ways. We either decrease values of s or k or increase the value of ℓ. Note
that for any given α, one can choose the values of ℓ, s and k such that c < α.
Thus, thanks to suitable parameter selection, the proposed protocol satisfies
query privacy with non-negligible probability.
Corollary 4. The proposed protocol satisfies result pattern privacy with non-
negligible probability according to Definition 31
Proof. The previous theorem states that from given a pair of queries the
adversary can distinguish whether these two queries are applied for the same
tag or not with negligible probability. Additionally, if the result sets of the
queries are given to the adversary, the expected number of tag data in a
result set is np per query. By Theorem 8, it is known that from the results,
the adversary has only negligible advantage over tag information. Therefore,
the adversary can break the result pattern privacy with the sum of 1/np and
the probabilities of the previous two theorems.
8.5.5 Practical Setups for Single-Keyword Search
Let the security level of the query privacy be at least 80-bit. Then, let the
number of tags n in the system be 220 and let the probability of false positive
of a Bloom filter be 2−10. With these assumptions, we optimize that the
Bloom size m = 214 bits (2KB), the number of hashes used in the filter
k = 6. The number of elements that will be inserted into a Bloom filter is
ℓ = 1024 and the number of elements that would be added into the Bloom
of a query is s = 11. The query can be represented by at most s × k index
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values and each index can be represented by log2(m) = 14 bits, hence the
query size will be at most 11× 6× 14 (≈ 116Byte) instead of 2KB.
With ℓ and s, there will be
(
1024
11
) ≈ 284 number of variants. Given two
queries based on either the same ID value or different ID value, the expected
the number of common bits on their Bloom for the both cases is less than
0.8. Besides, given a query, distinguishing the correct result from the result
set is 1/(220 × 2−10) = 2−10.
8.6 The Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, we provide a new security and privacy model for RFID au-
thentication systems, which use cloud services to leverage the availability and
scalability. In this context, we first define the capabilities of the adversary
and give the definitions related to security and privacy. After that, we present
two RFID authentication protocols and provide the security analysis using
our new privacy model. We prove that the first proposal based on symmet-
ric cryptography and PUFs achieves destructive privacy whereas the second
proposal based on ECC is narrow-strong private. Finally, we introduce an
efficient private information retrieval between reader and the cloud. This
search mechanism is proven that it satisfies data, query and result pattern
privacy.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS
The rapid increase of deployment of RFID technology into our daily-life has
created new security and privacy challenges. The tags/labels, which are the
main components of the RFID systems, are ubiquitous elements and they can
easily be abused. In order to protect the security and privacy of the tag own-
ers, several cryptographic algorithms and protocols have been proposed in
the literature. However, not all cryptographic solutions can be applied to the
tags because of their chip area, time, power and energy constraints. There-
fore, lightweight cryptographic solutions are getting important to handle such
issues. Nevertheless, developing such lightweight cryptographic protocols is
also a very challenging task, because these tags are susceptible to tamper-
ing. Namely, the secrets used for authentication can be extracted from the
tags. On the other hand, while designing a privacy-preserving RFID authen-
tication protocol, the security and privacy goals should be should be proven
using a formal privacy model.
Motivated by these challenges, this dissertation addressed the security
and privacy issues in RFID systems from the cryptography and information
security points of view. The contributions of the thesis are summarized as
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follows.
In Chapter 3, Vaudenay’s privacy model is revisited and a privacy de-
ficiency is addressed. In order to cover this deficiency, we introduced two
new notions of adversary classes, k-strong adversary and k-forward adver-
sary. With these adversary classes, two new privacy classes are derived such
as k-strong privacy and k-forward privacy. Moreover, we study existing PUF
definitions and the assumption behind these definitions. In order to make
PUFs more robust and secure, we proposed a new extended PUF definition k-
PUFs, in which the PUFs are not destroyed up to k corruptions. These type
of PUFs are more realistic than prior proposals. To demonstrate our model,
we give two PUF based authentication protocols. The first one achieves the
strong privacy in Vaudenay’s model (∞-strong privacy in our model). The
second protocol satisfies both strong privacy and reader authentication.
In Chapter 4, we study security and privacy of oﬄine RFID systems and
introduce the notion of compromised reader attacks. In this context, we
present the notion of privacy+. In order to demonstrate our privacy model,
we propose an RFID mutual authentication protocol based on PUF functions.
We proved that the protocol satisfies destructive privacy for tag owner. This
is the first proposal in the literature that provides destructive privacy in case
of compromised reader for oﬄine model.
In Chapter 5, we first give a formal security and privacy analysis of a
recently published RFID authentication protocol [31]. Then, we introduced
a unilateral authentication protocol and proved that this protocol achieves
narrow strong privacy. We also proposed the enhanced version of our protocol
that satisfies both destructive privacy and reader authentication.
In Chapter 6, we studied RFID distance bounding protocols, briefly re-
viewed current challenge dependent protocols and introduced the notion of
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k-PCD protocols. We proved that when we increase the dependency param-
eter k, security level against mafia fraud attack and distance fraud attack
increases, as expected. We also proved the conjecture that the best trade-off
curve for k1-PCD protocols lies above the best trade-off curve for k2-PCD
protocols where k1 < k2. Finally, we gave a method of constructing secure
k-PCD protocols with only two registers.
In Chapter 7, we proposed two distance bounding protocols based on PUF
function for the first time in the literature. We showed that our first pro-
tocol achieves the security level of (3/4)n against mafia and distance frauds
and (3/4)n against terrorist fraud under the assumption that the tag is still
functional after an attack. The second protocol is the extension of the first
one by adding a final signature to enhance the security levels. We proved
that second protocol achieves the security level (1/2)n against for all mafia,
terrorist and distance frauds. To the best our knowledge, this is the first
protocol in the literature that achieves the ideal security level (1/2)n against
all frauds.
In Chapter 8, we provided a new security and privacy model for RFID au-
thentication systems that use cloud services to leverage the availability and
scalability. To do so, we first introduced the capabilities of the adversary
and gave the definitions related to security and privacy. Then, two RFID
authentication protocols were proposed. The first proposal is based on sym-
metric cryptography and PUF functions, and it achieves destructive privacy.
The second proposal is based on ECC and satisfies narrow-strong privacy.
Finally, we introduced an efficient private information retrieval mechanism
between reader and the cloud. This mechanism satisfies data, query and
result pattern privacy.
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